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This thesis examines the practice of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation is a form of reasoning used by 
parliamentarians to articulate the constitutional effect of a Bill, within the 
legislative process in Parliament. The significance of the practice is explored 
through a combination of empirical study and theoretical enquiry.  
 
The first part of the thesis describes and analyses parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation in three case studies, each on a different Government Bill from 
the 2010-2012 parliamentary session. Each study provides a fine-grained 
account of how parliamentarians interpreted the constitutional effect of each 
Bill and the role this interpretation played during the passage of the Bill. In 
order to identify the constitutional effect of a particular clause, 
parliamentarians interpret a range of constitutional norms including: 
constitutional principles, constitutional statutes and constitutional conventions. 
In each case study, parliamentary constitutional interpretation played an 
important role in shaping the constitutional effect of each Bill and holding the 
Government to account.  
 
The second part of the thesis uses the reality of the practice, as described in the 
case studies, to identify the value of parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
and to situate the practice within political constitutionalism. Two principal 
values of the practice are identified. Firstly, parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation can enhance the level of justification within the legislative 
process. Secondly, it can facilitate a distinctively parliamentary contribution to 
the normative content of the constitution. By expanding the role of legislative 
politics within the constitution, parliamentary constitutional interpretation can 
develop and strengthen the political model of constitutionalism. These values 
also serve as both a template for analysis of parliamentary performance and as 
a guide to parliamentary reform.  
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The aim of this thesis is to identify the value of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation in the United Kingdom. This aim translates into two principal 
research questions. Firstly, how do parliamentarians interpret the 
constitutional effect of Bills within the legislative process? Secondly, what 
is the value of this form of legislative reasoning? Constitutional 
interpretation is not a form of reasoning associated with either the United 
Kingdom’s constitution or Parliament. This thesis argues that constitutional 
interpretation currently plays a significant role in the law making process 
within Parliament, and has the potential to strengthen both the legislative 
process and the constitution. 
 
Parliament regularly considers pressing and complex constitutional 
questions as a result of the steady flow of Government Bills that have 
constitutional effect.1 A central premise of this thesis is that in order to 
determine and scrutinise the constitutional effect of a Bill, parliamentarians 
and parliamentary committees engage in constitutional interpretation. 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation arises in two principal scenarios. 
Firstly, a Bill can contain a clause that is considered to have a constitutional 
effect in the sense that it raises a point of constitutional principle, for 
                                                
1 The House of Lords of Select Committee on the Constitution uses slightly 
different terminology. The terms of reference state the committee is ‘to 
examine the constitutional implications of all public Bills coming before the 
House’; House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Reviewing 
the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working (HL 2001-02, 
11) para 1. 
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example: a broad Henry VIII power.2 Secondly, a Bill can contain what is 
considered to be a new constitutional norm, for example: five-year fixed 
parliamentary terms.3 In both scenarios, the legislative process presents an 
opportunity for parliamentarians and parliamentary committees to interpret 
constitutional norms. The first object of interpretation in both scenarios is 
the relevant clause, but in order to determine the constitutional effect of the 
clause in question, the interpreter will also have to interpret existing 
constitutional norms. Both of these interpretive practices make up the 
subject of this thesis.  
 
The thesis aims to develop awareness of the role of constitutional 
interpretation within the legislative process within Parliament. The 
Westminster model is widely regarded as resulting in executive domination 
of the legislature, but the emphasis on this aspect of the model can produce 
an over-simplified picture of legislative politics within Parliament. 4 
Parliament is rightly regarded as a ‘law-affecting’, rather than a ‘law-
making’ body.5 Parliamentary debate is not where the policy aims behind 
Acts of Parliament are decided. However, the institutional and political 
constraints upon Parliament do not prevent parliamentary scrutiny playing a 
significant role within the legislative process. In Parliamentary Scrutiny of 
Government Bills Griffith observed: 
                                                
2 See Chapter 3.  
3 See Chapter 5. 
4 Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy (Collins 1978) 9-11; See also 
A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press 1999).  
5 P Norton, Parliament in British Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 3.  
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That Parliament makes an impact on the legislative proposals of 
Governments is undeniable. That Governments, with their 
majorities, will at the end of the day almost always have much the 
greater part of what they want is common knowledge. But the 
language which is used to describe the more or less of the impact is 
imprecise.6 
Part of the problem is that scholars of law and politics have been slow to 
develop the language that can identify what parliamentarians should be 
doing in the legislative process.7 This thesis seeks to respond to this gap in 
the literature by identifying the qualities that make a particular form of 
legislative reasoning valuable to the legislative process. This analysis can 
form the basis of understanding and evaluating the performance of 
parliamentarians within the legislative process. 
 
This thesis is based on empirical analysis of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation. The basic aim of the empirical part of the project is to 
develop a fine-grained account of how parliamentarians and parliamentary 
committees use constitutional interpretation within the legislative process. A 
motivating factor behind this inquiry was the sense that Parliament, and the 
House of Lords in particular, is becoming increasingly effective at 
constitutional interpretation, and so the analysis was limited to the first 
parliamentary session after the 2010 general election, the long session of 
2010-2012, so as to provide a relatively recent account of this developing 
                                                
6 JAG Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (George Allen 
& Unwin 1974) 13.  
7 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) 9-10.  
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practice. The empirical part of the project aims to identify and then to 
analyse examples of the practice. The empirical analysis uses three case 
studies of Government Bills, chapters three, four and five, each of which 
was deemed to have ‘constitutional implications’ by the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, and contained a number of examples 
of constitutional interpretation at multiple stages during their passage 
through Parliament.8 Each case study addresses the following questions: 
what were the main examples of constitutional interpretation? How were the 
relevant clauses and constitutional norms interpreted? What contribution did 
constitutional interpretation make to the passage of the Bill and to the 
constitution? The methods used in the case studies to address these 
questions are set out in chapter two.  
 
To narrow the focus, the interpretation of human rights is excluded from the 
empirical analysis. The role of human rights in Parliament has been subject 
to extensive analysis in the literature, including a number of recent 
empirical projects.9 Further, the significance of the role of constitutional 
norms, other than rights, within the parliamentary legislative process has 
arguably not received the attention it deserves.10 The norms that structure 
the constitutional system in the United Kingdom are clearly relevant to 
analysing the content of Government Bills, but precisely how such 
                                                
8 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 1). 
9 M Hunt, H Hooper and P Yowell, Parliaments and Human Rights (AHRC 
2012); J King, ‘Parliament’s Role Following s 4 Declarations of 
Incompatibility’ in M Hunt, H Hooper and P Yowell (eds), Parliaments and 
Human Rights (Hart 2015); A Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (OUP 
2012). 
10 W Waluchow, ‘Constitutional Rights and Democracy: a Reply to 
Professor Bellamy’ (2014) 14 German Law Journal 1039, 1043. 
 11 
constitutional norms are used has not yet been identified. This thesis argues 
that constitutional interpretation is the activity responsible for articulating 
the substance of the norms that underpin the UK’s constitutional 
architecture within Parliament. One of the advantages of the focus on these 
norms is that it shifts attention away from the relationship between 
Parliament and the courts, which is such a prominent feature in literature on 
human and constitutional rights in Parliament. Instead this thesis analyses 
Parliament’s constitutional interpretation on its own terms, and does not 
consider the implications of the practice for the role of courts in the UK. It 
should be noted that the literature on the role of constitutional rights within 
Parliament is used to inform the analysis of the value of constitutional 
interpretation.  
 
The second part of the project, chapters six, seven and eight, uses the 
empirical account of the case studies to build a normative analysis of the 
contribution of parliamentary constitutional interpretation within the 
parliamentary legislative process. There is a strong tradition within public 
law of building constitutional analysis on detailed accounts of ‘the 
mundane, every day practices of constitutional actors’. 11  How can 
parliamentarians use the interpretation of the substance of the constitution to 
enhance both the process and the constitution itself? This question is 
answered by using the insight from the case studies to engage with relevant 
literature on the legislative process, constitutional law and constitutionalism. 
This search for the value of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is not 
                                                
11 G Webber, ‘Parliament and the Management of Conflict’ [2014] Public 
Law 101, 104. 
 12 
intended simply to praise the work of parliamentarians. Instead the aim is 
produce a realistic account of the potential value of the practice so as to 
provide a basis for the critical evaluation of the parliamentary performance 
of constitutional interpretation. Without a sense of why the practice is 
valuable or what makes it work well, it is difficult to build the case for the 
practice’s role to be strengthened and developed.  
 
1.1 A mini case study: the Parliamentary Standards Bill 
To illustrate the form of legislative reasoning that is the subject matter of 
this thesis, this mini case study provides a snapshot of how parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation influenced the debate on a clause within the 
Parliamentary Standards Bill.12 In the summer of 2009, Parliament was 
rocked by the expenses scandal. In response, on 23 June the Government 
introduced the Parliamentary Standards Bill to the House of Commons.13 
Despite being a measure of constitutional reform, the Bill was fast-tracked 
through Parliament. 14  The Bill was deemed to be of ‘first-class 
constitutional significance’ and as a result received its Committee stage on 
the floor of the House of Commons.15 Both of these procedural features 
proved significant. The substance of the Bill sought to end the self-
regulation of MPs expenses, and this represented a departure from the long-
                                                
12 For a fuller account see N Parpworth, ‘The Parliamentary Standards Act 
2009: A Constitutional Dangerous Dogs Measure?’ (2010) 73 Modern Law 
Review 262; R Kelly and M Hamlyn, ‘The Law and Conduct of MPs’ in A 
Horne, D Oliver and G Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart 2013) 
108-109.  
13 Parliamentary Standards HC Bill (2008-09) [121].  
14 See House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fast-track 
Legislation: Constitutional Implications and Safeguards (HL 2008-09, 116). 
15 M Jack and TE May, Erskine May's treatise on the law, privileges, 
proceedings and usage of Parliament (24th edn, LexisNexis 2011) 566. 
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established constitutional status quo of parliamentary self-regulation. As 
Jack Straw MP (Labour), Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for 
Justice, put it ‘the painful lesson of the past six weeks is that our 
prescription for others must now be applied to ourselves’.16 The Bill sparked 
major constitutional debates in both Houses of Parliament, and the 
interpretation of parliamentary privilege and Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 
1689 figured prominently within those debates.  
 
Clause 10 of the Bill as introduced stated:  
No enactment or rule of law which prevents proceedings in 
Parliament being impeached or questioned in any court or place out 
of Parliament is to prevent— 
(a) the IPSA from carrying out any of its functions; 
(b) the Commissioner from carrying out any of the 
Commissioner’s functions; 
(c) any evidence from being admissible in proceedings 
against a member of the House of Commons for an offence 
under section 9.17 
The clause was designed to ensure that evidence against an MP under the 
new standards regime created by the Bill would be admissible in court, and 
that an MP could not rely on the protection provided by parliamentary 
privilege and Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 in such a situation.18 
Article 9 and parliamentary privilege are central to the regulation of the 
                                                
16 Jack Straw MP (Labour) Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for 
Justice, HC Deb 29 June 2009, vol 495, col 45.  
17 Parliamentary Standards HC Bill (2008-09) [121] cl 10. 
18 Explanatory Notes Parliamentary Standards HC Bill (2008-09) 121-EN.  
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relationship between Parliament and the courts,19 so a formal legislative 
change to the remit of these constitutional norms is potentially of major 
constitutional significance. 
 
On 1 July the Commons’ Justice Committee published a report on the Bill.20 
Sir Malcolm Jack, Clerk of the House of Commons, gave both written and 
oral evidence to the Committee.21 In his evidence, Jack warned that clause 
10 was a ‘wide qualification of Article 9’:22 
It would mean that the words of Members generally, the evidence 
given by witnesses (including non-Members) before committees and 
advice given by House officials on questions, amendments and other 
House business could be admitted as evidence in criminal 
proceedings. This could have a chilling effect on the freedom of 
speech of Members and of witnesses before committees and would 
hamper the ability of House officials to give advice to Members.23 
This stark warning was noted by a number of MPs during the second 
reading debate. Bernard Jenkin MP (Conservative) echoed Jack’s warning 
on the effect of the freedom of speech in the House.24 In response, the 
Government indicated that it was willing in principle to amend the clause to 
                                                
19 See L Lawrence Smyth, ‘Privilege, Exclusive Cognisance and the Law’ in 
A Horne, D Oliver and G Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart 
2013).  
20 Justice Committee, Constitutional Reform and Renewal: Parliamentary 
Standards Bill (HC 2008-09, 791). 
21 Justice Committee (n 20).  
22 Justice Committee (n 20) Ev 2. 
23 Justice Committee (n 20) Ev 12.  
24 HC Deb 29 June 2009, vol 495, col 55.  
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limit the extent of the conflict with Article 9.25 Two days later, on the 
second day of the committee stage, the debate did not reach clause 10 
because a programme motion limited the debate, but even before clause 10 
was reached, a number of MPs made reference to the Clerk’s warnings on 
the impact of the clause on privilege.26 When the clause was put to a vote, it 
was defeated by 250 to 247.27 
 
That the programming of the Bill resulted in clause 10 not being debated 
highlights a key problem with the Government’s control of the timetable in 
the House of Commons. A failure to deliberate on a provision with such a 
significant constitutional effect departs from almost any form of 
constitutionalism. However, as the Bill was caught by the convention on 
Bills of ‘first class constitutional importance’, it was heard on the floor of 
House, where the chances of defeating the Government were markedly 
higher than in a public bill committee.28 So in this case, the absence of 
debate did not inhibit the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. MPs were 
able to communicate their dissatisfaction with the constitutional effect of the 
clause and their support for the Clerk’s analysis in the report of the House of 
Commons’ Justice Committee by defeating the Government in a vote. In 
response to the defeat, Jack Straw MP, speaking for the Government, said 
that the defeat would not be reversed in the Lords: ‘we will respect the 
                                                
25 HC Deb 29 June 2009, vol 495, col 129. 
26 HC Deb 1 July 2009, vol 495, cols 340-362. 
27 HC Deb 1 July 2009, vol 495, cols 382-383.  
28 On the limited impact of Public Bill Committees see: L Thompson, ‘More 
of the Same or a Period of Change? The Impact of Bill Committees in the 
Twenty-First Century House of Commons’ (2012) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 
459. 
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decision’. 29  This was confirmed when in the Lords the Government 
accepted an amendment from Lord Strathclyde (Conservative), leader of the 
opposition in the Lords, which stated that ‘nothing in this Act shall be 
construed by any court in the United Kingdom as affecting Article IX of the 
Bill of Rights 1689’.30 These words became s1 of the 2009 Act.31 Within 
this particular episode, the active ingredient in the parliamentary analysis of 
clause 10 was the interpretation of the constitutional effect of the clause, 
which relied upon the interpretation of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. 
The idea that the qualification was exceedingly broad underpinned a range 
of parliamentary action, namely a committee report, the dialogue between 
parliamentarians and the Government at second reading and in the 
committee stage, and ultimately a vote. It would be wrong to claim that 
constitutional interpretation necessarily caused the defeat, or that every 
parliamentarian who voted against the clause was necessarily motivated by 
Jack’s analysis in the Justice Committee report. But at the same time it is 
reasonable to say that Parliament’s engagement with this particular clause 
was shaped by how parliamentarians interpreted the constitutional effect of 
the clause and their interpretation of the relevant constitutional norms. This 
thesis examines the role of this practice within the parliamentary legislative 
process, to work out what factors influence its character and to develop an 
account of why it matters. 
 
                                                
29 HC Deb 1 July 2009, vol 495, col 387.  
30 HL Deb 15 July 2009, vol 712, col 1049. 
31 Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 s 1.  
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One important lesson from this mini-case study is that outside of the rights 
context, parliamentarians are adept at interpreting those constitutional 
norms that are central to their own constitutional role. This can be seen in a 
cynical sense, that parliamentarians simply defend their own powers and 
interests. But in terms of the balance of power between Government and 
Parliament within the legislative process, parliamentarians’ ability to 
interpret the norms that underpin the existing constitutional settlement, 
particularly in relation to those norms that underpin the democratic law-
making procedure, is extremely valuable. As Davis explains, in an 
important article on the parliamentary passage of the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006, the law-making procedures within Parliament 
represents an opportunity for parliamentarians to limit the Government’s 
ability to depart from existing constitutional principles. 32  Through the 
ability to table amendments, and to challenge the Government on the detail, 
parliamentary procedure does allow parliamentarians to transmit their own 
constitutional interpretation into parliamentary scrutiny of Government 
Bills. In this context, it is a strength of the parliamentary system that 
parliamentarians can use their loyalty to the parliamentary process to shape 
their interpretation of Government Bills and to hold the Government to 
account via legislative scrutiny.  
 
Although Davis is right to emphasise the role of procedure in providing a 
platform for this constitutional dynamic, this thesis argues that the active 
                                                
32 P Davis, ‘The Significance of Parliamentary Procedures in Control of the 
Executive: a Case Study: the Passage of Part 1 of the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006’ [2007] Public Law 677, 678.  
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ingredient in the process is the ability to articulate the constitutional effect 
of a Bill and to interpret constitutional norms, especially those that are 
central to Parliament’s constitutional role. This mini-case study shows that a 
factor within parliamentary constitutional interpretation is the 
parliamentarians’ own awareness of the norms that underpin their role 
within the constitution. There is a coincidence of interests between the 
substance of the norms that relate to Parliament’s constitutional role and the 
activity for which they are interpreted: the scrutiny of Government Bills. 
This is part of what makes focusing on the parliamentary interpretation of 
constitutional norms outside of the rights context so important. Parliament 
depends on parliamentarians’ desire and ability to articulate the legislative 
implications of the principles that regulate its functions. 33  Without it, 
Parliament’s role within the constitution could be marginalised. 
 
1.2 Parliament and the UK constitution 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation is defined by the relationship 
between Parliament and the constitution. One of the features of that 
relationship is that both elements have changed significantly over the past 
50 years. According to Nicol, prior to the European Communities Act 1972 
(EC Act) parliamentarians operated within an ‘autonomous political 
sphere’.34 The idea of an ‘autonomous political sphere’ is important to 
understanding the changing nature of the relationship between Parliament 
and the constitution, as well as the division between law and politics in the 
                                                
33 C Pinelli, ‘Constitutional Reasoning and Political Deliberation’ (2013) 14 
German Law Journal 1171, 1173.  
34 D Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialisation of British Politics (OUP 
2001) 254.  
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United Kingdom. The autonomous political sphere can be related to 
Griffith’s vision of the UK constitution as a ‘political constitution’, put 
forward in 1979, where ‘everything that happens is constitutional’.35 Within 
the ‘political constitution’, the autonomy of the political sphere was the 
product of a constitution which had parliamentary sovereignty as its first 
principle, and which was ‘indeterminate, indistinct and unentrenched’.36 
Within the ‘autonomous political sphere’, the absence of a codified 
constitutional framework meant that law and constitutional norms did not 
play a significant role in shaping the substance of parliamentary politics. 
Membership of the European Union and the challenge to parliamentary 
sovereignty marked for Nicol the beginning of fundamental change to the 
approach of parliamentarians to law in general, and to constitutional law in 
particular.37 
 
A number of important changes to the normative content of the constitution 
have occurred since 1997. The enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), the devolution statutes, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the 
Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 (subject to detailed analysis in Chapter 5) 
have all contributed to a major change in the relationship between 
Parliament and constitution. The UK constitution has always been shaped 
by Acts of Parliament, for example the Bill of Rights 1689, the Septennial 
Act 1716, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, and the European 
                                                
35 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 The Modern Law 
Review 1, 19. 
36 S E Finer, V Bogdanor and B Rudden, Comparing Constitutions (OUP 
1995) 40. 
37 Nicol (n 34) 260.  
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Communities Act 1972. However, there is a sense that the combined effect 
of recent changes has radically changed the constitution and Parliament’s 
role within it. For Bogdanor, it is now a ‘new constitution’ defined by the 
HRA, where the separation of powers rather than parliamentary sovereignty 
is the predominant principle.38 Power has shifted from Parliament to the 
courts, to devolved assemblies, and to Europe. As a result the norms that 
divide responsibility, distribute power and constrain the Government figure 
more prominently in parliamentary politics within the legislative process.  
 
British constitutional lawyers disagree on the level of engagement of 
parliamentarians with constitutional norms. For Nicol, as a result of these 
changes parliamentarians are now more adept at engaging with 
constitutional law issues than ever before.39 Nicol’s analysis is concerned 
with whether parliamentarians are aware of the constitutional implications 
of the Bill before them, and in particular whether a Bill is transferring power 
to the judiciary. This partly explains his positive verdict. By contrast, those 
who focus on parliamentarians’ ability to use constitutional norms as tools 
for scrutiny and justification remain sceptical that ‘political autonomy’ has 
been abandoned. According to Murray Hunt, the second adviser to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, parliamentary sovereignty influences political 
attitudes towards the significance of constitutional norms within the 
legislative process: 
The idea that Parliament can make any law but is subject to none is a 
truly powerful one, which continues to shape a surprising amount of 
                                                
38 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart 2009) 285.  
39 Nicol (n 34) 260.  
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what goes on in Parliament. It pervades the language, the customs 
and, most importantly, it sub-consciously defines the ways in which 
some of the principal actors perceive of their roles. If Parliament can 
make any law, and courts must give effect to that law come what 
may, why should parliamentarians or, for that matter, Government 
lawyers, bother thinking about how a new statute fits with other 
laws?40 
Oliver also strikes a pessimistic tone, when she observes that in comparison 
with a number of other constitutional democracies, in the UK there is ‘a 
worrying lack of appreciation on the part of ministers and some 
parliamentarians of the existence and importance of legal and constitutional 
values’.41 Constitutional reform has changed the conditions upon which 
parliamentarians’ autonomy was based; however, this has not necessarily 
resulted in a change of attitude throughout Parliament. Hunt and Oliver’s 
critical view of the approach of certain parliamentarians to constitutional 
norms is in part informed by the contrast with those within Parliament, 
particular in the Lords, who are now regularly using constitutional norms to 
inform their analysis of Government Bills. 
  
The House of Lords has become more important than the House of 
Commons in providing effective constitutional scrutiny and constitutional 
interpretation. The ability to perform this role changed radically in 1999. 
The House of Lords Reform Act 1999 removed the bulk of the hereditary 
                                                
40 M Hunt, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ in A Horne, D Oliver 
and G Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart 2013) 248.  
41 D Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: The Case for Standards and 
Checklists’ [2006] Public Law 219, 226.  
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peers from the Lords, and the resulting change to the composition of the 
House has made its scrutiny more effective.42 Since 1999, the House of 
Lords has become more assertive in the legislative process, which is 
apparent from the data on the number of government defeats in the Lords 
and the number of times that the Lords has insisted on its amendments.43 
For example between 1979 and 1997 the House of Lords insisted on its 
amendments 3 times, while between 1997 and 2013 it has insisted on its 
amendments 43 times.44 While Parliament or the House of Lords do not 
block Government Bills, the Lords’ scrutiny now regularly results in major 
changes to the content of the Government’s legislation.45  
 
Russell notes that the Lords is particularly influential when it is in 
‘constitutional propriety mode’.46 The first decade of the 21st century saw a 
number of examples of the House of Lords’ prominent role in the scrutiny 
of Government Bills with constitutional effect. In the 2002-2003 session, 
during the consideration of the Criminal Justice Bill, the Lords twice 
defeated the Labour government on a proposal to restrict trial by jury.47 In 
March 2004 during a debate on the Constitutional Reform Bill the 
Government was defeated in the Lords on a procedural motion to commit 
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the Bill to a special ad hoc select committee. 48  The resulting select 
committee on the Bill took evidence and made a number of significant 
changes to the Bill. These changes included the introduction of provisions to 
safeguard the rule of law and judicial independence.49 In that same session, 
during the debate on the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, which contained a 
number of measures that were considered to be constitutionally 
unacceptable, the Lords defeated the Government a record eighteen times.50  
 
The following statement by a Government official, made as part of a study 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (covered in Chapter 4) by the 
Institute for Government, gives an indication of the role of the House of 
Lords post-1999:  
Ninety per cent of our effort went into planning and managing the 
Lords. It is what all government departments do, because it is only 
really in the Lords that the ultimate shape of any Bill gets 
determined. Will the Government achieve its policy objectives given 
the different nature of the debate there, the quality of debate, and the 
mathematics?51 
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As Russell observes, the House of Lords’ role in the legislative process 
challenges the assumption that parliamentary scrutiny is ineffective and that 
bicameralism in Parliament is weak.52 
 
In the legislative process, it is always important to maintain a dose of 
realism, and even with the Lords’ resurgence, Daniel Greenberg, a former 
parliamentary counsel, comments that:  
The reality is that almost all provisions of almost all Acts of 
Parliament are constructed entirely by Government officials and 
taken through without any real involvement at a technical level of 
anybody outside the Government machine.53 
Furthermore, recent studies have indicated that despite the reform of the 
committee stage in the Commons, 54  legislative scrutiny remains weak 
within the primary and directly elected chamber.55 It is important though not 
to equate effective scrutiny with the number of concessions secured or 
Government defeats, as the reality of the legislative process is more 
complicated than such a simple equation would indicate.56 The influence of 
legislative scrutiny extends beyond the parliamentary process to the internal 
Government machine. The existence of the Cabinet Guide to Legislation, 
which contains guidance on preparing a Bill for the Parliament, evidences 
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this point. The Government adjusts its proposals in anticipation of the 
reaction within Parliament.57 The problem is that Parliament’s influence 
within Government is difficult to detect.   
 
The other major change to Parliament’s capacity to engage in constitutional 
interpretation has been the creation of a number of parliamentary 
committees dedicated to scrutinising Government Bills for compliance with 
constitutional norms. The most important committee for this thesis is the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (hereafter  
Constitution Committee). The Committee was established following a 
recommendation of the Royal Commission on the House of Lords that the 
House of Lords ‘should establish an authoritative Constitution Committee to 
act as a focus for its interest in and concern for constitutional matters’.58 It 
was given the following terms of reference ‘to examine the constitutional 
implications of all public bills coming before the House; and to keep under 
review the operation of the constitution’.59 It began work in 2001. After a 
slow start, the Constitution Committee has established itself as important 
part of the legislative process.60   
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The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (hereafter 
DPRRC) was established in 1992 on the recommendation of the Jellicoe 
Committee.61 Its terms of reference are ‘to report whether the provisions of 
any Bill inappropriately delegate legislative power, or whether they subject 
the exercise of legislative power to an inappropriate degree of parliamentary 
scrutiny’.62 Robert Hazell indicates that the main role of the committee is 
‘to police the boundary between primary and secondary legislation’.63 The 
work of the committee has made an impact on the way legislation is 
prepared in Government. The Cabinet Guide to Making Legislation contains 
an entire chapter dedicated to the work of the Committee.64  
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (hereafter JCHR) was established in 
2001.65 The JCHR scrutinises Government Bills for ‘compatibility with 
human rights, including common law fundamental rights and liberties, the 
Convention Rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the human 
rights contained in other international obligations assumed by the UK’.66 
Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires that every Government 
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Bill is accompanied by a ministerial statement on the compatibility of the 
Bill with rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights.67 
The JCHR has transformed the level of deliberation on human rights within 
Parliament, and of the three committees referred to, it has received by far 
the most analysis within constitutional law scholarship in the UK, which is 
another reason why this thesis focuses on constitutional interpretation 
outside of the rights context.68 
 
Together these committees lead Tomkins, currently a legal adviser to the 
Constitution Committee, to argue that parliamentarians ‘take the 
constitution seriously and that they take their onerous constitutional 
responsibilities seriously’.69 Hazell observes that these committees have 
externalised the protection of constitutional norms. 70  Prior to the 
establishment of these committees, the protection of these values was 
internalised within the executive and in the work of the Parliamentary 
Counsel. This important point highlights one of the key values of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation, that it facilitates open public 
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debate on the role of constitutional norms within Government Bills.71 When 
we know that in the past, as Nicol has shown, Parliament has been ill-served 
by the information provided by the Government lawyers in relation to the 
constitutional implications of Government Bills, the presence of actors in 
the legislative process designed to transmit constitutional analysis of Bills 
whose loyalty is to Parliament, rather than to the Government, is a major 
step forward.72  
 
These committees have created a mechanism by which the constitutional 
effect of legislation can be identified, debated and scrutinised. However, as 
a mechanism for the protection of constitutional norms, or for creating a 
safeguard or a level of deliberation for measures of constitutional change, 
one should not lose sight of the broader perspective. The Lords only holds a 
one-year delaying power and rightly recognises its inferior democratic 
credentials in its negotiations with the Commons. The Government can still 
use its majority in the Commons, together with its control of the timetable, 
to minimise the scope for effective analysis of significant constitutional 
measures. As Oliver observes, the existing arrangements provide ‘a fragile 
protection against the passage of unconstitutional laws’.73 Parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation lacks the support of a formal procedure of 
constitutional amendment, or a codified set of constitutional norms, or the 
threat of judicial enforcement (outside of the HRA 1998 and EU Law 
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context). In that context it is quite remarkable that constitutional 
interpretation has carved out even this rather fragile position within 
Parliament.  
  
1.3 Why should Parliament interpret constitutional norms? 
The notion that constitutional interpretation should be a routine part of the 
way in which parliamentarians analyse Government Bills is not prominent 
in the UK constitutional law literature. In part this is because for some the 
Westminster system of parliamentary government is not the ‘natural 
partner’ of constitutionalism’. 74  More importantly, constitutional 
interpretation is associated with the interpretation of the text of a codified 
constitution, no more and no less. To the extent that it is relevant to UK 
constitutional law, constitutional interpretation is regarded as a task for the 
courts rather than parliamentarians. This thesis challenges these 
assumptions, and draws on a range of literature to construct an account of 
the UK parliamentary legislative process in which constitutional 
interpretation plays a vital role.  
 
The approach taken is in part inspired by the rich literature in the United 
States on congressional constitutional interpretation.75 In a classic article 
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published in 1893, Thayer argued that US judges should defer heavily to 
legislative interpretations of the Constitution. 76 Thayer also recognised that 
features of the legislature would influence the nature of the interpretation, so 
that the courts and the legislature would develop their own complementary 
approaches to constitutional interpretation. 77  Thayer’s analysis has 
prompted a number of responses in US scholarship.78 One of the important 
features of this work is to emphasise the distinctive features of the 
legislative approach to constitutional interpretation, and one of the goals of 
this thesis is to identify the implications of the parliamentary context for the 
practice.79 Another important input into the US debate came in the Supreme 
Court decision of City of Boerne v Flores.80 The majority implored that 
Congress ‘has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed 
judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution’.81 In 2001, Katyal’s 
article on ‘legislative constitutional interpretation’ set out the key features of 
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the practice. 82  Katyal emphasises that legislative constitutional 
interpretation can serve to reconcile what previously have been considered 
incompatible goals, ‘a living Constitution and a democratic government’.83 
If the meaning of the constitution can be updated via the democratic 
process, then concerns that the content of the constitution is only determined 
by unaccountable judges or by the dead hand of the past would be 
minimised. Within the Congressional setting, constitutional interpretation is 
considered to be politically accountable.84 
 
The most influential element of this work for these purposes is the case 
developed by Tushnet that legislators should interpret the constitution in 
order to enhance the democratic legitimacy of constitutionalism:  
The tension between constitutionalism and self-governance and the 
countermajoritarian difficulty would be substantially reduced if non 
judicial actors had incentives to interpret the constitution, and were 
at least as good as judges at doing so. We could get the benefits of 
constitutionalism and self-governance were the constitution’s 
primary interpreters nonjudicial actors who did a reasonably good 
job of interpretation.85 
Constitutional interpretation in the context of strong judicial review gives 
rise to a counter-majoritarian difficulty, but when it occurs within the 
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majoritarian structure of the legislative process, it can produce an important 
political and legal effect that does not give rise to the same difficulties. In 
particular, it allows for constitutional norms to produce a substantive effect 
on the content of the law but without undermining the primacy of the 
democratic process. This argument is important because it alludes to the 
potential value of the practice, especially in terms of ‘taking the constitution 
away from the courts’, but does not explain the potential value of the 
practice for the legislative process itself.86 This thesis seeks to focus on the 
question of why constitutional interpretation within the legislature might be 
valuable even without the presence of the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
that inspires the US debate. Tushnet also addresses the issue of how 
adequate constitutional interpretation should be identified in the legislative 
process, which he recognises is far from straightforward – in part because 
the methods used to identify it in courts cannot be easily translated into the 
legislative context.87 Tushnet argues that we should use a constitution-based 
standard for evaluating Congressional constitutional interpretation: 
Congressional performance is adequate, and congressional capacity 
to engage in good constitutional analysis is demonstrated, when 
those who refer to constitutional questions speak in 
‘constitutionalist’ terms – connect their constitutional concerns and 
analyses to some broader ideas about constitutionalism, the 
separation of powers, and the rule of law, make reference to relevant 
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constitutional provisions, and the like. The criterion, that is, is 
whether those participants who deal with constitutional questions 
appear to be thinking about those questions in the right way, with the 
constitution and constitutionalism in mind.88 
Tushnet argues that constitutional interpretation within the legislature 
should not be analysed through a prism of the author’s own standard of 
constitutional interpretation, but rather it should be identified by focusing on 
examples whereby legislators consider themselves to be examining 
constitutional norms.89 Tushnet calls for empirical analysis to serve as the 
basis for analysis of Congressional constitutional interpretation, and also to 
make use of case studies to analyse the practice.90  Both in terms of 
substance and approach, Tushnet’s writings on this subject have influenced 
the approach taken in this thesis.91  
 
Jeremy Waldron, like Tushnet, has used scepticism of the democratic 
credentials of the judiciary as a basis for work that seeks to build and 
develop the recognition of the role of the legislative process within a 
constitutional state. 92  Waldron’s approach is more theoretical than 
Tushnet’s, and has sparked renewed interest in the legislative process and 
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legislatures within political, constitutional and legal theory. Waldron argues 
that legislatures and the legislative process have been neglected by legal 
theory.93 Waldron’s defence of the role of disagreement in the legislative 
process has served to emphasise the virtues of legislatures as deliberative 
law-making arenas, as opposed to sites of crude political bargaining.94 This 
awareness has led other legal theorists to call for re-evaluation of the nature 
of legislative reasoning and the role of the legislative process within a 
constitutional system.95 This renewed interest in the legislative process 
provides an important context for understanding the role of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation. 
 
Waldron’s writing on the legislature’s role in relation to constitutional rights 
emphasises that legislative reasoning is capable of the sophistication 
associated with judicial decisions that use constitutional interpretation: 
It is often thought that the great advantage of judicial decision-
making on issues of individual rights is the explicit reasoning and 
reason-giving associated with it. Courts give reasons for their 
decisions, we are told, and this is a token of taking seriously what is 
at stake, whereas legislators do not. In fact this is a false contrast. 
Legislators give reasons for their votes just as judges do (…). The 
difference is that lawyers are trained to close study of the reasons 
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judges give: they are not trained to close study of legislative 
reasoning.96  
This positive case for the role of constitutional rights within legislative 
deliberation has challenged assumptions on the role of a legislature in the 
realisation of rights. Although this study does not directly address 
constitutional interpretation in the context of rights, this literature has 
nonetheless proved influential in developing the arguments within this 
thesis. One of the most important recent works on this subject, which builds 
on Waldron’s work, is Webber’s The Negotiable Constitution.97 Webber 
conceives a constitution as an ‘activity’, whereby rights are not simply 
limits upon legislative capacity, instead the legislature and the legislative 
process play a central role in constructing the scope and content of 
constitutional rights.98 Webber emphasises that constitutional rights are not 
simply tools to be used by judges to restrict the legislative capacity of a 
legislature, but they are also designed to frame an on-going negotiation of a 
constitution within the legislative process. 99  A central component of 
Webber’s argument is that the negotiability of constitutional rights is 
secured through limitation clauses within a charter of rights, which sets out 
the conditions for how limitations to the rights will be evaluated.100 The key 
point being that as such rights are not absolute, the legislature is able to 
delineate how those rights influence the content of the law. One of the 
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reasons Webber’s argument is particularly relevant to the whole of the UK 
constitution, and not just the HRA 1998, is that unlike many other 
constitutions all of the normative content of the UK constitution may be 
renegotiated within the ordinary legislative process. In legal terms, the UK 
constitution leaves the entire normative content of the constitution within 
the scope of primary legislation. Webber’s analysis shows that rather than 
conceiving the UK’s political constitution as being free of constitutional 
constraints, the political constitution can be conceived as granting 
parliamentarians the opportunity to decide how constitutional norms should 
be specified in primary legislation. Webber argues that primary legislation 
that specifies the content of constitutional rights should not be understood as 
interpretation, but instead should be seen as construction or specification; 
but this thesis argues that within Parliament, constitutional interpretation is 
central to the process of deciding how constitutional norms should be 
specified and constructed.101  
 
Webber’s work also fits with a positive conception of constitutionalism, 
which sees constitutional norms as facilitating, rather than simply limiting, 
the legislative process.102 In the United States, Ely famously argued that the 
primary justification for strong judicial review should be to safeguard the 
democratic process, rather than to determine the substantive values that 
should decide public policy.103 Other constitutional scholars have sought to 
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build on this positive connection between democratic law-making and 
constitutionalism by articulating a connection between constitutional norms 
and the ideals of deliberative democracy. 104 Sunstein sees deliberative 
democracy and constitutionalism working together:  
In a deliberative democracy one of the principal purposes of a 
constitution is to protect not the rule of the majority but democracy’s 
internal morality, seen in deliberative terms.105  
The basic point is that constitutional norms can serve to frame and enhance 
democratic deliberation.106 Constitutional theorists appear to be responding 
to the deliberative turn in democratic theory, and incorporating analysis of 
political deliberation within constitutionalism.107 The increasing recognition 
of the value of legislative deliberation to both constitutionalism and to 
democracy underlines the potential significance of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation, which is a practical manifestation of this 
connection between constitutional norms and democratic deliberation. 
 
In the United Kingdom context, the connection between legislative 
deliberation and constitutionalism has received the most attention from 
those working on human rights. Sathanapally’s Beyond Disagreement 
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examines the role of Parliament in engaging with human rights post-
HRA.108 Sathanapally focuses on parliamentary responses to section 4 
declarations of incompatibility, and places the analysis within the context of 
debates within constitutional scholarship on the proper role of legislatures in 
the protection of constitutional rights.109 A recent study by King focuses on 
the same subject matter but makes more use of empirical methods to 
highlight the nature of parliamentary responses to s 4 declarations.110 King 
notes that parliamentary responses to s 4 declarations do show ‘evidence of 
enhanced deliberative output’,111 primarily because the debates show that 
minorities with ‘less voice’ are being taken into account.112 These two 
works also fit within the ‘dialogue’ literature, which focuses on how 
constitutional rights can enhance the engagement between Parliament and 
the courts on questions of rights.113 There appears to be a consensus that the 
HRA 1998 has made a positive impact on parliamentary deliberation. 
Gardbaum argues that the HRA 1998 has created a system of ‘pre-
enactment political rights review’, which has made rights more prominent 
within legislative debate.114 While most would accept that the HRA 1998 
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has had a positive impact on parliamentary scrutiny, particularly via the 
JCHR,115 Hiebert has argued that the role of human rights post-2000 has 
fallen short of the culture of rights within Parliament that was promised by 
some of supporters of the 1998 Act.116 This thesis seeks to build on the body 
of work on HRA 1998 in Parliament, and to try to contribute to a more 
complete picture of the potential of constitutional interpretation by looking 
beyond the realm of individual rights. 
 
In both Canada and Australia, there is an emerging literature on 
constitutional interpretation in their respective Parliaments. In Canada, 
Lajoie, Bergada and Gelineau have argued that constitutional interpretation 
is more than simply a having the last word via the notwithstanding clause in 
the Charter of Rights.117 They argue that constitutional interpretation is a 
major part of the parliamentary process, and often represents the ‘only 
word’ on the implications of the constitution upon primary legislation.118 In 
Australia, a recently published article, ‘Parliament’s Role in Constitutional 
Interpretation’ by Appleby and Webster, argues that Parliament should 
consider the High Court’s jurisprudence in its analysis of constitutional 
questions raised by Bills, and adopt ‘a court-centred interpretation’.119 Both 
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recognise that the legislative process presents parliamentarians with the 
opportunity to consider questions of constitutional interpretation, and that 
parliamentarians have a duty to take up the responsibility of making a 
contribution to the meaning and application of constitutional norms.  
 
Within UK public law scholarship, there are a small number of studies that 
consider the precise subject under consideration namely the role of 
constitutional norms within the legislative process in Parliament. Nicol’s 
book The Judicialisation of British Politics examines the constitutional 
scrutiny of a number of constitutionally significant Bills.120 The significance 
of this book for this study is covered in detail in Chapter 2. Oliver has 
written two important articles about the role of constitutional norms in 
enhancing legislative scrutiny in Parliament.121 Feldman has argued that 
constitutional principles and fundamental values, and not just human rights, 
play a key role in legislative scrutiny within Parliament.122 Literature on the 
role of Parliament in scrutinising constitutional reform is also directly 
relevant to this thesis.123 Although there is not a significant amount of 
published research on the precise subject of this thesis in the United 
Kingdom, there is a great deal of research in law and politics that is directly 
relevant. Using a combination of empirical analysis and insight from this 
literature, this thesis aims to show that parliamentary constitutional 
                                                
120 Nicol (n 34).  
121 D Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Government Bill’ (2004) 4 
Macquarie Law Journal 33; D Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: The 
Case for Standards and Checklists’ [2006] Public Law 219. 
122 D Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ 
[2002] Public Law 323. 
123 R Hazell, ‘Time for a new convention: parliamentary scrutiny of 
constitutional bills 1997-2005’ [2006] Public Law 247.  
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interpretation is a valuable addition to the UK public law vocabulary for 
understanding the role of Parliament within the contemporary constitution. 
 
1.4 Structure 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two set outs the methods used. It 
deals predominantly with the methods used to analyse constitutional 
interpretation within the case studies. Chapters three, four and five represent 
the empirical part of the thesis. Each is a case study of a Bill which contains 
significant examples of constitutional interpretation within Parliament. 
Chapter three examines the Public Bodies Bill; chapter four covers the 
Health and Social Care Bill; and chapter five details the Fixed-term 
Parliaments Bill. Each case study examines the constitutional framework of 
each Bill as introduced to Parliament, then analyses how parliamentarians 
interpreted that framework in order to debate the constitutional effect of 
each Bill. Chapter six builds on the analysis in the case studies to outline the 
value and character of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. The 
chapter explains how the parliamentary context affects the nature of 
constitutional interpretation. It also details the two key values of practice 
identified in the case studies. Chapter seven explores the relationship 
between parliamentary constitutional interpretation and political 
constitutionalism. Chapter eight concludes by assessing how the value of 
the practice might be used to assess parliamentary performance, and 
considers a number of reform options that would enhance constitutional 




In a lecture given to inaugurate The Journal of Legislative Studies, JAG Griffith 
(1918-2010), the public lawyer who made major contributions to both the study 
of the UK constitution1 and Parliament,2 said: 
It has always seemed to me a weakness in the study of politics and in the 
study of law that so often an intimate relationship is treated as no more 
than the chance meeting of two disparate disciplines.3 
This study of parliamentary constitutional interpretation aims to overcome this 
weakness by engaging in empirical analysis of the legislative process, which is 
predominantly the domain of political science, but from the perspective of a 
public lawyer.  
 
The legislative process is the institutional interface of politics and law.4 This 
dynamic combination of law and politics presents major methodological 
challenges for any study that seeks to engage in qualitative analysis of the 
legislative process within Parliament. These methodological challenges are 
                                                
1 JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Manchester University Press 1977); 
‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 The Modern Law Review 1; ‘The common 
law and the political constitution’ (2001) 117 Law Quarterly Review 42. 
2 See JAG Griffith, The Place of Parliament in the legislative process, Part I’ 
(1951) 14 The Modern Law Review 279; ‘The Place of Parliament in the 
legislative process, Part II’ (1951) 14 The Modern Law Review 425; 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (George Allen & Unwin, 1974); 
JAG Griffith, M Ryle, R Blackburn, A Kennon, and M Wheeler-Booth, Griffith 
& Ryle on Parliament: functions, practice and procedures (Sweet & Maxwell 
2003). 
3 JAG Griffith, ‘The Study of Law of Politics’ The Journal of Legislative Studies 
1 (1995) 3, 3. 
4 A Daniel Oliver-Lalana, ‘The sources of legitimacy of political decisions: 
between procedure and substance’ in L Wintgens (ed), The Theory and Practice 
of Legislation: Essays in Legisprudence (Ashgate 2005) 245. 
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exacerbated by the reliance on the publicly available material. Academic lawyers 
and political scientists take different approaches to this set of challenges.5 A 
lawyer might argue that it is not possible to divorce the analysis of the process 
from the substantive content of the particular proposal in question, whereas a 
political scientist might argue that analysis that focuses on the substance of 
debate will reveal very little, as it does not account for what really matters: the 
political affiliations of the participants, the behind the scenes negotiations and the 
distribution of political power. The reality is that both are right, and it should be 
acknowledged that the approach taken here, which emphasises the substantive 
analysis of the Bill during debate, is only one part of a broader and complicated 
picture. In any case it is difficult to be certain about the cause of legislative 
change within Parliament. Even what appears to be a clear Government 
concession secured by effective parliamentary scrutiny might in fact be what 
Cowley refers to as ‘carefully calibrated concessions’.6  
 
The methods used in the thesis are designed to achieve the overarching research 
aim of identifying the value of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. For the 
purposes of the empirical analysis of constitutional interpretation in the 
parliamentary session of 2010-2012, this resulted in a case study approach. 
Within each of the case studies the overall research aim was broken down into 
three questions. Firstly, what were the main examples of constitutional 
                                                
5 R Post, ‘Law Professors and Political Scientists: Observations on the 
Law/Politics Distinction in the Guiner/Rosenberg Debate’ (2009) 89 Boston 
University Law Review 581. 
6 P Cowley, The Rebels: How Blair Mislaid his Majority (Politico’s 2005) 91; 
See also M Shephard, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny and Oversight of the British “War 
on Terror”: From Accretion of Executive Power and Evasion of Scrutiny to 
Embarrassment and Concessions’ (2009) 15 The Journal of Legislative Studies 
191, 194. 
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interpretation during the passage of the Bill? Secondly, what were the normative 
components of the constitutional interpretation? And thirdly, how did the practice 
contribute to the passage of the Bill and to the constitution? The second part of 
the thesis uses the answers to these questions to build an account of the value of 
the practice and where it fits within accounts of constitutionalism.  
 
The chapter begins with an examination of the parameters of constitutional 
interpretation in the context of the UK Parliament. It then sets out the methods 
chosen for the case studies via a review of the relevant literature, and ends with a 
brief review of the methods used in the second part of the thesis.  
 
2.1 Defining parliamentary constitutional interpretation  
This thesis is premised on the idea that parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
is a distinct form of reasoning within the UK Parliament’s legislative process. 
This section puts forward the definition of the practice used and the basic 
parameters of the analysis of the primary material. This section is set out in the 
following order. Firstly, it explores the meaning of constitutional interpretation. 
Secondly, it explains how this translates to the context of the United Kingdom’s 
uncodified constitution. Thirdly, it describes how the practice operates within the 
parliamentary legislative process. 
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2.1.1 Constitutional interpretation 
Constitutional interpretation is a ‘practical human activity’.7 Defined in the most 
basic terms, constitutional interpretation is the practical activity of interpreting a 
constitutional norm. American law journals are filled with articles on 
constitutional interpretation, but relatively few tackle the descriptive question of 
what constitutional interpretation is. 8  Steven Smith has pointed out that 
constitutional interpretation is a facilitative equivocation.9 The term is often used 
despite the fact that there is much disagreement over what it means, and without 
acknowledgment of that disagreement or any clarification of the definition from 
the user. Much of the disagreement is over what ‘constitutional’ means and how 
constitutional meaning should be found, which is dependent on the context. 
Defining constitutional interpretation outside of a particular context is therefore 
predominantly a question of defining the meaning of ‘interpretation’. 
 
The meaning of interpretation has attracted much attention in legal and political 
philosophy, notably in the work of Dworkin,10 Raz,11 Marmor12 and Fish.13 The 
aim is here is not to engage directly with these debates, but to highlight some of 
                                                
7 S Smith, 'What Does Constitutional Interpretation Interpret? ' in G Huscroft 
(ed), Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 22. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Smith (n 7) 34-37. 
10 R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press 1985); Law’s 
Empire (Harvard University Press 1986); Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard 
University Press 2011).  
11 J Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (OUP 2010); Practical Reason 
and Norms (Princeton University Press 1990); The Concept of a Legal System 
(OUP 1980). 
12 A Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Hart 2005). 
13 S Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (OUP 1989). 
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the basic features of interpretation that distinguish it from other forms of 
reasoning. Raz explains: 
Interpretation is of meaning; that it not only establishes what the meaning 
is, but makes it transparent, that it is intelligible, and that therefore 
interpretation is backed by constitutive reasons.14 
According to this account, interpretation involves explaining the meaning of 
something using reasons. Raz says that interpretation ‘is closely related to 
explanation’.15 Interpretation is a demanding form of explanation. It demands 
constitutive reasons. He suggests that the following four elements help to 
distinguish interpretation as an ‘activity’ when it is used in the humanities: 
‘(1) Interpretation is of an original. There is always something which is 
interpreted… (2) An interpretation states, or shows (eg in performing 
interpretations) the meaning of the original. (3) Interpretations are subject 
to assessment as right or wrong (correct or incorrect), or as good or bad… 
(4) Interpretation is an intentional act. One does not interpret unless one 
intends to interpret…16 
I take the following from Raz’s exploration of the meaning of interpretation. 
Firstly, interpretation normally involves the exploration of the meaning of an 
object. Secondly, the process of interpretation often ends with an explanation of 
the meaning of that object. Thirdly, that the quality of interpretation can be 
enhanced if it is supported by constitutive reasons. Constitutive reasons explain 
how the object has been interpreted, they support an argument that relates to why 
                                                
14 J Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (OUP 2010) 230.  
15 Raz (n 14) 266. 
16 Raz (n 14) 268. 
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something is the case.17 Interpretation, then, is a process of exploring the meaning 
of an object that ends with a determination and is supported by reasons. 
According to this approach, constitutional interpretation refers to the explanation 
of the meaning of an ‘object’ which is considered constitutional. 
 
One of the reasons why constitutional interpretation is primarily associated with 
courts is that some consider that it is fundamental to the practice that it should be 
authoritative.18 Palmer defines constitutional interpretation as ‘the determination, 
authoritative in practice, of what an element of the constitution means as applied 
to a particular instance of doubt or dispute’. 19  Thought of, in this way, 
constitutional interpretation might be limited to courts, but Palmer also considers 
that the law officers within Government make authoritative determinations and 
therefore engage in constitutional interpretation.20 Webber, citing Whittington, 
suggests that interpretation is an ‘essentially legalistic’ activity.21 Webber argues 
that instead that the process of developing the meaning of a right should be 
understood as ‘construction’, because the latter term allows meaning external to 
the text of a right to be used to specify the meaning of a right.22 Construction by 
contrast to interpretation is ‘essentially political’.23  
 
                                                
17 J Hage, Studies in Legal Logic (Springer 2005) 77.  
18 M Troper, ‘Constitutional Interpretation’ (2006) 39 Israel Law Review 35. 
19 M Palmer, ‘What is the New Zealand Constitution and Who Interprets it? 
Constitutional Realism and the Importance of Public Office Holders’ (2006) 17 
Public Law Review 133, 149.  
20 Ibid.  
21 G Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: on the Limitation of Rights (CUP 
2009) 168.  
22 Webber (n 21) 166. 
23 Webber (n 21) 168.  
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While it is correct to recognise that authoritative forms of constitutional 
interpretation are likely to be highly significant, it seems unnecessarily restrictive 
to limit the definition so that it only refers to such contexts. Surely constitutional 
interpretation, like statutory and legal interpretation, is a practical form of 
reasoning that can occur in multiple and non-authoritative contexts. Further, to 
regard interpretation as necessarily ‘legalistic’ is problematic. In the legislative 
process, interpreting the meaning of either a clause in a Bill or a constitutional 
principle is a very different activity to that performed by courts. Within the 
legislature the political nature of the interpretation means that the restrictions 
associated with the practice in the legal context are less relevant. Feldman puts 
forward an account of constitutional interpretation that rejects the notion that the 
practice must be authoritative and that it is limited to the interpretation of a 
codified constitutional text: 
The first task of the constitutional interpreter is to present what seems to 
him or her to be the best, or most legitimate, form of allocation of 
functions, powers and duties between institutions, and the proper 
restrictions on them, having regard to the matrix of textual and non-
textual rules and practices recognized by constitutional actors in the 
state’24 
Feldman’s approach reflects the fact that for him, constitutional interpretation is 
something that is done by ‘all public officials and constitutional commentators’.25 
This fits with the approach of a number of scholars of constitutional law around 
                                                
24 D Feldman, ‘Factors affecting the Choice of Techniques of Constitutional 
Interpretation’ in Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien (ed), L’Interprétation 
Constitutionnelle (Dalloz 2005) 2.  
25 Feldman, ‘Factors affecting the Choice of Techniques of Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (n 24) 3.  
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the world, particularly in the United States, who regard constitutional 
interpretation as a practice that occurs in many different contexts, including the 
legislature.26 One of the reasons to value constitutional interpretation outside of 
the courts, is precisely because within a political context, interpreters can afford 
to be more creative, and less legalistic in their approach to deciding the meaning 
of a particular constitutional norm. 
 
2.1.2 What counts as constitutional in the United Kingdom?  
A more difficult definitional question for this project is to decide what counts as 
‘constitutional’ in the United Kingdom. In order for constitutional interpretation 
to be distinguished from other forms of reasoning, arguably it must be possible to 
determine whether the object of interpretation is constitutional. The uncodified 
nature of the UK constitution makes this difficult.27 This subsection explains this 
thesis’ basic approach to determining what counts as a ‘constitutional’ norm for 
the purposes of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. 
 
The definition of constitutional interpretation used here refers to the 
interpretation of a constitutional norm rather than simply constitutional law. 
Wheare defines the constitution as ‘the collection of legal rules and non-legal 
rules which govern the Government in Britain’.28 Non-legal rules are a key part 
of the UK constitution, as they are in many countries which have codified 
constitutions, and this means that what constitutional interpretation interprets 
                                                
26 See 1.4; for example M Tushnet, ‘Some Observations on Legislative Capacity 
in Constitutional Interpretation’ (2008) 2 Legisprudence 163.  
27 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The Process of 
Constitutional Change (HL 2001-02 69) para 60. 
28 K Wheare, Modern Constitutions (OUP 1960) 21.  
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must in the UK context refer to more than just the interpretation of law. 
Constitutional principles, conventions and practices are all constitutional norms 
that are subject to constitutional interpretation. The importance of the 
interpretation of non-legal constitutional norms highlights the point that 
constitutional interpretation can be non-authoritative and non-binding. 
Ultimately, in any context constitutional interpretation does not normally only 
refer to the authoritative interpretation of a codified constitution.  
 
Deciding what counts as constitutional is considered to be wholly subjective by 
some. Jennings made the point in the following terms: 
What is in the constitution is “constitutional”, what is not in it is not 
“constitutional”. But where there is no such document it is quite 
impossible to make a distinction which is not purely personal and 
subjective.29 
The current Government agrees with this assessment.30 The danger is that in 
arriving at my own subjective definition of what is ‘constitutional’, the thesis will 
present an account of constitutional interpretation that is divorced from the reality 
of the political context. It is also worth noting that the very notion of interpreting 
the UK constitution is unrealistic according to some accounts, in the sense that 
some take a non-normative view of the UK constitution. Bogdanor described the 
constitution as ‘a resume of historical experience, rather than a set of normative 
                                                
29 I Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th Edition, University of London 
Press 1959) 38.  
30 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Ensuring standards in the 
quality of legislation: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of 
Session 2013–14 (HC 2013-14 611) paras 58-60. 
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principles’.31 While Griffith’s famously claimed that ‘the constitution of the 
United Kingdom lives on, changing from day to day, for the constitution is no 
more and no less than what happens’.32 Each of these statements are right in their 
own terms, but they are also misleading in the sense that they do not recognise 
that the constitution is made up of norms that dictate how laws should be made 
and Government power exercised.33 It is these norms that are the subject of 
constitutional interpretation.  
 
One of the most important categories of constitutional norms in the United 
Kingdom is constitutional legislation. This increasingly prominent category of 
constitutional norms is one of the most prominent subjects of constitutional 
interpretation. Hazell describes them as ‘in quantitative terms… the most 
important single source of constitutional law in the United Kingdom’.34 He also 
recognises that ‘there is no clear classification of what is a constitutional Bill and 
what is not, and with our unwritten constitution it is impossible to devise one’.35 
Famously, Laws LJ attempted to do precisely that in the case of Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council:  
A constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship 
between the citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) 
                                                
31 V Bogdanor, ‘Constitutional Law and Politics’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 454, 456.   
32 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 
19. 
33 A Goodhart, ‘The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty’ (1958) 106 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 943, 951.  
34 R Hazell, ‘Time for a new convention: parliamentary scrutiny of constitutional 
bills 1997-2005’ [2006] Public Law 247, 247.  
35 Hazell (n 34) 271.  
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enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as 
fundamental constitutional rights.36 
He went on to explain that constitutional statutes could not be subject to implied 
repeal. This challenged the idea that parliamentary sovereignty prevented the 
legal system recognising a hierarchy in the legal status of the Acts of Parliament. 
Laws LJ gave the example of the EC Act 1972, which he said was ‘by force of 
common law, a constitutional statute’.37  
 
Feldman has recently provided a powerful critique of Laws’ approach.38 Feldman 
argues that there is a problem with connecting ‘constitutional’ to fundamental 
rights. The basic problem is two-fold. Firstly, some constitutional legislation is 
not concerned with rights, in other words it is under-inclusive.39 Secondly, it is 
also over-inclusive because some very technical legislation enlarges or 
diminishes the scope of fundamental rights but does not merit the adjective 
‘constitutional’.40 Instead Feldman recommends ‘an institutional approach’ as an 
alternative: 
Constitutional legislation establishes state institutions and confers 
functions, responsibilities and powers on them. Such legislation 
constitutes the state and lays out its structure. These are important, and I 
suggest core, functions of a constitution. An institutional approach may be 
particularly valuable in the United Kingdom, both because not all 
                                                
36 [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin).  
37 Ibid.  
38 D Feldman, ‘The Nature and Significance of "Constitutional" Legislation’ 
(2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 343.  
39 Feldman, ‘The Nature and Significance of "Constitutional" Legislation’ (n 38) 
347. 
40 Feldman, ‘The Nature and Significance of "Constitutional" Legislation’ (n 38) 
348. 
 53 
constitutions recognise fundamental rights, and because the key function 
of a constitution is (in my view) to constitute the state and its institutions 
and confer functions, powers and duties on them.41 
Feldman’s focus on the role of constitutional law in establishing and regulating 
the key institutions of state is an important reminder that there is a significant 
body of constitutional norms that are not rights. These norms are particularly 
important to Parliament, because it is responsible for defending the role of the 
parliamentary process within the constitution. Feldman also challenges Laws’ 
approach by arguing that entire Acts should not be classified as constitutional, but 
rather we should focus upon the status of individual provisions.42 This is also an 
important point for my approach, in the sense that the object of constitutional 
interpretation need not be a whole Bill or Act that is considered to be 
constitutional. Instead, a specific provision within a Bill or an Act can be 
considered to have constitutional effect even if the general subject matter of the 
Bill or Act is not constitutional. Rather than the focus on the whether an Act has 
constitutional status, it is better to consider whether the substance of a specific 
provision can be considered constitutional.43 
 
There are important differences of opinion about the precise boundaries of this 
category, but outside of the Government, particularly within the courts, it is 
widely accepted that the category exists, and that it has important implications. In 
Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Lord Bingham said that 
                                                
41 Feldman, ‘The Nature and Significance of "Constitutional" Legislation’ (n 38) 
350. 
42 Feldman, ‘The Nature and Significance of "Constitutional" Legislation’ (n 38) 
353.  
43 A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 
2009) 294. 
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because the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was ‘in effect a constitution’, then the 
provisions should be interpreted purposively.44 Most recently, in the HS2 case, 
Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance said the following:  
The United Kingdom has no written constitution, but we have a number 
of constitutional instruments. They include Magna Carta, the Petition of 
Right 1628, the Bill of Rights and (in Scotland) the Claim of Rights Act 
1689, the Act of Settlement 1701 and the Act of Union 1707. The 
European Communities Act 1972, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 may now be added to this list. The 
common law itself also recognises certain principles as fundamental to the 
rule of law. It is, putting the point at its lowest, certainly arguable (and it 
is for United Kingdom law and courts to determine) that there may be 
fundamental principles, whether contained in other constitutional 
instruments or recognised at common law, of which Parliament when it 
enacted the European Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate 
or authorise the abrogation.45 
There is a great deal worth unpicking in this paragraph; however, the most 
significant for these purposes is the recognition of a distinct category of 
constitutional norms. The approach of Lord Mance and Lord Neubeurger may be 
different from other constitutional actors, but there can be little doubt that the 
distinction between ordinary and constitutional law is now firmly part of UK 
constitutional discourse. In the courts, leading judges have developed a number 
                                                
44 [2002] UKHL 32.  
45 R (HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 
UKSC 200. 
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of distinct approaches to the interpretation of constitutional legislation. The aim 
of this thesis is to examine the approach of parliamentarians. 
 
In order to side step the problems associated with subjectivity, my approach to 
the definition of what counts as constitutional is to rely upon the definition 
offered by the Constitution Committee:  
The set of laws, rules and practices that create the basic institutions of the 
state, and its component and related parts, and stipulate the powers of 
those institutions and the relationship between the different institutions 
and between those institutions and the individual.46 
This broad working definition is helpful because it highlights the breadth of 
norms, both in form and function, which can be considered constitutional within 
Parliament. The Committee then added that the constitution is also made up of 
the following five tenets: 
▪ Sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament 
▪ The Rule of Law, encompassing the rights of the individual 
▪ Union State 
▪ Representative Government 
▪ Membership of the Commonwealth, the European Union, and other 
international organisations.47 
In a later report, on the subject of constitutional change, the Committee explained 
that the fact that there is not a ‘watertight’ definition of what counts as 
                                                
46 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Committee, Reviewing 
the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working (HL 2001-02 11) 
para 20.  
47 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution Committee (n 46) para 
21. 
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‘constitutional’ in the United Kingdom does not mean that it is not possible in 
practice to identify norms that are ‘constitutional’.48 While it is important not to 
assume that the Committee’s definition represents Parliament’s position, at the 
same time this project aims to present a realistic account of the approach taken 
within what is the relevant ‘interpretive community’.49 Although parliamentarians 
and the Constitution Committee do not explicitly consider themselves to be 
engaged in constitutional interpretation, this thesis is not seeking to impose an 
externally formulated account of what counts as constitutional. The aim is to 
analyse the practice through the lens of what parliamentarians considered to be 
constitutional. As Llewellyn points out, institutions are responsible for 
determining how much weight to place upon particular constitutional norms and 
which norms to validate; the norms do not validate the institutions.50  
 
The uncodified status of the UK constitution does make a major difference to 
how Parliament interprets constitutional norms. One of the motivating factors 
behind this thesis is to identify what difference the absence of codification makes. 
At the same time, the absence of an objective or technical definition of what 
counts as a constitutional norm does not mean that the interpretation of 
constitutional norms does not occur. It is important not to exaggerate the 
uncertainty caused by the nature of the constitution. There is a consensus within 
the UK on the constitutional status of a number of norms, and in many cases 
                                                
48 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The Process of 
Constitutional Change (HL 2010-12 177) para 7.  
49 S Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (OUP 1989) 153.  
50 K LLewelyn, ‘The Constitution as an Institution’ (1934) 34 Columbia Law 
Review 1, 19.  
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there is also a consensus within Parliament that a particular Bill or clause has 
‘constitutional implications’. 
 
2.1.3 Parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
One of the motivations of this thesis is to outline how the parliamentary context 
influences the value and character of constitutional interpretation. It is clear that 
the perspective of the institution is partly responsible for the nature of the 
constitutional interpretation that occurs within it.51 The important preliminary 
question addressed here is: to what does parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation refer? The answer to this question determines the basic parameters 
of the thesis. The previous chapter set out the basic approach, and the aim of this 
section is to set out in some detail what counts as an example of the practice. 
 
The review of the relevant literature did not produce any research which sought 
to systematically examine the role constitutional interpretation has within the 
parliamentary legislative process in the UK. There is a growing body of research 
on the role of human rights and constitutional norms within Parliament, and some 
of this work highlights the distinctive features of Parliament’s approach to the 
application of these norms, and particularly committees.52 Much of the significant 
body of work in the United States on constitutional interpretation within the 
                                                
51 W Blatt, ‘Interpretive Communities: The Missing Ingredient in Statutory 
Interpretation’ (2000-2001) 95 Northwestern University Law Review 629, 639; 
Feldman, ‘Factors affecting the Choice of Techniques of Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (n 24). 
52 A representative sample of this work would include: A Sathanapally, Beyond 
Disagreement (OUP 2012); D Feldman, “The Impact of Human Rights on the 
UK Legislative Process” (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 91, 104–115; J Hiebert, 
‘Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR help facilitate a culture of 
rights?’ (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1. 
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legislature does not explain the precise boundaries of what counts as part of the 
practice, in part because it is rare for it to directly engage with empirical analysis 
of the legislative process.53 As a consequence, this thesis sets its own distinct 
parameters of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. It would be wrong to 
imply that this thesis began with a prejudged idea of how constitutional 
interpretation operates within the parliamentary context. One of the aims of the 
empirical work was to learn more about the character of the practice. The 
approach used was open-minded at the outset, but some basic criteria were 
developed to inform my analysis.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis ‘parliamentary’ refers to legislative deliberation 
within Parliament. Constitutional interpretation outside of the legislative process 
was excluded.54 This decision was in part designed to narrow the focus, but also 
to reflect the fact that interpretation is, in my view, such an important part of the 
process of legislative debate and scrutiny within Parliament. A significant 
proportion of the debate in Parliament on Bills and clauses turns on how they are 
interpreted. As Oliver-Lalana points out, a key feature of parliamentary 
argumentation, is that parliamentarians take interpretive standpoints on legal 
                                                
53 N Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation (2001) 51 Duke Law 
Journal 1335; R Bauman and T Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: The 
Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (CUP 2006); N Devins and L 
Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (OUP 2004); N Devins and K Whittington, 
Congress and the Constitution (Duke University Press 2005). 
54 For analysis of the use of constitutional principles within Parliament but 
outside of the legislative context see: D Nicol, ‘Legitimacy of the Commons 
Debate on Prisoner Voting’ [2011] Public Law 681; S Fredman, ‘From dialogue 
to deliberation: human rights adjudication and prisoners' rights to vote’ [2013] 
Public Law 292; G Phillipson, ‘Historic’ Commons’ Syria vote: the constitutional 
significance (Part I)’ and ‘Historic’ Commons’ Syria vote: the constitutional 
significance. Part II – the Way Forward’  UK Constitutional Law Blog (29th 
November 2013) (both available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org).  
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norms, including both on clauses within a Bill and existing legal and 
constitutional norms.55 Even in the context of the legislative process, it is difficult 
to determine the precise boundaries of the practice. In one article on 
constitutional interpretation in the Canadian federal and provincial legislatures, 
Lajoie et al suggest that constitutional interpretation can refer to all legislative 
enactments, on the basis that there is the implicit decision that the legislation is 
within their jurisdiction.56 The problem with this approach is that, as Tushnet 
indicates, it is probably too generous.57 It assumes that the legislature has 
engaged in constitutional interpretation, even when legislators may not even have 
considered the constitutional implications of the change to the law enacted. 
Further, this approach does not fit within the UK constitutional context, where 
constitutionality does not determine the legality of an Act of Parliament. On the 
other hand, to focus only on explicit examples of constitutional interpretation will 
result in analysis of a narrow subset of participants.58  
 
For the purpose of identifying examples of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation, the following definition was used: 
The interpretation of the constitutional effect of a Bill by a parliamentary 
actor during the legislative process in Parliament.  
This definition captures two main uses of the practice. The first use of the 
practice is when a parliamentarian interprets a constitutional norm as part of the 
                                                
55 Daniel Oliver-Lalana (n 4) 245.  
56 A Lajoie, C Bergada and E Gelineau, ‘Legislatures as Constitutional 
Interpretation’ in R Bauman and T Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: 
The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (CUP 2006) 390-391. 
57 M Tushnet, ‘Is Congress Capable of Conscientious, Responsible Constitutional 
Interpretation?’ (2009) 89 Boston University Law Review 499, 503. 
58 Ibid. 
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debate on the content of a Bill. In this scenario the constitutional norm in 
question, the object of interpretation, can either be a pre-existing constitutional 
norm, for example a constitutionally significant provision (such as the section 1 
of the Constitutional Reform Act) or a non-legal constitutional norm, or it can 
refer to a clause within the Bill that is being considered. If a Bill proposes to 
introduce a new constitutional norm, for example the establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament (section 1 of the Scotland Act 1998), then the interpretation 
of the relevant provision within the debate is a form of constitutional 
interpretation. When the norm in question is not part of the Bill being debated, it 
is used to identify the constitutional effect of a Bill. For example, the rule of law 
might be used to highlight the constitutional effect of a clause with retrospective 
legal effect. The second use of the practice is when the interpreter is interpreting 
the constitutional effect of a Bill, or a particular clause, but without referring to a 
pre-existing constitutional norm or to a clause within a Bill that could be 
considered a constitutional norm. In this scenario, the object of interpretation is 
the constitutional effect of a clause that is not a constitutional norm, but is a 
clause that is considered to have constitutional effect. An example of this second 
scenario is a Henry VIII power or clause, which grants a Minister a power to 
make secondary legislation that can amend primary legislation for a particular 
purpose. Such a clause regulates the relationship between the Government and 
Parliament, but is not a constitutional norm in the conventional sense, in part 
because it only would normally only apply to a particular context, for example 
public bodies. The identification of this second use of the practice was based on 
the fact that at some point in the parliamentary process, a parliamentary actor, for 
example the Constitution Committee, regarded a clause as having constitutional 
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effect. Once a clause is identified as being constitutional significant within 
Parliament, the entire parliamentary debate on that particular clause was 
examined to identify examples of the interpretation of the constitutional effect of 
the clause. In this context constitutional interpretation need not refer to a 
particular constitutional norm, as a parliamentarians’ analysis of the merits of 
such clause is considered to form part of Parliament’s identification of the 
constitutional effect of a Bill. 
 
The parliamentary legislative process guided the parameters used to define the 
practice for this project. Contributions to debate, individual amendments and 
parliamentary reports need to be understood in the context of the content of the 
Bill being considered, and most importantly the parliamentary debate from which 
they form a part. Contributions to debate cannot always be evaluated outside of 
the context of the total deliberations of the Bill. The aim of the analysis is not to 
evaluate the interpretation of individual parliamentarians or parliamentary 
committees, but rather to analyse the use of constitutional interpretation in the 
context of the complete parliamentary journey of a particular Bill.59 The relevant 
unit of analysis is the overall institutional performance of Parliament during the 
passage of the Bill, from introduction to Royal Assent. To engage in any form of 
analysis that seeks to evaluate how a parliament or legislature contributes to the 
                                                
59 M Tushnet, ‘Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts: Incentives and 
Institutional Design’ in R Bauman and T Kahana (eds) The Least Examined 
Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (CUP 2006) 371; N 
Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation (2001) 51 Duke Law Journal 
1335, 1397; M Tushnet, ‘Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: 
Some Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies’ (1999) 50 Duke Law Journal 
1395, 1398.  
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legislative process through debates and amendments, it is necessary to take into 
account the entire process.60 
 
2.2 Methods in the relevant literature  
Empirical analysis of the legislative process poses many methodological 
difficulties. The difficulty for this thesis, which is conceived as an exercise in the 
academic discipline of law, is that there is no established clearly articulated legal 
method for qualitative analysis of the legislative process. Research in political 
science on the legislative process has many important lessons for this project. 
However, a significant proportion of the methods used in that literature are 
designed to produce causal claims, based on testing variables and hypotheses.61 
Such methods are not suited to this thesis’s research aims. This thesis does not 
attempt to measure the influence or impact of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation on legislation. Instead the aims are to identify the character and 
value of the practice. These aims require detailed engagement with substance of 
parliamentary negotiations on a Bill, and therefore rely upon different methods 
from those that are used to measure the influence of legislative scrutiny on 
legislative outcomes. This section reviews the methods used by studies of the 
legislative process in the UK in both law and political science. 
 
                                                
60 F Hage and M Kaeding, ‘Reconsidering the European Parliament’s Legislative 
Influence: Formal vs Informal Procedures’ (2007) 29 Journal of European 
Integration 341, 351. 
61 R Post, ‘Law Professors and Political Scientists: Observations on the 
Law/Politics Distinction in the Guiner/Rosenberg Debate’ (2009) 89 Boston 
University Law Review 581, 584. 
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2.2.1 Public law and the parliamentary legislative process in Westminster 
Danny Nicol’s EC Membership and the Judicialisation of British Politics, 
published in 2001, is a rare example of a study of Parliament’s legislative 
deliberation from the perspective of a public lawyer. 62 The object of the book is 
to examine ‘what was in the mind of Parliament when it passed the European 
Communities Act 1972 and other statutes which have incorporated European law 
into our law’.63 He describes his task ‘as to assess how widespread and how deep 
were parliamentary understandings of the constitutional law implications of 
membership’.64 The study relies upon the parliamentary debates in Hansard as 
the primary material. The book contains a number of case studies of the passage 
of different Bills. Each study relies upon qualitative analysis of Parliament’s 
deliberations to probe the extent to which parliamentarians ‘understood’ the 
implications of the Bill or Bill(s) in question. The key feature of Nicol’s research, 
for my purposes, is that it uses a subject-specific approach to qualitative analysis 
of the legislative process. Nicol uses his understanding of the constitutional 
implications of the relevant Bills to analyse the strength and weaknesses of the 
parliamentary deliberation. The detailed chronological analysis of the debate 
allows Nicol to draw some important conclusions on the factors that can affect 
the substance of parliamentary deliberation. For example, Nicol notes that during 
the passage of the European Communities Act 1972, the Government failed to 
deliver a consistent message on the constitutional impact of the Bill that in turn 
hindered effective consideration of the relevant issues.65 
                                                
62 D Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialisation of British Politics (OUP 
2001).  
63 Nicol (n 62) ix. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Nicol (n 62) 115.  
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Nicol’s work is also important because it includes an explanation of the 
limitations of Hansard analysis. A particular problem for his project is that his 
main research question is to assess parliamentarians’ ‘understanding’ and this is 
arguably very difficult to establish from Hansard. Nicol acknowledges this point: 
‘what parliamentarians said may not correspond with what they knew or 
believed’.66 Nicol also defends the value of systematic Hansard analysis. He 
argues that despite its methodological shortcomings it remains better than 
reliance on random quotations.67 
 
Nicol’s analytical approach to the case study of the European Communities Bill 
is particularly effective. Unlike the other chapters, it focuses exclusively on the 
passage of that one constitutionally significant Bill. It assesses the ‘adequacy of 
the consideration of the constitutional issues’ within the debate.68 It begins with a 
survey of the debate on the constitutional implications of the Bill that occurred in 
the run up to its parliamentary consideration.69 This provides the normative 
background for analysis of the form of the Bill as it was introduced. The analysis 
of the legislative passage of the Bill is divided by topic rather than simply by 
chronology. Nicol is able to use his understanding of the constitution to analyse 
the subjects examined within the debate on the Bill, for example a proposed 
amendment to the Bill that would have declared the ‘Ultimate Sovereignty of 
Parliament’.70 His analysis of the legislative process is interwoven with academic 
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68 Nicol (n 62) 76. 
69 Nicol (n 62) 76-81. 
70 Nicol (n 62) 94.  
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discussion of the issues at stake and this effectively conveys the nuances of the 
normative contours of the scrutiny of the Bill. Nicol’s approach to the qualitative 
analysis of the parliamentary deliberation provides a useful template for this 
thesis.  
 
There are a number of examples of article-length studies in public law that 
provide narrative accounts of the passage of constitutionally significant 
legislation. Rawlings’ account of the passage of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill is notable for the way it manages to weave analysis of the 
constitutional context with detailed analysis of both the legal and parliamentary 
technicalities that animated the passage of this politically controversial Bill.71 
Davis’s study of the passage of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 
combines an explanation of the influence of parliamentary scrutiny with analysis 
of the substance of the Bill.72 Horne and Walker’s recent evaluation of the 
parliamentary scrutiny of the Terrorism, Prevention and Investigation Measures 
Act 2011 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 is another important example 
of this form of analysis.73 Horne and Walker test the scrutiny of both Bills against 
the ‘assertions of political constitutionalism’.74 Each of these examples shows 
that a narrative account of the passage of a Bill can form the basis of qualitative 
analysis of the legislative process. The Hansard Society has also produced 
                                                
71 R Rawlings, ‘Legal politics: the United Kingdom and ratification of the Treaty 
on European Union: Part 1’ [1994] Public Law 254.  
72 P Davis, ‘The Significance of Parliamentary Procedures in Control of the 
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 66 
important publications that contain a number of in depth case studies of specific 
Bills.75 They use a narrative model as the basis to make a number of concrete 
recommendations to improve the legislative process.  
 
Parliaments and Human Rights is another important recent contribution to the 
public law literature on Parliament.76 The report by Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper 
and Paul Yowell identifies and evaluates references to the JCHR in Parliament 
since 2000. The research goals of their report are very different to those of this 
thesis, and those of the public law studies examined above. Their overall aim is to 
ascertain how debate in Parliament on human rights has changed since 2000.77 
The key difference is that they use a quantitative approach as the basis of their 
qualitative analysis. The methods used are nonetheless worth setting out in detail 
in order to highlight the differences between their approach and the case study 
method detailed above. 
 
The first aim of the report’s analysis of parliamentary debates is to identify 
substantive references to JCHR reports. A substantive reference is one that makes 
use of the content of the report in some way, rather than simply a mere mention 
of the JCHR.78 The methodology was to use the JUSTIS Parliament database to 
search for references to the JCHR and then the results were classified as either 
                                                
75 See The Hansard Society, Making the Law: The Report of the Hansard Society 
Commission on the Legislative Process (The Hansard Society 1993); The 
Hansard Society, Law in the Making (The Hansard Society 2008); See also S 
Kalitowski, ‘Rubber Stamp or Cockpit? The Impact of Parliament on 
Government Legislation’ (2008) 61 Parliamentary Affairs 694. 
76 M Hunt, H Hooper and P Yowell, Parliaments and Human Rights (AHRC 
2012).  
77 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 17. 
78 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 20-21. 
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substantive or non-substantive.79 The resulting data showed a marked increase in 
the number of substantive references in the 2005-2010 Parliament compared to 
the 2000-05 Parliament.80 On the basis of this finding, the authors decided to 
focus their quantitative analysis of the data on the substantive references to the 
JCHR during the 2005-2010 Parliament. The authors analysed the quantitative 
data, and the report uses a table to show who makes use of the reports and how 
they are used. This produced some noteworthy findings. For example, the report 
notes that the six of the members of the JCHR came in the top seven of the high-
frequency users of the reports.81 The report also shows that 60% of substantive 
references came in the context of legislative scrutiny.82 
 
The second objective of the analysis of the references to the JCHR in 
parliamentary debate is to ‘evaluate parliamentary deliberation with respect to 
arguments referring to JCHR reports and the effect of the work of the JCHR on 
parliamentary debate about human rights’.83 To do this, the report uses an 
evaluative framework of five main considerations: 
1. What use was made, explicitly or implicitly, of human rights 
sources in the debate? 
2. What use was made, explicitly or implicitly, of the concept of 
proportionality? 
3. Has the work of the JCHR led the Government to provide more 
detailed justification for laws and policies affecting human rights? 
                                                
79 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 20. 
80 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 22.  
81 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 24-25.  
82 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 30. 
83 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 37. 
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4. Has the work of the JCHR framed, stimulated or influenced debate 
in Parliament? 
5. Has the work of the JCHR led to more informed debate in 
Parliament? 
To answer these questions the report uses qualitative analysis of some of the 
substantive references documented by the search of the parliamentary debates. 
For example, in relation to question 1, the report concludes that the reports of the 
JCHR have provided a framework for discussing human rights issues within 
Parliament.84 However, the answers to some of the questions asked, particularly 
question 3, highlight the limitations of the quantitative approach to analysis. The 
quantitative data produced provides a limited basis for addressing some of the 
questions that relate to the nature of the JCHR’s influence on the legislative 
process. For these points, the report relied on the substantive references produced 
by their database search, and oral evidence obtained from parliamentarians.85 The 
limits of this approach made it difficult for the report to explain in much depth 
how the reports of the JCHR influence legislative debate. They acknowledge 
these limitations, but one wonders if the answers to these evaluative questions 
may have been better served by looking at a smaller data sample in greater depth.  
 
These legal studies of the content of parliamentary debate in Westminster provide 
important lessons for this thesis’ methodology. Nicol’s study highlights the 
benefits of an in depth case study approach, which uses a contextual narrative to 
demonstrate how the content of the debate develops, and how different factors 
affect the quality of Parliament’s deliberation. In contrast, Parliaments and 
                                                
84 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell (n 76) 40.  
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Human Rights relies predominantly on quantitative analysis, and this provides an 
important insight into the role of the JCHR within Parliament over a ten-year 
period. However, the benefit of these insights is offset by the absence of detailed 
qualitative analysis of the contribution that the reports of JCHR make to 
Parliament.86 
 
2.2.2 Political science  
Political science places a greater emphasis on empirical methods than legal 
scholarship, and there are a number of studies of the UK legislative process 
within political science that rely on sophisticated empirical methods. Despite this, 
there have been relatively few large-scale studies of the UK legislative process.87 
The major difference between the disciplines is that many political scientists are 
‘non-normative’ in their approach,88 meaning that they tend to treat the legislative 
process predominantly as a power broking process, and this does not always 
adequately reflect the ‘legal’ elements of the procedure.89 However, despite this 
and other differences there is much that can be learnt from their approach to 
analysing the legislative process within Parliament. This section reviews some of 
the most notable studies and highlights which aspects inform my own approach. 
 
                                                
86 It should be noted that a number recent studies of the Human Rights Act 1998, 
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Dialogue Working under the Human Rights Act 1998?' [2011] Public Law 773; 
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Griffith’s Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills was the first major study 
of legislative scrutiny in the United Kingdom. Although, Griffith was a public 
lawyer, this work is recognised to be contribution to political science.90 It 
examines three parliamentary sessions: 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1970-71. 91 
Griffith’s principal motivation for the research was the lack of accurate 
information on the nature of the impact of legislative scrutiny.92  Griffith’s 
methods were designed to look beyond the formal measures of impact. Griffith 
looked at the ‘quality as well as the quantity of the impact of the Houses’.93 This 
required a qualitative analysis of the importance of individual amendments. This 
creates difficulties ‘as there is no alternative to using general words to describe 
the greater or less importance of particular judgements’.94  
 
One of the most significant results of Griffith’s approach to the study of 
legislative scrutiny was that he identified that many Government amendments 
responded to arguments made earlier in the debate by parliamentarians outside of 
Government.95 This meant that the well known fact that a very high percentage of 
Government amendments are successful, and that a very small percentage of non-
Government amendments are agreed, does not paint a complete picture of the 
influence of legislative scrutiny of Government Bills. 96  This is crucial to 
                                                
90 G Webber, ‘Parliament and the management of conflict’ [2014] Public Law 
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91 JAG Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (George Allen & 
Unwin 1974). 
92 Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 91) 13.  
93 Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 91) 14. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 91) 206.  
96 This is true in many legislatures see D Olson, Democratic Legislative 
Institutions: A Comparative View (ME Sharpe 1994) 84.  
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understanding the nature of the United Kingdom’s legislative process. 
Assessment of legislative scrutiny requires comprehensive analysis of every stage 
of the parliamentary passage of a Bill in order to identify the connections 
between Government amendments and legislative scrutiny from outside 
Government. This formed a crucial part of Griffith’s methodology.97 It also adds 
further subjectivity to the process of identification, as it is not always clear cut 
that a Government amendment is a direct response to non-Governmental 
arguments or amendments, especially, as the Government amendment can 
represent a compromise or it may be difficult to identify the source of the original 
argument from within the debate on the Bill. His overall conclusion is that 
parliamentary scrutiny does make a significant impact on legislation. But at the 
same time he recognised that the Government accepts change on its own terms or 
on the rare occasions ‘when opposition to some part of their proposals is strong 
and widespread’.98 The study’s contribution to legislative studies in the UK is 
hard to exaggerate, and it contains key lessons for my own study. The primary 
lesson is that tracking the development of specific arguments within the scrutiny 
of the Bill, which progresses across the different stages of the process and can 
end with a Government amendment, is a key method for studying the legislative 
process in the United Kingdom. 
 
Meg Russell has conducted research on the UK legislative process that explicitly 
aims to build on the example set by Griffith.99 In a 2007 paper Russell and Johns 
                                                
97 Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 91) 3. 
98 Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 91) 256. 
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develop an even more sophisticated version of Griffith’s methods and apply them 
to the legislative scrutiny of the Identity Cards Bill. They explain that their focus 
is on uncovering ‘Where in parliament the influence lay, and how the different 
actors in the legislative process interacted. That is, why and how did legislative 
change happen?’100 The study has three stated aims: to identify the number of 
amendments which were the result of non-Government forces, to reveal how the 
chambers interacted in achieving alteration of the Bill and to detail the 
coordination between the party groups and backbenchers.101 The paper sets out 
nine hypotheses each of which is designed to test these dynamics. 
 
Russell and Johns use a process of coding amendments in order to test these 
hypotheses. The paper analyses each of the 859 amendments to the Bill, and then 
codes each of them into ‘policy strands’.102 The basic idea is to group together 
amendments which occur at different stages of the legislative process. This 
enables the tracking of amendments which are eventually accepted, in some form 
by Government and turned into Government amendments. It enables Russell and 
Johns to classify the outcome of all the amendments tabled to the Bill. The 
methods used to strand are fairly complex, and for two amendments to form part 
of the same strand, they have to share the same effect and address the same 
provision within the Bill.103 The process revealed that 66.5 % (349) of the 
amendments were raised at only one stage in the legislative process, and 176 
passed through more than one stage, and one was considered in 14 separate 
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stages. 104  Another important method for the project was to classify the 
amendments according to their importance, as either: typographical, 
detail/clarification and substantive.105 These methods produced data that proved 
effective for testing their hypotheses, for example, they were able to show a 
significant proportion of government amendments responded to points made by 
backbenchers or opposition members earlier in debate.106 These methods are an 
effective way of tracing the origins of legislative amendments and for tracking 
the development of legislative scrutiny.  
 
Thompson’s study of the much maligned public bill committees in the House of 
Commons uses a similar approach to Russell and Griffith.107 Her study found that 
today’s public bill committees ‘are perhaps more negligible than before’.108 
These empirical methods are now an established part of political science in the 
UK. 
 
Russell has developed these methods further in a larger study that is due to report 
in 2014. That study examines six Bills from the 2005 and the 2010 Parliaments 
respectively. It represents the most significant research project on legislative 
scrutiny in the United Kingdom since Griffith’s classic book was published in 
1974. In two conference papers published in 2012, Russell and her co-authors 
explained how they developed the approach used in the ID Cards paper for this 
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project.109 Russell explains that this project is intended to test the general 
perception that Parliament ‘plays little role in policy-making’.110 One of the 
interim papers from the project sets out a number of the methodological 
challenges that arise from assessing the influence of legislative scrutiny: 
The answers remain elusive, due in large part to the methodological and 
design challenges that they present. The potential number of independent 
variables is huge (ranging from formal institutional structures and rules, to 
party systems and cultures, or the nature of the particular policy under 
scrutiny), while the dependent variable is difficult to define. It is not even 
clear that we know how to recognise an influential legislature when we 
see one.111 
Russell recognises that the assessment of legislative impact is often too 
simplistic.112 Part of the problem is the reliance on the language of strength, 
weakness, impact and influence. Indeed this is one of the strengths of a narrative 
approach to case studies, which can capture the nuance of the substance of the 
legislative debate, in part because it does not rely on this language, and 
recognises the uniqueness of each Bill.  
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The political science approach to studying the British legislative process contains 
two key lessons for my own approach. The first is that the influence of legislative 
scrutiny within the legislative process should not be judged on the number of 
successful non-Government amendments. This confirms the point that the 
evaluation of legislative deliberation on a particular Bill requires analysis of all of 
the stages of the process. The essential point is that lines of argument and 
amendments develop across the stages of the legislative process. The second 
point is that the principle of ‘stranding’ parliamentary debate is a valuable way of 
identifying how legislative deliberation on particular points develops over the 
course of the parliamentary stages on a Bill. 
 
2.3 Methods and parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
This section sets out the methods used to analyse the practice of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation in the parliamentary session of 2010-2012. One key 
lesson from the review of other studies of the legislative process in Parliament is 
that it is vital to explain how the methods chosen correspond to the research goals 
and to acknowledge the limitations of the methods used. The overall research aim 
was to identify the value and features of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation. This translated into three specific research aims for the empirical 
analysis of the primary material. Firstly, to document and analyse examples of 
the practice. Secondly, to evaluate the normative basis of the examples analysed. 
Thirdly, to determine the contribution that the practice made to the legislative 
process and to the constitution. 
 
 76 
2.3.1 The case study method 
The basic method used for the empirical analysis was to carry out three case 
studies of individual Bills. Each study uses a narrative account of the process to 
analyse the specific debates that contain the most prominent examples of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation. Each case study focuses on these 
specific lines of debate, and employs an evaluative framework to highlight the 
role played by constitutional interpretation within the parliamentary process. This 
means highlighting the role of reports, contributions to debate and amendments 
moved, and attempting to demonstrate the connections between these forms of 
parliamentary activity and the use of constitutional interpretation. 
 
The case study method is suited to my research aims for two reasons. The first is 
that it allows for in-depth analysis of the debate on each of the Bills selected. 
Each case study contributes to the account of the main features of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation, but each study also has its own independent value as 
a piece of research into the passage of that particular Bill.113 The approach is 
intended to link the analysis of the role of constitutional interpretation to the 
content of the Bill itself. The second is that the case study approach suits the 
‘normative’ focus of this thesis. The aim is not to try to measure the influence of 
the practice, nor is to quantify how prevalent it is over a particular period. Instead 
the aim is to present an accurate depiction of how the practice operates within the 
legislative process which can then be used to identify its main characteristics and 
its value. The aim is not to make deterministic conclusions as to the strength and 
influence of the practice, but instead to gain understanding of the internal 
                                                
113 R Gomm, M Hammersley and P Foster, ‘Case Study and Generalisation’ in R 
Gomm, M Hammersley and P Foster (eds), Case Study Method (Sage 2000) 99. 
 77 
mechanics of the process and how it can contribute to debate on the constitutional 
effect of a Bill. It is this basic evaluation of how the practice works which forms 
the basis of the analysis of why it is valuable, which is not necessarily related to 
its influence upon the Government. It is important to acknowledge that the case 
study approach does limit the strength of the generalisations drawn from the case 
studies.  
 
2.3.2 Case selection  
The case selection was narrowed to the first parliamentary session of the 2010 
Parliament. The 2010-2012 was nearly two years long, whereas most 
parliamentary sessions are normally around only one year. One reason for 
choosing to focus on this particular session was to provide an in-depth 
contemporary account of the practice. Further, the 2010-2012 is also notable for 
being the first session of the first peacetime coalition Government since 1932. 
The most important reason was that the Coalition’s legislative programme for the 
session contained a number of important constitutional Bills. There were forty-
one Government Bills which received Royal Assent in the 2010-2012 
parliamentary session, excluding the standard supply Bills, which are not 
scrutinised in the Lords. The first task was to work out which of these Bills might 
contain examples of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. As chapter 1 
explained, the aim was to focus on the interpretation of constitutional norms other 
than human rights, and on this basis I decided to narrow the range of Bills to 
those that generated a report from the Constitution Committee. The Committee 
reported on twelve Bills, which are detailed in the table below.  
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The only other ‘official’ parliamentary basis for determining which Bills have 
constitutional content, the convention within Parliament that Bills of first class 
constitutional significance should receive their committee stage in the House of 
Commons on the floor of the House,114 was not adequate for my purposes. The 
problem is that some Bills which have significant constitutional content are not 
considered to be of first class constitutional importance. Hazell observes that the 
designation of the Bill as constitutional, and therefore worthy of having its 
committee stage on the floor of the Commons ‘is decided only in part by 
reference to a set of principled criteria, because the decision is made by the 
business managers in the House of Commons’.115 Even though it does not 
provide a basis for selection, the table below highlights those which did fall 
within the convention. 
 







To put the terrorist asset-
freezing regime on a 
permanent statutory footing. 
The Bill raises a range of important constitutional 
concerns. These relate to the rule of law, to the 
principle of legal certainty, to the principle of 
effective parliamentary scrutiny, to the powers 
and responsibilities of the courts of law, and to 
the legal balance between executive powers and 
civil liberties. (Date report published: 21/07/ 
2010) 
 
2. The Public 
Bodies Bill 
[HL] 
To allow the Government to 





The use of Henry VIII clauses in the Bill was 
problematic. It did not pass the tests of 
constitutional propriety. (3/11/2010) 
                                                
114 M Jack and TE May, Erskine May's treatise on the law, privileges, 
proceedings and usage of Parliament (24th edn, LexisNexis 2011) 566. 










To provide for a referendum 
on the voting system for 
parliamentary elections; to 
provide for parliamentary 
elections to be held under 
the alternative vote ("AV") 
system if a majority of those 
voting in the referendum are 
in favour of that; and to 
reduce the number of 
parliamentary constituencies 
in the UK from 650 to 600 
 
Lack of pre-legislative scrutiny and criticism of 







To provide for fixed days 
for polls for parliamentary 
general elections. 
Concern over the approach to the Bill and the 
case for the change. (16/12/2010) 





To change the way in which 
the UK gives its agreement 
to specified EU decisions 
and Treaty changes; to 
underwrite the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in 
the EU context; and to allow 
for an adjustment of seats in 
the European Parliament. 
 
Concern over the complexity of the referendum 
locks, concern over the expansion of the use of 
referendums beyond fundamental constitutional 
matters, explains that the Bill does not change 






To reform oversight and 
management of policing in 
the UK 
From a constitutional perspective, the chief risk 
with Part 1 is that of politicising operational 
decision-making. (4/05/2011) 
7. The Police 
(Detention and 
Bail) Bill 
To "reverse" the effect of a 
High Court judgment dated 
19 May 2011 but published 
only on 17 June: namely, R 
(Chief Constable of Greater 
Manchester Police) v 
Salford Magistrates' Court 
and Hookway. 
Expresses concern over the highly unusual 
circumstances of the Bill. The Bill raises issues of 
constitutional principle as regards both the 
separation of powers and the rule of law. Concern 
over the lack of time to consider the Bill. 
(6/07/2011). 
 





To confer new competences 
on the Scottish Parliament, 
re-reserve some powers to 
the United Kingdom, 
conferring new powers on 
the Scottish Ministers, and 
to make considerable 
reforms to fiscal matters and 





Nothing of constitutional concern, analysis 







Gives effect to the 
recommendation of the 
Government's Review of 
Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Powers, published 
on 26 January 2011, that the 
current system of control 
orders should be repealed 
and replaced with a system 
of less restrictive and more 
focused "terrorism 
prevention and investigation 
measures", or "TPIMs". 
 
Sets out a number of concerns with the "terrorism 
prevention and investigation measures" regime, 
namely its effectiveness, whether or not it should 
be permanent, and that enhanced judicial review 
should be referred to in the Bill and the context of 
the Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects 
(Temporary Extension) Bills. (14/09/2011) 
10. The Health 
and Social Care 
Bill 
To implement a number of 
reforms to the National 
Health Service 
Questions the desirability of the proposed change 
to the constitutional and legal responsibility of the 





To repeal or reform 
measures which the 
Government considers 
unduly restrictive of 
individual liberty or which 
interfere disproportionately 
with individual rights. 
 
Expresses concern over the wide-ranging Henry 
VIII clause in clause 41(3). (2/11/2011) 




To reform the justice system 
by making changes to legal 
aid, litigation costs, 
sentencing and the 
rehabilitation and 
punishment of offenders. 
 
Explains a number of concerns relating to the 
restrictions that the Bill would impose on the right 
of access to justice. (16/11/2011) 
 
Three case studies were chosen to reflect both the range of constitutional issues 
raised within the above Bills and a number of different approaches to 
parliamentary scrutiny. None of the Bills selected were subject to pre-legislative 
scrutiny. The following Bills were chosen for the three case studies:  
• The Public Bodies Bill was introduced to the House of Lords, which is 
relatively rare for a controversial Bill. Of the Bills reported on by the 
Constitution Committee in this long session, only two were introduced to 
the House of Lords first, the other being the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. 
Bill. The Bill was chosen because of the focus on the issue of Henry VIII 
clauses, and the scale of the debate on constitutional issues in the Lords. 
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There were four committee reports on the Henry VIII powers in the Bill, 
and a number of amendments were made to the Bill to respond to the 
constitutional objections raised in the Lords.  
• The Health and Social Care Bill was chosen because it did not represent a 
typical constitutional Bill but nonetheless provoked a surprising amount 
of constitutional interpretation. The Bill proposed to change the way that 
existing statutes regulated the accountability of the Secretary of State for 
Health and this change prompted a significant amount of debate in both 
Houses of Parliament. The Constitution Committee played a particularly 
prominent role in the debate in the Lords.   
• The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was chosen because unlike the other two 
Bills selected, it was a clear example of a constitutional reform Bill. It 
received its committee stage on the floor of the House of Commons. 
Despite being a short Bill, its handful of clauses raised a number of 
important constitutional questions that were subject to extensive debate in 
both Houses, albeit without the benefit of pre-legislative scrutiny.  
 
2.3.3 Analysing the parliamentary process 
Each case study addresses three main research questions. Firstly, what were the 
main examples of the practice during the debate on the Bill? Secondly, what were 
the normative components of the practice identified within the debate on the Bill? 
Thirdly, how did the practice contribute to the legislative process within 
Parliament and to the constitution? These three questions informed the methods 
used to analyse the primary materials in each of the case studies.  
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The first step of the process was to acquire all the relevant materials. This meant 
all the publicly available Bill documents, the relevant pages of Hansard, and all 
the relevant committee reports. These materials are all available on the 
Parliament website,116 on which each Bill has a page which contains all the links 
to relevant pages of Hansard and every Bill document, including amendments 
papers, the different versions of the Bill, the official explanatory notes and 
relevant committee reports. I then conducted a sift through this material to 
identify which clauses within the Bill provoked significant examples of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation. 
 
Once the clauses within the Bill that prompted the most significant examples of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation were identified, I focused attention on 
all of the parliamentary debates on those particular clauses. I then attempted to 
identify the role that the practice played within those debates. Griffith’s and 
Russell’s approach show that is important to track how the debate develops 
across different stages of parliamentary process in order to evaluate a 
contribution to the parliamentary debate on a particular element of a Bill. So, for 
example, in order to appreciate the influence of a Constitution Committee report 
on a Bill that uses parliamentary constitutional interpretation to analyse a 
particular clause, it was necessary to follow the debate on that particular clause 
through every stage of the parliamentary process. It is important to recognise the 
limitations of this form of analysis. The reliance upon primary material and the 
absence of interviews or inside knowledge of the process makes it very difficult 
to establish causal claims. Establishing causal connections was not my primary 
                                                
116 <http://www.parliament.uk> last accessed 18 July 2014.  
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aim; accordingly I remained cautious about making claims that were not 
confirmed by the participants in the primary material. Once all the relevant 
material was identified, it was then a question of presenting it in a way that 
facilitated critical evaluation of the practice and addressed my research questions.  
 
The following approach was used to analyse the examples of the practice within 
each case study. The first part of each study provides an analysis of the 
constitutional framework of the Bill in the form it was introduced to Parliament. 
This part is designed to provide normative context and facilitate the qualitative 
analysis of the interpretation of the relevant norms in the debate. A key research 
aim is to identify how the normative elements of the parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation affect the way that the practice contributes to the debate on the Bill. 
The analysis of key constitutional elements of the Bill in the form it was 
introduced highlights how the constitutional analysis engaged with the normative 
elements of the Bill’s constitutional framework.  
 
The second part of each study critically analyses the examples of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation within the debate on each Bill. The critical analysis 
in the second part of each case study does three things. It highlights the main 
examples of the practice in the debate; it unpicks the normative ingredients of the 
most prominent examples of the practice in order to show how the constitutional 
analysis of the Bill was constructed; and it aims to show how the constitutional 
interpretation contributed to the passage of the Bill in question and to the 
constitution. In order to focus on these three aims, the analysis of the debate is 
divided into individual strands of debate. These show how the debate of each of 
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the elements of a Bill that provoked constitutional interpretation developed. Each 
debate covered includes analysis of all the forms of parliamentary activity that 
are relevant to assessing the role of the practice. The aim of the analysis is not to 
highlight each and every example of the practice, but rather to present an accurate 
account of the role that constitutional interpretation played in the major debates 
on the constitutional issues within each Bill during the legislative process within 
Parliament. 
 
2.3.4 The methods used in the second part of the thesis 
The second part of this thesis, Chapters 6, 7 and 8, uses the empirical analysis of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation to build an account of its value to both 
the legislative process and to the constitution. Chapter 6 generalises from the case 
studies in order to set out the basic features of the practice. In order to identify the 
value and character of the practice, the analysis combines the analysis from the 
case studies with a review of the relevant literature. Chapter 7 engages directly 
with a narrower range of literature on constitutionalism. It seeks to place the 
analysis of the value and character of parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
within a wider theoretical framework. Chapter 8 examines a number of practical 
changes that could be made to the legislative process to enhance the role of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation within the legislative process. For this 
chapter the reports of parliamentary committees and think tanks were particularly 
helpful. For the literature review a combination of online and physical searches 
was used. An initial search at the beginning of the project was used to refine the 
research questions, and the analysis of literature was regularly updated until 
submission.
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3. The Public Bodies Bill 
 
I urge this House to say that the means that has been adopted is 
constitutionally wrong so far as the partnership between the 
legislature and the judiciary that we value so much in this country.1 
 Lord Woolf 2 
 
This chapter is the first of three case studies, each of which seeks to 
critically analyse the parliamentary constitutional interpretation that 
occurred during Parliament’s deliberations on a Government Bill during the 
exceptionally long parliamentary session of 2010-2012.  
 
The Public Bodies Bill [HL] was introduced to the Lords on 28 October 
2010. The Bill used Henry VIII powers to, in effect, transfer a significant 
amount of legislative power from Parliament to the Government.3 As the 
quotation above from Lord Woolf indicates, the Bill departed from what 
certain peers considered to be constitutionally acceptable. The content of the 
Bill prompted a number of parliamentarians to engage in constitutional 
interpretation to communicate their position on the Bill. The aims of this 
chapter are threefold: to identify the main examples of the practice during 
the debate on the Bill; to analyse the normative components of those 
examples; and to evaluate the nature of the contribution that the practice 
made to the parliamentary process and to the constitution. 
                                                
1 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 77. 
2 Peer (Crossbench), former Lord Chief Justice, former Master of the Rolls 
and former member of the Constitution Committee. 
3 For a definition see 3.1.1. 
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The Bill prompted reports from both the Constitution Committee and the 
DPRRC. The interpretation and application of normative standards by each 
of these committees played a central role in the House of Lords’ 
deliberations. The passage of the Bill through the Lords highlights how 
these committees have increased Parliament’s capacity to engage in 
constitutional interpretation. The arguments made by both of these 
committees in their reports permeated throughout the debate in the Lords, 
and one of the aims of this chapter is to show how these arguments were 
used and developed over the stages of the parliamentary process. 
 
The main part of the chapter is divided into two sections. The first section 
sets out the constitutional framework of the Bill. The second section 
describes how parliamentarians interpreted that framework during the 
debate on the Bill. 
 
3.1 The constitutional framework of the Bill 
The Public Bodies Bill was not a first class constitutional Bill. It did not 
contain any new constitutional laws, nor did it seek to repeal any of 
significance. However, a number of parliamentarians argued that the Bill 
pushed at the boundaries of constitutional acceptability. This section 
provides some context to the debate on the constitutional effect of the Bill 
by setting out the basic normative architecture. It explains the basic 
structure of the Bill as introduced, and provides an analysis of the 
constitutional norms relevant to the Bill.  
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The origins of the Bill lay within the Conservative Party’s manifesto for the 
2010 General Election, which contained the following pledge:  
Any quangos that do not perform a technical function or a function 
that requires political impartiality, or act independently to establish 
facts, will be abolished.4 
After the election the Coalition Government announced that it would review 
all public bodies. The review concluded that changes should be made to 481 
bodies.5 Many of the public bodies that the Coalition Government wished to 
abolish or merge with other bodies or modify were created by statute, and 
therefore legislation was needed to give effect to the policy. The Bill was 
designed to enable changes to bodies created by primary legislation, but 
rather than simply draft a Bill which made the specific changes arising from 
the review, the Government opted to draft a new procedure for public body 
reform.  
 
The aim of the Government’s policy was to reduce the number of public 
bodies in order to increase accountability and to cut costs.6 This policy did 
not appear to raise any obvious constitutional issues. However, the Bill 
aimed to give departments the powers to execute the policy quickly and 
efficiently. The Bill’s Impact Assessment stated its aims to be ‘saving time 
on the floor of the House’ and ‘to allow departments to affect the changes 
                                                
4 Conservative Party Manifesto (2010) 70.  
5 The Cabinet Office, Public Bodies Reform – Proposals for Change (2010). 
6 The Cabinet Office, Public Bodies Bill Impact Assessment (2010) 1. 
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they need’.7 The problem was that the aims of the Bill, as opposed to the 
policy itself, did raise significant constitutional issues. 
 
3.1.1 The Bill as introduced to the House of Lords 
The Public Bodies Bill sought to create a way for the Government to make 
changes to primary legislation without having to use the standard 
parliamentary procedure for making Acts of Parliament.8 The Bill created a 
truncated procedure, which would allow the Government to change the 
primary legislation relating to public bodies by order. This form of 
delegated power is known as a ‘Henry VIII power’.9 For some, Henry VIII 
powers are problematic because they allow the Government to circumvent 
the normal democratic process.10  
 
In the form it was introduced to the House of Lords, the Bill contained 
seven order-making powers in seven clauses, each linked to a schedule, and 
each clause gave the Minister a particular type of power over each of the 
bodies contained in the corresponding schedule.11 Clause 1 was a power to 
abolish any body in schedule 1, clause 2 was a power to merge bodies in 
schedule 2, clause 3 was a power to modify the constitutional arrangements 
of a body listed in schedule 3, clause 4 allowed for a modification of 
funding arrangements of a body listed in schedule 4, clause 5 created the 
                                                
7 Ibid. 
8 The Public Bodies HL Bill (2010-12) 25.  
9 M Jack and TE May, Erskine May's treatise on the law, privileges, 
proceedings and usage of Parliament (24th edn, LexisNexis London 2011) 
667. 
10 N Barber and A Young, ‘The rise of prospective Henry VIII clauses and 
their implications for sovereignty’ [2003] Public Law 112, 113. 
11 The Public Bodies HL Bill (2010-12) 25. 
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power to modify or transfer functions of bodies contained in schedule 5, and 
clause 6 allowed a Minister to authorise the delegation of functions from a 
public body listed in schedule 6 to an eligible person.12  
 
Without doubt the most constitutionally controversial power of them all was 
clause 11. It gave the Minister the power to add any body listed in schedule 
7, of which there were 150, to any of the other schedules in the Bill. 
Schedule 7 included ‘bodies and offices where there is no policy intention to 
make changes to their status and functions’.13 Clauses 1-6 and 11 were all in 
effect Henry VIII clauses, in that many of the bodies included in each of the 
schedules were created by primary legislation and therefore the order-
making powers enabled the Minister to alter primary legislation through 
secondary legislation. 
 
Clause 8 contained the main legal constraints on the order-making powers 
within the Bill. It stated that when making an order a Minister must have 
regard to ‘increasing efficiency, effectiveness and economy in the exercise 
of public functions’ and ‘securing appropriate accountability to Ministers in 
the exercise of public functions’.14 Clause 8 also stated that a Minister could 
make an order only if ‘the order does not remove any necessary protection 
and if the order does not prevent any person from continuing to exercise any 
right or freedom which that person might reasonably expect to continue to 
                                                
12 Explanatory Notes to The Public Bodies HL Bill (2010-12) 25, para 87.  
13 Ibid.  
14 The Public Bodies HL Bill (2010-12) 25, cl 8. 
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exercise’.15  This was the only mandatory restriction on the Minister’s 
discretion. 
 
Another constitutionally significant element of the Bill was the 
parliamentary procedure used for orders made under the Bill. Orders made 
under each of the clauses in the Bill used a simple affirmative procedure.16 
This procedure allows for limited parliamentary scrutiny because there is no 
opportunity to amend an order. The procedure only allows for the order to 
be either approved or rejected outright. A further difficulty with this 
arrangement is that it is an established practice of the House of Lords that it 
does not regularly vote down the Government’s secondary legislation.17  
 
3.1.2 Henry VIII powers 
The norms that regulate the use of Henry VIII powers within primary 
legislation are complex and somewhat unclear. There is no primary 
legislation or soft law code to tell us when or how they can be used, and the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty means that, in theory, Parliament can 
sanction any form of delegated legislative power. However, the theoretical 
legal position is misleading. In reality Parliament does regulate the way that 
Henry VIII powers are used. Two committees, the Constitution Committee 
and the DPRRC, are both responsible for policing the boundaries between 
primary and secondary legislation. In the course of their work both of the 
Committees apply a series of standards to these powers, and these standards, 
                                                
15 The Public Bodies HL Bill (2010-12) 25, cl 8. 
16 The Public Bodies HL Bill (2010-12) 25, cl 10 and cl 12.  
17 Jack and May (n 9) 682.  
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in part, determine whether the nature of the Henry VIII powers within a Bill 
are politically acceptable.  
 
The use of Henry VIII powers, and delegated powers more generally, is 
controversial. Their use is central to the debate on the balance of power 
between Parliament and Government in the UK. In 1929, Lord Hewart 
famously argued in The New Despotism that delegated powers were 
problematic: 
A persistent and well contrived system, intended to produce, and in 
particular producing, a despotic power which … places government 
departments above the sovereignty of Parliament and beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court.18 
However, others have challenged the idea that the use of delegation 
legislation should be characterized in this way. The Donoughmore 
Committee on Ministers’ Powers, which reported in 1932, said that 
parliamentary sovereignty was not affected by the practice because the 
power to legislate had been expressly given by Parliament. 19  The 
Donoughmore Committee also noted, however, that Henry VIII powers 
should only be used in emergency or to bring an Act into operation.20 In 
1950, Griffith agreed with the Donoughmore Committee, and argued that 
claims about the incompatibility of the practice with parliamentary 
                                                
18 Lord Hewart of Bury, The New Despotism (Benn, London 1929) 14. 
19 The Committee on Ministers' Powers, Report of the Committee on 
Ministers' Powers (Cmd 4060, 1932) 65. 
20 Ibid.  
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sovereignty are based on a misconception of the principle.21 The principle, 
in his view, does not mean that Parliament is supreme over the Government. 
According to Griffith, Parliament does not have a ‘monopoly on power’ and 
therefore delegated legislation, when approved by Parliament, does not 
threaten the sovereignty of Parliament.22  
 
The debate on the constitutionality of Henry VIII powers has reared its head 
a number of times in the last 30 years. In 2001 Parliament enacted the 
Regulatory Reform Act 2001, which contained a number of Henry VIII 
powers. The DPRRC said that the powers within the Regulatory Reform 
Bill raised ‘matters of fundamental constitutional importance’. 23  The 
committee was concerned that the powers could have a profound effect of 
the legislative process: 
Depending on how this power was used by successive Governments, 
it would be capable of bringing about a major change in the long-
standing arrangements for the parliamentary consideration of 
legislation.24 
This was a problem for the committee, and they added:  
We do not believe that these new powers could conceivably be 
acceptable to the House in principle unless there were stringent 
                                                
21 JAG Griffith, ‘The Constitutional Significance of Delegated Legislation 
in England’ (1950) 48 Michigan Law Review 1079, 1083-84.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation, Fifteenth 
Report (HL 1999-00, 61) para 28. 
24 Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation (n 23) para 33. 
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safeguards to protect against potential abuse, including a sufficient 
measure of Parliamentary control.25 
The DPRRC also recommended the introduction of a sunset provision.26 
These reports on the Regulatory Reform Bill show that the DPRRC assesses 
the appropriateness of Henry VIII powers based on the subject matter of the 
Bill in question, the purpose of the power and the nature of the safeguards 
included. The basic principle is that safeguards, both in terms of the way the 
power is defined and in terms of the parliamentary procedure used, should 
reflect the significance of the relevant power. 
 
In 2005, the Labour Government introduced the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Bill. The Bill contained a Henry VIII power that was exceptionally 
wide in scope. The report of the Constitution Committee on that Bill said:  
The general acceptability of delegating powers to Ministers to 
change the statute book is now accepted within the United 
Kingdom’s constitutional system. The question in relation to the Bill 
is therefore whether Ministers should have power to change the 
statute book for the specific purposes provided for in the Bill and, if 
so, whether there are adequate procedural safeguards to ensure that 
Parliament has effective oversight and control over Ministers’ 
legislative powers. The Government’s original proposals for a power 
                                                
25 Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation (n 23) 36.  
26 A provision in a Bill that gives it an 'expiry date' once it is passed into 
law. 'Sunset clauses' are included in legislation when it is felt that 
Parliament should have the chance to decide on its merits again after a fixed 
period, Glossary Parliament website <http://www.parliament.uk/site-
information/glossary/sunset-clause> accessed 16 July 2014; Select 
Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation, Second Report (HL 
2000-01, 8) para 20.  
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to be used for “reforming legislation” clearly failed this test.27 
As with the DPRRC, the Constitution Committee’s ability to develop 
standards in its interpretation and analysis of Government Bills and to then 
apply those standards in their scrutiny is a major part of its contribution to 
the legislative process. Parliament’s scrutiny of the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Bill led to a number of amendments, which meant that 
the 2006 Act contained a number of significant safeguards. For example, the 
Act includes a complex ‘super-affirmative’ procedure for orders made under 
the Act, which means that amendments can be tabled to the orders, and that 
the committee in charge of scrutinising the order can veto the order.28 
 
Henry VIII powers are now established as a legislative option that can be 
used by Government in primary legislation. Parliament, through the DPRRC 
and the Constitution Committee, has developed principles and precedents to 
determine how they should be used. Interpreting these principles and 
precedents formed a central part of the parliamentary scrutiny of the Public 
Bodies Bill.  
 
3.2 The parliamentary debate 
This section identifies and critically analyses the main examples of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation during the debate on the Public 
Bodies Bill. The aims of this section are to highlight how parliamentarians 
                                                
27 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The Legislative 
and Regulatory Reform Bill (HL 2005-06, 194) para 35.  
28 P Davis, ‘The Significance of Parliamentary Procedures in Control of the 
Executive: a Case Study: the Passage of Part 1 of the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006’ [2007] Public Law 677, 687. 
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interpreted the norms that made up the Bill’s constitutional framework, and 
to evaluate the contribution that the examples covered made to the passage 
of the Bill through Parliament. Despite the lack of codified rules governing 
the use of Henry VIII powers, parliamentarians used the precedent of the 
Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 to judge the boundaries of 
constitutional propriety that applied to the Public Bodies Bill. 
 
The parliamentary journey of the Public Bodies Bill was atypical. Unlike 
most Bills, it was introduced to the Lords. When a Bill is introduced to the 
Lords, the House has a veto over the legislation because the Parliament Acts 
1911 and 1949 do not apply. Although the use of the veto is unlikely, it 
appears that starting in the Lords increases their ability to have a major 
impact on a Bill. Firstly, often Bills are deliberately chosen by Government 
to start in the Lords, because the Government is willing to accept changes to 
a Bill. Secondly, when a Bill is a Lords starter, the Lords does not act as the 
chamber of ‘sober second thought’.29 When the House of Commons has 
already approved a Bill, the pressure is on the House of Lords to approve 
the Bill so that it can become law, whereas when the House of Lords 
operates as the first chamber, it is free from the prior judgment of the 
Commons and the pressure to complete the work of the Commons. In this 
case, the Lords dominated the debate on the constitutional effect of the 
Public Bodies Bill, in the sense that by the time the Bill reached the 
Commons, most of the main constitutional questions had led to 
                                                
29 J Waldron, ‘Bicameralism and the Separation of Powers’ (2012) 65 
Current Legal Problems 1, 8. 
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amendments, and the Commons showed limited interest in those that 
remained. 
 
3.2.1 The Constitution Committee report  
The first constitutional analysis of the scope of the Bill within Parliament 
came from the Constitution Committee. Its report on the Bill, published 
before the second reading debate in the Lords, explained in highly critical 
terms that the use of Henry VIII powers in the Bill was not satisfactory.30 
The Committee’s analysis of the constitutional effect of the Bill is not an 
evaluation of the merits of this particular proposal, nor is it simply an 
informational account of what the constitutional implications of the Bill are; 
rather it is an analytical judgment based upon the interpretation and 
application of external normative standards. As such it is a significant 
example of the practice of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. 
 
The critical evaluation of the Public Bodies Bill is justified by the 
application of a test originally used in the Committee’s report on the 
Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill in 2006. The 2006 report said that 
Henry VIII powers should be ‘clearly limited, exercisable only for specific 
purposes, and subject to adequate parliamentary oversight’,31 The report on 
the Public Bodies Bill concluded that the clauses within the Bill failed to 
meet this test. 32  The strength of this conclusion is a product of the 
Committee’s ability to interpret and apply normative standards. In the 
                                                
30 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The Public Bodies 
Bill (HL 2010-12, 51). 
31 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 30) para 5. 
32 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 30) para 9.  
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absence of a codified constitution, the Committee’s ability to generate 
norms from constitutional principles is central to their ability to scrutinise 
the constitutional effect of the Bill. The test from the report on the earlier 
Bill served to fill the gap left by the absence of any codified regulation of 
Henry VIII powers. The Committee argued that Henry VIII powers are a 
‘constitutional oddity’ that challenge two constitutional principles. The first 
is that ‘only Parliament may amend or repeal primary legislation’.33 The 
second is that: 
It is a fundamental principle of the constitution that parliamentary 
scrutiny of legislation is allowed to be effective.34 
No authority is cited to support the existence of the latter principle. The 
Committee explained that these two principles can only be departed from 
where ‘a full and clear explanation and justification is provided’.35 The use 
of constitutional norms to demand a specific level of justification from the 
Government is a tool frequently used by the Constitution Committee.36 It is 
one of the strongest tools available to the Committee. It enables the 
Committee to say, in effect, that a particular departure from a constitutional 
norm is prima facie unconstitutional, but can be made constitutional if the 
Government can produce good reasons to explain why the departure from 
principle is necessary. It is a form of reasoning that closely resembles that 
                                                
33 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 30) paras 4 and 
6. 
34 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 30) para 6. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See for example: House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 
The Civil Contingencies Bill (HL 2003-04, 114) para 7; House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, The Banking Bill (HL 2008-09, 19) 
para 7. 
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used by the UK courts in human rights cases. For example, in R v Ministry 
of Defence, Ex p Smith, Lord Bingham said: 
The more substantial the interference with human rights, the more 
the court will require by way of justification before it is satisfied that 
the decision is reasonable. 37 
The proportionality test outlined by Lord Clyde in the case of de Freitas is 
also based on the idea that a departure from a valuable normative standard 
should only be accepted if the reasons for doing so are good enough.38 The 
Constitution Committee used the language of proportionality to tell the 
Government that the norms of the constitution create expectations of both 
the process of law making and the substance of the law.  
  
The report also addressed each of the main provisions within the Bill. In 
relation to the restrictions on the use of the power contained in clause 8, the 
Committee drew attention to the fact that the restrictions were drawn from 
the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.39 However, the 2006 Act 
contained more restrictions, including that the effect of the order should be 
proportionate to the policy objective, that the order should strike a fair 
balance between the public interest and interests of any person adversely 
affected by it, and that the order should not be of constitutional 
significance.40 The Committee in effect cited the restrictions in the 2006 Act 
as a precedent for how the constitutional norm cited –– that Henry VIII 
                                                
37 [1996] QB 517, 554. 
38 de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69.  
39 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 30) para 9. 
40 Ibid.  
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powers should be limited –– should be interpreted. The report also made use 
of the comparison with the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 to 
analyse the parliamentary procedure used in clause 10 of the Public Bodies 
Bill.  
 
The 2006 Act included a super-affirmative procedure that requires the 
Minister to consult before laying an order, and requires the Minister to take 
into account any representations or resolutions made by a parliamentary 
committee on a draft order, which is laid for 60 days.41 The report argued 
that Parliament could not be completely denied the opportunity to debate 
changes to bodies which were established by primary legislation, and 
therefore a more robust parliamentary procedure, such as that used in the 
2006 Act, should be included in the Bill.42 
 
The Constitution Committee’s report highlights a number of features of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation. The practice enabled the 
Constitution Committee to describe in precise terms why the constitutional 
effect of the Bill was problematic, both in terms of the content of the Bill 
and how the Government justified the substance. The constitutional 
interpretation explained exactly what the Government needed to do in order 
to bring the Bill in line with the principles of the constitution. Constitutional 
interpretation was used to provide a judgment on constitutionality, and the 
constitutional interpretation also supplied the rules themselves. In the 
absence of settled codified constitutional rules on Henry VIII powers, the 
                                                
41 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 30) para 7. 
42 Ibid. 
 100 
Committee was able to draw on its own reports to supply the normative 
basis for its judgment. The overriding value of both of these contributions is 
the ability to make the normative basis of the regulation of Henry VIII 
powers accessible and therefore relevant to the passage of this Bill. 
 
3.2.2 Second reading in the House of Lords 
Two features of the second reading debate in the House of Lords were 
significant for parliamentary constitutional interpretation. The first is that 
the Minister responsible for the Bill in the Lords, Lord Taylor of Holbeach 
(Conservative), indicated that the Government would be taking a 
constructive approach to negotiations on the Bill. For example, he said ‘this 
Bill was not a Lords starter by chance’.43 He explained that the Government 
wanted to make use of the Lords’ expertise to improve the Bill. The ability 
of parliamentarians outside of the Government to influence the content of a 
Bill after it is introduced depends to a large extent on the attitude of the 
Government. The Government’s proactive attitude meant that the Lords 
would not have to rely upon defeating the Government in order to get its 
position across. Lord Lester of Herne Hill (Liberal Democrat) revealed in 
his speech that he had already met the Ministers responsible on ‘several 
occasions’ and that they had ‘assured him of their intention’ to improve the 
essential safeguards and parliamentary procedures in the Bill.44 The attitude 
of Government provided a platform for those engaged in constitutional 
interpretation in their scrutiny of the Bill. It is also worth noting that despite 
                                                
43 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 64. 
44 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 99. 
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this positive attitude, the Government Minister did not directly acknowledge 
the constitutional implications of the use of Henry VIII powers in the Bill. 
 
The second feature was the impact of the Constitution Committee’s report 
on the debate. Of the 57 speeches made, 19 made reference to the report. 
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Labour), the Leader of the Opposition in the 
Lords, who made the first speech after the Government Minister, quoted 
extensively from the report.45 Reading the debate, it appeared that the Lords 
as a Chamber endorsed the judgment of the Committee’s report. Baroness 
Scotland of Asthal (Labour), a former Attorney General, said:  
In that [the Constitution Committee’s] report, members of our House 
of such eminence say with one voice that the Bill is wrong, that the 
tests are wrong, that the process is wrong… if the Minister disagrees 
with that analysis, could we please have the basis on which that 
disagreement is founded?46 
Another peer described it as ‘one of the most devastating critiques of a 
Government Bill that I have ever seen a committee of this House deliver’.47 
The ability of peers to use and to endorse the constitutional analysis of the 
Constitution Committee within the debate on the floor of the Lords is 
central to the Committee’s role within the legislative process. It 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the reporting function of the Committee, 
in that the value of their reports and the analysis within them depend on 
peers within the Lords using them as part of their scrutiny. The report did 
                                                
45 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 66. 
46 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 81. 
47 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 69. 
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more than just inform the debate; it supplied a non-partisan judgment on the 
constitutionality of the Bill, which the Lords could endorse. 
 
The second reading debate was also notable, because each of the three 
elements of the Bill that provoked the most significant examples of 
constitutional interpretation were analysed extensively in a number of the 
speeches. 
 
Schedule 7 and clause 11  
Schedule 7 and clause 11 were the source of much criticism. Baroness 
Royall said, ‘the Government propose to station permanently the sword of 
Damocles, throwing their current operations and future prospects into doubt 
and confusion’.48 She added that it was a power that struck ‘at the heart of 
parliamentary supremacy’.49 Baroness Andrews (Liberal Democrat) was 
perplexed by the fact that the Government was securing powers for 
Ministers to legislate in the future ‘without clear purpose or intent’.50 Lord 
Norton of Louth (Conservative), a current member and former chairman of 
the Constitution Committee, made the important point that the Government 
had presented a false dichotomy on the design of the Bill.51 He explained 
that while one Bill could make many changes to many public bodies, it did 
not require separate primary legislation for each public body, and therefore 
the scope of the Henry VIII powers in the Bill could not be justified by 
                                                
48 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 71. 
49 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 71. 
50 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 86. 
51 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 153.  
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claiming the need to save time.52 This point illustrates why the Constitution 
Committee demanded that the Government give more justification for their 
design of the Bill, as their reasoning did not stack up. Lord Norton 
described the design of the Bill as ‘lazy’, and he pointed out that a desire to 
save time is not sufficient justification for appropriating significant 
legislative powers from Parliament. 53  Lord Norton recommended that 
schedule 7 and clause 11 be removed from the Bill.54 Viscount Eccles 
(Conservative) agreed that schedule 7 should simply be dropped and 
suggested that a sunset clause should be inserted into the Bill in order to 
limit its scope, and to force the Government to propose another Public 
Bodies Bill when it knew what it wanted to do to the relevant public 
bodies.55 
 
Lord Woolf (Crossbench) also criticised clause 11 and schedule 7, but from 
a different angle. He argued against the inclusion of certain bodies in 
schedule 7 because of their involvement in the administration of justice and 
their potential impact upon judicial independence:  
I have to say to the Minister that I do not believe that this Bill, in so 
far as it refers to the bodies that I have indicated, is consistent with 
the Constitutional Reform Act… As is indicated here, we are not 
concerned with purpose; we are concerned with means, and I urge 
the House to say that the means that has been adopted is 
                                                
52 Ibid.  
53 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 154. 
54 Ibid.  
55 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 166.  
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constitutionally wrong so far as the partnership between the 
legislature and the judiciary that we value so much in this country.56 
The speech became a reference point in the debate, and was referred to in 23 
of the speeches given.57 Lord Woolf argued that these bodies should not 
have to fear that the executive could abolish or substantially change them by 
simply making an order.58 The use of s 3(1) of the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005 by Lord Woolf is noteworthy.59 S 3(1) provides that the Lord 
Chancellor and other Ministers with responsibility for the administration of 
justice ‘must uphold the continued independence of the judiciary’. It shows 
that statutory provisions that are designed to protect constitutional norms 
can be used by parliamentarians engaged in the analysis of the constitutional 
effect of a Bill. In the absence of a codified constitution, an appeal to a 
provision in a statute is an important tool of constitutional interpretation, in 
that it provides more traction than a reference to judicial independence or 
the rule of law in general terms.  
 
The scope of the power 
A number of peers argued that the existing restrictions on the powers in the 
Bill, set out in clause 8, were inadequate. Baroness Andrews stated: 
I have absolutely no confidence in the ability of loose terms such as 
freedom and efficiency to protect vital bodies and their functions, 
                                                
56 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, cols 75-77. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid; the same point was made by Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Labour) HL 
Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 181.  
 105 
especially when the rest of the protections offered in the legislative 
reform orders legislation has been left out of the Bill.60 
Lord Lester also argued that the Bill did not have adequate safeguards 
against the misuse of Ministers’ delegated powers. He engaged in close 
textual analysis of the statutory safeguards, highlighting the limitations of 
clause 8(2) which only operates ‘if the minister considers’ the matters in 
clause 8(2)(a) and (b).61 He questioned why the Bill did not include a 
provision that would restrict the use of the order-making powers to certain 
limited purposes.62 Lord Crickhowell (Conservative), a member of the 
Constitution Committee, explained that he and others in the Committee had 
met the Ministers and Bill team responsible for the Bill, and that he was 
troubled by their reference to ‘safeguards’ because the words ‘the Minister 
must have regard to’ and ‘if the Minister considers’ do not ‘provide any 
kind of reassurance’.63 Lord Norton compared the restrictions with those in 
the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, and expressed surprise 
that the Government had not included the same restrictions that were 
included in that Act.64 He noted the 2006 Act included a number of 
additional legal restrictions on the way in which the order-making powers 
could be used, including for example a limit on using the powers for 
‘constitutionally significant’ legislation.65 The use of existing legislation, in 
the form of the 2006 Act, was again central to the parliamentary analysis of 
the constitutional effect of the Bill. 
                                                
60 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, cols 86-87.  
61 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 99.  
62 Ibid. 
63 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 135. 





The other major focus for constitutional analysis was the design of the 
parliamentary procedure for agreeing an order. The general consensus was 
that the procedure did not allow for effective parliamentary oversight or 
scrutiny of orders made under the Bill. Lord Freeman (Conservative) 
described the process as a ‘procedural inevitability’.66 Baroness Royall 
explained that orders made under Bill might force the Lords to depart from 
the convention that the Lords do not reject statutory instruments.67 She 
explained that the skeleton nature of the Bill meant that the orders would be 
treated as exceptional and this was enough to justify departing from the 
convention.68 Lord Mayhew of Twysden (Conservative), a member of the 
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, was the first to say 
that the Bill should contain a super-affirmative resolution procedure, the 
procedure used in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.69 That 
process would require the Minister to take into account consultation after 
laying an order, and require the minister to take into account the view of 
parliamentary committees before he could come back with an order.70 Lord 
Crickhowell also recommended following the example of the Legislative 
and Regulatory Act 2006, which he explained requires ‘Ministers to take 
account of any representations, any resolution of either House and any 
recommendations of a parliamentary committee in respect of a draft order, 
                                                
66 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 84. 
67 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 71. 
68 Ibid. 
69 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 96. 
70 Ibid.  
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laid for 60 days’. 71  He also recommended that a provision requiring 
consultation and explanation of an order in an accompanying explanatory 
note should also be considered.72 Lord Roberts of Conwy (Conservative) 
explained the problem with the affirmative procedure: ‘orders cannot be 
amended in either house, are subject to time-limited debates and it is not our 
practice, in the house, to vote on them’.73 Lord Norton also supported the 
use of the super-affirmative procedure instead of a simple affirmative 
procedure.74 Again the precedent of the 2006 Act was instrumental. A 
distinctive feature of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is that 
parliamentarians can bring their knowledge, experience and institutional 
perspective afforded by legislative scrutiny to their analysis of the substance 
of a Bill that relates directly to Parliament. This parliamentary focus is a 
vital element of the practice.  
 
Read together, the second reading debate and the Constitution Committee’s 
report represent a detailed constitutional critique of the Bill’s constitutional 
effect. Peers set out a number of critiques on how the Bill challenged the 
existing delicate dynamics of a number of relationships in the constitution. 
The sections below track the debates and assess the role of constitutional 
interpretation on each of three constitutional issues debated at second 
reading: clause 11 and schedule 7, the scope of the power, and the 
parliamentary procedure.  
 
                                                
71 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 136. 
72 Ibid.  
73 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 147. 
74 HL Deb 9 November 2010, vol 722, col 154. 
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3.2.3 Clause 11 and schedule 7 
In its first report on the Bill, the DPRRC labelled the clause 11 power 
‘inappropriate’ and ‘unacceptable’.75 The report explained that it would 
have enabled a Minister to, for example, appropriate the functions of the 
Judicial Appointments Commission, and therefore alter the impact of the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, through secondary legislation.76 The report 
also pointed out that the power did not make any allowance for the different 
statutory functions of each of the bodies listed, whether they performed 
judicial, legislative or executive functions.77 The DPRRC suggested that the 
best option to solve the problems caused by clause 11 was to remove some 
of the power from the Bill altogether.78 In their second report on the Bill 
they reiterated that clause 11 and schedule 7 should be removed from the 
Bill.79  
 
On the seventh day of Committee, the Government Minister began the 
debate by offering an update on the ‘work that has taken place since the 
Committee last met to improve this Bill’.80 He announced that schedule 7 
and clause 11 would be dropped from the Bill. It is difficult to exaggerate 
the significance of this change in the context of the Bill. The Minister 
explained: ‘the Government have accepted the arguments that bodies and 
offices should be listed in the schedules of this Bill only where Parliament 
                                                
75 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, The Public 
Bodies Bill (HL 2010-12, 57) para 1. 
76 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (n 75) para 23. 
77 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (n 75) para 5. 
78 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (n 75) para 36. 
79 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, The Public 
Bodies Bill (HL 2010-12, 62) para 4. 
80 HL Deb 28 February 2011, vol 725, col 798. 
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has given its consent in primary legislation’.81 He added his name to the 
amendment led by Lord Norton to delete schedule 7.82 This intervention 
represented a major victory for the Constitution Committee, the DPRRC, 
Lord Woolf and all those who opposed schedule 7 and clause 11. The Lords 
used constitutional norms to set out a clear standard, that it is not acceptable 
to create Henry VIII powers on a ‘just in case’ basis without a compelling 
argument for doing so. Their ability to articulate why the Bill departed from 
constitutional norms was central to this change, which dramatically altered 
the nature of this Bill, challenging the idea that Parliament does not make a 
significant impact on the content of legislation. The change is likely to serve 
to inform future Governments contemplating trying to use Henry VIII 
powers. 
 
3.2.4 The scope of the power 
A number of parliamentary actors indicated that in order to make the Henry 
VIII powers conform to the norms of the constitution, the scope of the 
powers would need to be limited or ‘ring fenced’. The DPRRC argued that a 
change to the parliamentary procedure could not ‘on its own, bring a 
misconceived delegated power within the bounds of acceptability’.83 The 
broad nature of the powers meant that further amendments were required to 
effectively specify and limit the purposes for which the powers could be 
used.84 After second reading, peers demonstrated their ability to use a 
                                                
81 HL Deb 28 February 2011, vol 725, col 799. 
82 M Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords (OUP 2013) 188-189.  
83 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (n 79) para 3.  
84 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (n 79) para 4.  
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normative standard to devise practical legislative solutions to improve the 
Bill, and a number of limitations were added.  
 
Restrictions on the use of the power 
The first amendment considered in the committee stage in the Lords was 
designed to restrict the scope of the powers in the Bill. Lord Lester, the co-
author of the amendment, (the other being Lord Pannick (Crossbench)), 
explained that his proposed amendments would make the relevant Ministers 
accountable for breaches of the standards of public administration. 
Amendment 1 was a paving amendment for Amendment 175, which 
included four restrictions, on judicial independence, respect for human 
rights, proportionality and the independence of bodies that need to act free 
from ministerial interference.85 Amendment 175 was designed to ensure that 
any exercise of the delegated powers in the Bill would have respect for 
certain constitutional principles.86 It is a prime example of a clause designed 
explicitly to protect constitutional norms. Lord Campbell of Alloway 
(Conservative) expressed his support: ‘What he (Lord Lester) said was 
wholly consistent with the acknowledged function of this House to protect 
the constitution and to amend the Bill as it goes through’.87 Lord Pannick 
also made his case for the amendment in constitutional terms, arguing that 
the Bill ‘confers excessive power on the executive’.88 
 
                                                
85 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1011.  
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 111 
The authors of the amendment criticised the amendment proposed by the 
Government, which would only require the Minister to consider defined 
matters before exercising powers; in contrast, their own amendment would 
not leave it to the consideration of the Minister.89 Lord Soley (Labour), a 
member of the DPRRC, explained the problem with the drafting of the 
Government amendment: ‘once the minister has considered, he can still go 
ahead and carry out actions that he was thinking of taking with or without 
changes’. 90  The authors argued that their amendment ‘embodies the 
principle of the rule of law and judicial independence that are set out in the 
2005 Constitutional Reform Act’.91 This argument again highlights the 
significant of statutory protection of constitutional norms for parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation. For the authors of Amendment 1, the 
comparison with the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 was also 
crucial. Like the DPRRC, they disagreed with the Government’s position, 
which was that because the scope of the Public Bodies Bill was narrower 
than the 2006 Act it justified weaker restrictions. 
 
The Government responded constructively to Lord Lester and Lord 
Pannick’s amendment. The Minister agreed to look again at the issue of 
proportionality, even though he admitted he thought it was unnecessary.92 
On the amendment’s change from a consideration to a requirement the 
Minister was more resolute and insisted that the Minister should have the 
final say on whether the necessary conditions for making an order have been 
                                                
89 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1015. 
90 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1020.  
91 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1011.  
92 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1034. 
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met.93 The Government was left in little doubt about the strength of feeling 
behind the objections raised by Lords Lester and Pannick’s amendment, as, 
even though Lord Lester wanted to withdraw the amendment following the 
Minister’s reassurances, he was pushed by his fellow peers to put it to a vote 
–– and the result was a defeat of the Government with 235 votes in favour 
of the amendment and 201 against.94 The defeat sent a clear message that 
further changes were needed to make the Bill constitutionally acceptable. 
 
On 9 March the Government amendment 175ZA was moved. The 
amendment was the product of negotiations between the Government and 
Lord Lester and Lord Pannick that had followed the Government defeat on 
the first day of the Committee stage.95 It limited the use of the order-making 
power for bodies that conduct three types of functions: firstly, a judicial 
function; secondly, where the body conducts enforcement activities in 
relation to obligations imposed on a minister; and thirdly, where the body 
oversees a Minister’s functions. 96  It also created a proportionality 
requirement. 97  The amendment was agreed without a division. The 
restriction clause remained weaker than the protection within the 2006 Act, 
but nonetheless represented a significant strengthening of the limits on the 
Henry VIII powers in the Bill. 
 
 
                                                
93 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1036. 
94 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1039.  
95 HL Deb 9 March 2011, vol 725, cols 1742-1743. 
96 HL Deb 9 March 2011, vol 725, cols 1743-1744. 
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The purpose of the power  
The DPRRC’s second report on the Bill also argued that further 
amendments were required effectively to specify the purposes for which the 
powers could be used.98 Their analysis of the Minister’s response to their 
first report was particularly important. The Minister claimed: ‘The powers 
under the 2006 Act apply at large, whereas the powers under the Bill can 
only be exercised in relation to the bodies specified in it’.99 The DPRRC 
disagreed with this view because the powers in the 2006 Act are limited to a 
particular purpose and cannot be used to abolish or create a regulatory 
function, whereas neither of these limits applied to the Public Bodies Bill.100 
By dissecting the Minister’s counter-argument, the DPRRC was able to 
progress the debate on the nature of the problem with the scope of the Bill. 
The DPRRC’s third report on the Bill, published on 8 March, reiterated the 
point that the powers needed to be limited to a specific purpose.101 
 
On 4 April the Government moved an amendment that responded directly to 
the DPRRC’s demand for a provision that would limit the purpose of the 
main powers in the Bill.102 It limited the purpose of the order to ‘improving 
the exercise of public functions, having regard to a) efficiency b) 
effectiveness c) economy d) securing accountability to Ministers’.103 The 
explanatory document which must accompany a draft order must explain 
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how the order serves these purposes. Despite the relative vagueness of the 
purposes listed, and the use of the term ‘having regard’ as opposed to more 
mandatory language, the amendment nonetheless added an additional limit 
to the scope of the powers. 
 
Sunset clause 
The first report of the DPRRC recommended that a sunset clause be added 
to the Bill.104 Baroness Royall of Blaisdown, a member of the DPRRC, 
followed this up by moving an amendment to introduce a sunset clause.105 
She explained: ‘It is not right and proper that powers granted by the other 
schedules are left unchecked for Parliament after Parliament’. 106  She 
explained that she learnt the value of sunset clauses from a Constitution 
Committee report.107 The Government Minister assured Baroness Royall 
that he would be willing to introduce a sunsetting amendment. As a 
consequence Royall withdrew her amendment. On 9 May, Baroness Royall 
of Blaisdon introduced a sunsetting clause. It was supported by Government 
and was agreed without amendment.108 It had the effect of sunsetting each 
of the entries to the schedules, so that each entry will come to an end five 
years after the day the Act comes into force. As each entry is time-limited 
rather than the Bill itself, it remains possible for the Bill to act as the 
legislative vehicle for future public bodies reform. The Bill could be 
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repopulated in the future through primary legislation.109 The sunset clause is 
an important example of a legislative tool that can allow Parliament to 
increase its ability to hold the Government to account. The use of such a 
tool can be justified when a Bill represents a challenge to the balance of 
power between Parliament and Government. The clause acts as a sort of 
insurance policy, to limit the risk of the Bill’s transfer of power. 
 
Conclusion  
Read together, these three limits described above changed the nature of the 
Henry VIII powers in the Bill. The interpretation of norms relating to the 
use of Henry VIII powers served as an analytical basis for each of the three 
amendments made. The legislative process is sometimes seen as a forum for 
policy debate. However, this discussion has shown that the principles of the 
process can also be translated into substantive provisions. Parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation is the practice that moulds these principles into 
practical solutions to difficult constitutional questions. 
 
3.2.5 Parliamentary procedure  
Unlike the opposition to the scope of the order-making powers in the Bill, 
the argument for greater parliamentary oversight of the order-making 
procedure within the Bill was met with sustained resistance from the 
Government. The Bill as introduced used a simple affirmative procedure 
and the complex negotiations towards an alternative procedure during the 
committee stage reflect the Lords’ understanding of parliamentary 
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procedures. The pattern of development was similar to that of the legal 
restrictions on the scope of the order-making power, in that the Constitution 
Committee that raised the issue initially, and then the DPRRC, provided the 
detailed analysis of the procedure during the more intricate negotiations of 
the committee stage. A further parallel was that the precedent of the 
Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 dominated the debate. The 
Government also made use of the example of the 2006 Act to argue against 
a procedure that would allow Parliament to amend an order made under the 
Bill. The arguments used by Government are instructive of how it can also 
make use of legislative precedents to strengthen its own justification for its 
position on the Bill.  
 
The DPRRC played a major role in making the case for strengthening the 
parliamentary oversight of the order-making powers within the Bill. In its 
first report on the Bill, the DPRRC made the case for the use of the same 
super-affirmative procedure that was used in the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006, primarily because it gives Parliament an opportunity to 
make representations on a draft order, which in turn enables the 
Government to change the order.110 The DPRRC’s second report on the Bill 
contained detailed analysis of the Government’s amendments to the 
procedure. The Government had introduced an ‘enhanced-affirmative’ 
procedure, similar to the super-affirmative procedure, in that it provided for 
different levels of scrutiny. But crucial differences with the 2006 Act 
                                                
110 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, The Public 
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remained, and the report outlined three main differences between the two 
procedures.  
 
The 2006 Act’s requirement for the Minister to have regard for 
representations, resolutions and recommendations is triggered merely by a 
recommendation of a committee of either House, whereas for this Bill it 
required a resolution of the House.111 The 2006 Act procedure contained a 
veto procedure, which meant that a committee can stop proceedings until a 
resolution of the House reverses it, but this Bill did not use this ‘veto’ 
mechanism.112 Lastly, the 2006 Act required that a Minister ‘wishing to 
proceed with an order unaltered after having been required to have regard to 
representations must lay a statement before Parliament giving details of any 
representations received’. 113  The DPRRC report disagreed with the 
Government’s view that the discrepancy was justified by the fact that the 
powers in the Bill are narrower than those in the 2006 Act.114 While it was 
true that the powers of the 2006 Act potentially applied to a wide range of 
legislation and this Bill only applied to listed Public Bodies, the DPRRC 
argued that the powers of the 2006 Act were limited by a stated purpose, 
namely to reduce legislative burdens and to promote regulatory principles, 
which lessened the potential controversy of the orders.  
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In contrast, the DPRRC claimed that the order-making powers in the Public 
Bodies Bill could potentially be used to make quite controversial changes to 
important public bodies, and such measures should be subject to effective 
scrutiny.115 The Government was intent on designing a system that could 
allow uncontroversial measures to be passed quickly and to allow more 
controversial orders to be subject to a rigorous process, but this proved a 
challenging task. 
 
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Baroness Royall, Leader of the Opposition in 
the House of Lords, tabled a number of amendments designed to introduce a 
procedure similar to the super-affirmative procedure used in the Legislative 
and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.116 They explained that the most important 
part of that procedure was that it ‘provides for a committee of either house, 
charged with reporting on a draft order, to recommend that no further 
proceedings be taken in relation to the draft order, unless that 
recommendation is rejected by a resolution of the House’.117 This is known 
as the veto. Their proposed procedure would also allow the committee to 
recommend that an order be amended, or that it should be brought forward 
as primary legislation. 118  Baroness Thomas of Winchester (Liberal 
Democrat) then made an intervention, speaking as the Chair of the DPRRC. 
She reiterated the point made in the DPRRC’s second report, that the 
parliamentary procedure set out in the Government amendments was not as 
                                                
115 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Government 
Amendments: The Public Bodies Bill, (HL 2010-12, 108) para 18.  
116 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1086.  
117 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1087.  
118 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, cols 1088-89.  
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effective as that contained within the 2006 Act and that the crucial 
difference was the absence of the veto power for the parliamentary 
committee in this procedure.119 
 
The Government rejected the procedure suggested by Lord Hunt of Kings 
Heath and Baroness Royall. The explanation of the rejection by the Minister 
represents the most sophisticated justification of the constitutionally 
controversial elements of the Bill offered by the Government during the 
legislative process. The Minister argued that to allow a committee to reject 
and amend an order, as the Hunt and Royall procedure proposed, would 
‘fundamentally change the role of Parliament in dealing with secondary 
legislation’. 120  He noted that giving the House the power to amend 
secondary orders would be ‘virtually unprecedented’, and very difficult to 
achieve effectively.121 This point essentially draws upon the conventions 
that regulate the Lords’ relationship with secondary legislation. The Lords 
do not routinely vote down the Government’s legislation, and some see this 
practice as a result of the primacy of the House of Commons. Whatever the 
source, the practice highlights the limits of the Lords’ powers in relation to 
the Government. The second reason for rejecting the suggested procedure 
was that the Public Bodies Bill’s order-making powers, the Minister 
claimed, are narrower than the 2006 Act.122 He explained that such a 
procedure would not be proportionate to the powers in the Bill, and it should 
be remembered that at this point schedule 7 had not yet been removed from 
                                                
119 Ibid.  
120 HL Deb 23 November 2010, vol 722, col 1093.  
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid.  
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the Bill. This view directly contradicted that of the DPRRC, referred to 
above. The third reason was that if this process were to apply to each and 
every order made under the Bill this would amount to an ‘excessive 
hindrance on the reform programme of the Government’.123 This again 
appeared to rely on the constitutional rationale that Parliament should not 
unduly restrict the Government’s legislative business, which seems to 
contradict the thrust of the arguments made by opponents to the Bill as 
introduced and accepted by Government. He added that the Government’s 
preferred procedure was ‘both sensible and proportionate, striking a balance 
between Parliament's ability to scrutinise and the Executive's ability to take 
forward its programme for government’.124 Despite his defence of their 
proposal, he indicated that he was willing to consider the DPRRC’s 
arguments. In response, Lord Taylor did not agree that his proposal would 
necessarily grant the House the ability to amend orders, and agreed to 
withdraw his amendment on the basis of the Government’s assurances to 
look again at the issue.  
 
In response, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath challenged the Minister’s 
constitutional interpretation of the conventions that govern the House of 
Lords’ scrutiny of delegated legislation. He said: 
I dispute that interpretation. I refer him to paragraph 10.02 of the 
Companion which states clearly: ‘The House of Lords has only 
occasionally rejected delegated legislation’. It then goes on to say: 
‘The House has resolved “That this House affirms its unfettered 
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freedom to vote on any subordinate legislation submitted for its 
consideration’”.125 
He also mentioned a report of the Joint Committee on Conventions which 
recommended that it was perfectly proper for the House of Lords to defeat 
secondary legislation in circumstances when the parent bill was a skeletal 
bill.126 The Minister responded, stating: ‘I think that the only statutory 
instrument to have been voted down in my time in this House was the 
casinos order. I think that it is reasonable to say that we do not do it. 
Whether we should is a different issue altogether.’127 Lord Norton of Louth 
argued that the fact that the Lords had not used its powers does not mean 
that it is a convention, stating ‘I see no reason why we should not exercise 
our due powers’.128 Despite the difference of opinion, the engagement with 
the disputed convention shows how parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation can be used to reveal the content and status of important 
constitutional norms, even if what they reveal is that reasonable people 
disagree on how they should be interpreted.  
 
On 7 March the DPRRC published another report on the Bill, which 
responded to the latest set of Government amendments to the parliamentary 
procedure.129 Government amendments had removed one of the DPRRC’s 
previous objections to the procedure, and now a committee of the House, 
rather than a resolution of the House, could trigger the enhanced 
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129 The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Government 
Amendments: The Public Bodies Bill, (HL 2010-12, 108).  
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procedure.130 However, the other two distinctions remained, and the report 
drew attention to the limitations of such a procedure. In particular, it 
reiterated the argument that order-making powers in the 2006 Act were not 
to be used for ‘controversial’ matters, and the DPRRC implied that the 
procedure might not be suited to scrutinising the type of reform that could 
be made through the powers in this Bill.131  
 
On 9 March Lord Hunt of Kings Heath again moved a series of amendments 
to the parliamentary procedure proposed by Government. 132  The most 
significant of these, Amendment 118B, would give the parliamentary 
committee the power to amend as well as veto draft orders and to 
recommend that the proposal be taken forward instead through primary 
legislation.133 The Minister reiterated his opposition to this power on the 
basis that it would fundamentally alter the House of Lords’ relationship with 
secondary legislation, and to effect this change was not within the scope of 
this Bill.134 He also argued again that such a restricted procedure was not 
proportionate to the scope of the Bill, especially now that schedule 7 had 
been removed.135 Further, the Minister explained that the Government had 
amended its own amendment so that the enhanced scrutiny procedure could 
now be activated by a recommendation of a committee of either House.136 
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In the report stage, on 4 April, a final attempt was made by Lord Hunt of 
Kings Heath to strengthen the parliamentary procedure used in the Bill.137 In 
response, the Minister restated the now well-rehearsed position on the 
comparison between this Bill and the 2006 Act: 
To impose a veto on these orders by a single Select Committee of 
either House and a capacity for Parliament to amend orders under 
this bill is excessive, bearing in mind that Parliament will have given 
its explicit consent both to the Bill as a whole and to the inclusion of 
each separate body in the schedules.138  
This line of reasoning would appear to clarify the Government’s position on 
the Lords’ relationship with secondary legislation, in effect saying that the 
consent to the primary legislation justifies limiting the Lords’ role over the 
order-making process. The final attempt at forcing a change was put to the 
House and defeated by 218 to 158.139 
 
The final version of the procedure fell short of what many peers argued was 
required, and the Government resolutely opposed the idea that a super-
affirmative procedure, with a veto power, should be used in this case. 
Despite not securing the change to the extent that many would have liked, 
the repeated exchanges over the correct procedure served to highlight the 
Government’s position on the constitutional boundaries that regulate 
Parliament’s relationship with secondary legislation. 
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The changes made in the Lords that are detailed above were approved by the 
Commons and formed part of the Bill when it received the Royal Assent. It 
is important to emphasise that the passage of this Bill, and the extent of the 
amendments, are far from typical. As Russell notes, the changes made to the 
Bill were notably ‘far-reaching’.140 As introduced, the Bill contained very 
limited restrictions on the delegated powers in the Bill, but by the time it 
reached the Commons it contained a number of different forms of limits, 
and most notably, the most constitutionally offensive Henry VIII power had 
been removed. While the significance of these changes should not be played 
down, it is also important to recognise that some of the changes described 
could be what Cowley calls ‘carefully calibrated concessions’. 141  The 
Government sometimes includes clauses that it is not committed to, in order 
to soak up scrutiny in the Lords, and such was the level of concessions 
during the passage of this Bill that it is possible that the Government was 
never committed to schedule 7. The causation behind the changes is not my 
primary focus, but it is important to recognise that within the parliamentary 
context the Government is to a large extent in control of how much 
influence constitutional interpretation has on a Bill. In this case, however, 
the Government’s attitude meant constitutional interpretation was central to 
the passage of the Bill; and here the aim is to summarise some of the 
features of the practice that emerged from the debate. 
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The first feature is the central role of parliamentary committees. 
Parliamentary committees have a number of institutional features, which 
provide a platform for constitutional interpretation within the legislative 
process. The first is the ability to issue reports that generate responses on the 
floor on the House of Lords and from Government. Each of the two 
committees involved in the analysis of the Bill was able to produce reports 
that communicated a level of constitutional analysis that would be very hard 
to replicate in a speech. The reporting function allows this constitutional 
analysis to gain a high level of prominence. Further, the nature of the 
constitutional effect of this particular Bill produced an effective double 
pincer movement, whereby the Constitution Committee analysed the broad 
principles at the outset, and the DPRRC followed up with the detail in three 
subsequent reports during the negotiations on how to amend the Bill. Their 
approaches perfectly complemented each other, maximizing their influence 
upon the debate. The DPRRC’s ability to follow up and issue additional 
reports was especially important to the debate, as the Bill was subject to so 
many amendments. The multiple interventions ensured that the authority in 
Parliament on the balance between primary and secondary was able to 
contribute to the debate at every stage in the Lords.  
 
A second feature of the practice was its ability to contribute to the process 
of holding the Government to account for the constitutional effect of the 
Bill. Despite the proactive attitude of the Government, and its willingness to 
collaborate, it is important that Parliament be able to hold the Government 
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to account by extracting and scrutinising its reasons for the constitutional 
effect of proposed change to the law. One of the distinguishing features of 
the parliamentary form of constitutional interpretation is that it forms apart 
of the negotiations between the Government and those parliamentarians 
engaged in scrutiny of a Bill. This dynamic is central to the parliamentary 
legislative process, and one of the values of constitutional interpretation is 
that it can supply a principled basis for scrutiny and negotiation on the 
constitutional effect of a Bill. This in turn can prompt the Government to 
develop its own justification for the constitutional effect of the Bill. The 
DPRRC’s use of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 as a 
comparison prompted the Government to explain why it thought that the 
Public Bodies Bill was narrower in scope. Prompting this type of 
justification of the constitutional effect of a Bill is a feature of the practice. 
Constitutional interpretation presents an analytical context for evaluating the 
Bill, which can help to explain what the effect of a Bill would be. In this 
sense the practice contributes to the accountability relationship between 
Parliament and Government, by increasing the level of justification of the 
constitutional effect of a Bill. This could be seen in the DPRRC analysis of 
the Government’s response to their first report. By facilitating exchanges 
between Government and parliamentary actors on the constitutional effect 
of the Bill, the practice is able to contribute to creating a site for ‘Socratic 
contestation’ of the meaning of the constitutional effect of the Bill.142 
Kumm defines Socratic contestation as ‘the practice of critically engaging 
                                                
142 M Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to 
Justification: The Point of Rights-based Proportionality Review’ (2010) 4 
Law & Ethics of Human Rights 142, 143. 
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authorities, in order to assess whether the claims they make are based in 
good reasons’.143 This contributes to a core function of the parliamentary 
legislative process: extracting, publicising and scrutinising the reasons for 
changing the law before the law is enacted.144 In this sense the interpretation 
of the constitutional effect provides an enhanced level of focus, whereby 
constitutional norms can be used as criteria to challenge the Government’s 
justification for the detail within a Bill.  
 
The third feature of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is the way it 
can be used to develop, to clarify and to highlight disagreements anout the 
norms of the constitution. The constitution and the law of this country 
provide little in the way of concrete accessible guidance as to how Henry 
VIII powers should be designed and utilised. And yet, during the debate on 
this Bill, a number of parliamentary actors were able to formulate rules that 
could be applied to the clauses before them. Parliamentary actors were able 
to take basic constitutional principles, for example parliamentary scrutiny of 
legislation should be allowed to be effective, and to apply them to the 
particular circumstances of the Bill by interpreting particular tests, for 
example Henry VIII powers should be subject to adequate oversight. The 
development of these concrete tests, applicable to the legislative context, 
made the content of the constitution relevant to the development of the Bill. 
This was valuable in terms of improving the fit of the Bill with the 
constitution, but also because it made the content of these important 
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constitutional norms more accessible. Constitutional interpretation in the 
UK is often not a question of discovering the intention of the original 
authors, because many of the principles are unwritten or uncodified. While 
this adds a degree of uncertainty and inaccessibility to the substance of the 
constitution, it also allows for a degree of dynamism in that it leaves scope 
for parliamentary actors, such as the Constitution Committee and DPRRC, 
to contribute to the development of the meaning of the constitution. The 
distinctive parliamentary perspective provided by constitutional 
interpretation within the legislative process strengthens the content of the 
constitution. Parliamentarians are ultimately constitutionally responsible for 
the norms that regulate their relationship with the Government, and it is up 
to them to ensure their continued relevance and development. It is only 
parliamentarians that can legitimately develop the standards and rules that 
relate to the correct balance between primary and secondary legislation, and 
a number of them took the opportunity to use constitutional interpretation to 
do this during the debate on this Bill – and make it count towards holding 
the Government to account and negotiating the content of the Bill. 
 
The fourth feature to emerge from the use of constitutional interpretation 
during the debate was the role of legislation. Legislation is an important tool 
for parliamentary scrutiny, and it appears that it is especially important to 
assessing the constitutional effect of a Bill. Unlike interpreting unwritten or 
codified principles, legislation has an author, and sometimes has a history of 
negotiation, which contributes to its accessibility. The Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006 proved central to the constitutional 
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interpretation during the passage of the Public Bodies Bill, and a number of 
points can be deduced from the use of this comparison as a tool for analysis. 
One of the primary reasons why it proved useful was that the House of 
Lords, including the Constitution Committee and the DPRRC, were heavily 
involved in the negotiations over the constitutional effect of the 2006 Act. 
In other words, it was not simply the Act itself that made it relevant, but it 
was also the debate, the analysis, and the constitutional interpretation within 
Parliament that informed the debate on the Public Bodies Bill. So while the 
statutory form of the provisions might make them easier to interpret and 
apply to a Bill than uncodified principles, their ability to serve as tools for 
constitutional interpretation was also a product of the quality of the scrutiny 
and debate that preceded their enactment. There is a cyclical quality of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation, whereby parliamentarians are 
able to import constitutional meaning into a statute through scrutiny. The 
enacted provision can then be used as a point of reference for further 
scrutiny. This appears to be an element of the practice with great potential.  
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4. The Health and Social Care Bill 
 
“It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health to … provide or secure 
the effective provision of services in accordance with the following 
provisions of this Act.” The language is simple; it is as curt as the 
Commandments. This is, however, the greatest task which has ever 
been placed upon the shoulders of any one man.1 
Lord Jowitt2 
 
The Health and Social Care Bill sought to reconfigure the Secretary of State 
for Health’s statutory responsibility for the National Health Service (NHS) 
in England, and this change was examined in detail within Parliament 
during the passage of the Bill. The change prompted concern, in part 
because the Bill proposed to remove the Secretary of State for Health’s 
historic duty ‘to provide’, to which Lord Jowitt is referring in the quotation 
above. This prompted a number of parliamentarians to question the 
constitutional effect of the Bill. This case study critically analyses the 
interpretation of constitutional norms in the debate on this particular aspect 
of the Bill. The research aims are the same as in the previous chapter: to 
identify the main examples of constitutional interpretation, to examine the 
normative content of the practice, and to identify what the practice brought 
to the scrutiny process within Parliament and to the constitution.  
 
                                                
1 HL Deb 8 October 1946, vol 143, col 3. 
2 Peer (Labour), Lord Chancellor (1945-1951). 
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The parliamentary constitutional interpretation prompted by the Health and 
Social Care Bill shares two similarities with that detailed in the previous 
chapter. The first is the role played by the Constitution Committee, whose 
report on this Bill was crucial in the deliberations in the Lords. The second 
is the focus upon the existing legislation. The constitutional effect of the 
Health and Social Care Bill related to a proposed amendment to legislative 
provisions within the National Heath Service Act 2006 (the NHS Act 2006), 
which were originally introduced to the statute book by the National Health 
Service Act 1946 (the NHS Act 1946). A number of parliamentarians 
grappled with the implications of the provisions on the statute book that the 
Bill sought to change, and this focus informed both the character of the 
constitutional interpretation and the nature of its contribution to the debate. 
 
In contrast with the previous case study, a distinct feature of the examples of 
practice examined in the debate on the Health and Social Care Bill is the 
uncertainty over the status, meaning and practical effect of the constitutional 
norms that were interpreted. This uncertainty changed the role of 
constitutional interpretation within the debate, and made it harder for 
parliamentarians to challenge and to justify the constitutional effect of the 
Bill. 
 
4.1 The constitutional framework of the Bill 
The Health and Social Care Bill was not a first class constitutional Bill. This 
section provides some context to the debate on the constitutional effect of 
the Bill by setting out the basic normative architecture used by those 
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engaged in constitutional interpretation during the debate, including the 
relevant clauses within the Bill in the form in which they were introduced to 
the House of Commons. 
 
The Health and Social Care Bill was arguably the largest and most 
significant piece of health legislation introduced to Parliament since the 
creation of the NHS Act 1946.3 It was designed to give effect to the policy 
outlined in the Coalition Government’s White Paper Equity and excellence: 
Liberating the NHS.4 The white paper explained that the Government aims 
‘to reduce the central direction of the NHS, to engage doctors in the 
commissioning of health services, and to give patients greater choice’.5 As 
Davies explains, ‘the main theme of the reforms is to make the NHS market 
more “real”’.6  It is also worth noting that the policy was not in the 
manifestos of either the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats. To put it 
mildly, the changes proposed to the NHS within the Bill were controversial. 
This case study focuses on a relatively small part of the debate during the 
passage of the Bill. This limited focus means that it inevitably presents an 
incomplete picture of the overall parliamentary debate on the Bill. 
 
As part of their wider reorganisation of the NHS, the Government sought to 
alter the statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Health to 
                                                
3 House of Commons Library, Health and Social Care Bill (Research Paper 
11/11, 2011) 1.  
4 Department of Health, Equity and excellence: liberating the NHS (Cm 
7881, 2010). 
5 Ibid. 
6 A Davies, ‘This Time, it’s for Real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012’ 
(2013) 76 Modern Law Review 564, 565.  
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reflect the reality of his role under the new statutory regime. This change is 
what provoked the debate on the constitutional effect of the Bill within 
Parliament, and the normative architecture of this particular change is 
crucial to analysing the nature of that debate. A Secretary of State’s political 
responsibility for his or her department is regulated by the convention of 
individual ministerial responsibility. This convention is not defined by 
statute, nor does it owe its authority to any particular enactment. 
Nevertheless, when the NHS was created, the Government of the day sought 
to define the meaning of this convention through statute for the particular 
nature of the role of the Minister for Health, by introducing a formal legal 
responsibility for specific policy goals. It hoped this would enhance the 
accountability relationship between the citizen, Parliament, the Government 
and the National Health Service. The Health and Social Care Bill sought to 
alter that accountability relationship, and this provided a test of 
parliamentarians’ understanding of that relationship and the role of the 
relevant statutory provision within it.  
 
4.1.1 The Bill as introduced to the House of Commons 
When the Bill was introduced to the House of Commons, clause 1 of the 
Bill retained the Secretary of State’s duty to promote a ‘comprehensive 
health service’.7 However, clause 1(1) of the Bill removed section 1(2), the 
‘must for that purpose provide or secure the provision of services’ 
subsection of the NHS Act 2006, and replaced it with: 
                                                
7 Explanatory Notes to the Health and Social Care Bill (2010-12) 132, para 
63. 
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… in exercising functions in relation to a body mentioned in 
subsection (2A), must act with a view to securing the provision of 
services for the purposes of the health service in accordance with 
this Act.8 
The explanatory notes on clause 1 said that rather than directly conferring 
this duty upon the Secretary of State, who then would have delegated this 
task to the Strategic Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts, under this 
Bill the responsibility to provide would be given by statute directly to the 
new NHS Commissioning Board.9 Clause 10 of the Bill transferred the 
specific duties within section 3(1) of the NHS Act 2006 from the Secretary 
of State to the NHS Commissioning Board and the commissioning 
consortia. This change appeared to change the nature of the accountability 
of the Secretary of State. The removal of the ‘duty to provide’ in section 
1(2) is a direct consequence of the transfer of accountability for the 
provision of services away from the Secretary of State by clause 10 of the 
Bill. The duty to provide within the duty to promote a comprehensive health 
service became redundant, once the duty to provide specific services was 
removed. 
 
Other clauses within Part 1 of the Bill did little to assuage doubts raised by 
the transfer, and clause 4, which contained a duty for the Secretary of State 
‘to promote autonomy’, increased them. Clause 4 sought ‘to establish an 
overarching principle that the Secretary of State should act with a view to 
                                                
8 The Health and Social Care HC Bill (2010-12) [132] Part 1 cl 1 (2)(b) 
(emphasis added). 
9 Explanatory Notes to the Health and Social Care Bill (2010-12) 132, para 
66. 
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promoting autonomy in the health service’.10 In order to understand why 
these changes to the NHS Act 2006 prompted criticism of the constitutional 
effect of the Bill, it is important to understand the statutory origins of the 
2006 Act.  
 
4.1.2 The duty to provide 
The National Health Services Act 1946 created the NHS. This Act was not 
‘constitutional’ in the conventional sense. However, it did create a 
legislative scheme to regulate the political and legal accountability of the 
Minister of Health. Section 1(1) of the 1946 Act stated: 
It shall be the duty of the Minister of Health (hereafter in this Act 
referred to as ‘the Minister’) to promote the establishment in 
England and Wales of a comprehensive health service designed to 
secure improvement in the physical and mental health of the people 
of England and Wales and the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of 
illness, and for that purpose to provide or secure the effective 
provision of services in accordance with the following provisions of 
this Act. 
Section 3(1) of the 1946 Act set out the specific services that the Minister 
should secure:  
As from the appointed day, it shall be the duty of the Minister to 
provide throughout England and Wales, to such extent as he 
considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements, 
                                                
10 Explanatory Notes to the Health and Social Care Bill (2010-12) 132 para 
74. 
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accommodation and services of the following descriptions, that is to 
say:- 
(a) hospital accommodation; 
(b) medical [defined to include surgical], nursing and other 
services required at or for the purposes of hospitals; 
(c) the services of specialists, whether at a hospital, a health 
centre provided under Part III of this Act or a clinic or, if 
necessary on medical grounds, at the home of the patient; 
(d) and any accommodation and service provided under this 
section are in this Act referred to as “hospital and 
specialist services”. 
The use of the words ‘to provide’ in both sections was not a coincidence; 
the two sections should be read together. Section 1(1) set out the basic duty 
of the Minister of Health for the health service. The Minister was under a 
duty to promote the establishment of a comprehensive health service, and in 
discharging that duty the Minister must provide the services required by the 
Act. The duty to provide was not separate from the duty to promote - they 
are one duty, and the specific content of the duty is set out in section 3(1). 
Put another way, the duty to provide specific services was part of, rather 
than additional to, the duty to promote a comprehensive health service. 
Although the Minister of Health was not meant physically to provide the 
said services, it would seem that the aim of the scheme was to create a 
legally binding duty, which would constrain the Minister’s political 
discretion relating to the National Health Service. It was this purpose that 
supplied the constitutional effect of the Act.  
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During the passage of the 1946 Act through Parliament, the Minister 
responsible, Aneurin Bevan MP (Labour), said the following about the 
accountability scheme: 
Responsibility for the co-ordination of the different aspects of the 
scheme rests where Parliament imposes it - upon the Minister of 
Health. That is where it should be. Clause 1 places upon the 
Minister, and not upon regional boards, the obligation of providing 
health services for all.11 
The provision was designed to send a message to the public that a politically 
accountable Minister was under direct legal responsibility for the NHS. 
Bevan described it as a ‘contract with the citizen’.12 Sir Henry Willink 
(Conservative), who was the Health Minister during the wartime Coalition, 
challenged the scheme during the debate on the Bill. Willink argued that it 
represented a departure from how ‘our governmental system’ regulates the 
responsibilities of a Minister of the Crown.13 He said:  
The Minister of Education is not placed under a duty to provide 
schools. He is under the sort of duty, which is expressed in Clause 1 
of this Bill, to promote everything to do with the improvement of 
education in this country.14  
In response Bevan said: 
                                                
11 SC Deb (C) 15 May 1946, vol 143, col 1066. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
14 SC Deb (C) 15 May 1946, vol 143, cols 1056-61.  
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What the scheme does is impose upon the Minister the obligation to 
provide the service and it entrusts its administration to local 
bodies.15 
He objected to the idea of giving the service providers, rather than the 
Minister, the duty to provide because:  
It would be difficult for us to say to the citizens of Great Britain, “As 
from a certain date we accept the obligation of providing you with a 
hospital, but we entrust this provision to someone who can deny it to 
you.”16  
Bevan’s comments indicate that the scheme was an innovative attempt to 
strengthen political accountability in the context of nationalisation. 
Willink’s criticism indicates that at the time the scheme was thought of as a 
change to the relationship between the Minister and Parliament, although 
the precise nature of that change is difficult to identify.17  
 
As a legal duty, one might expect that the duty to provide would bolster the 
Secretary of State’s legal accountability through judicial review. This does 
not appear to be right in this case. The relevant case law indicates that the 
provisions were designed to limit the ability of the courts to enforce the duty 
to provide through judicial review. Although it has been used as a basis for 
judicial review, the courts have consistently said that the duty to provide is 
                                                
15 SC Deb (C) 15 May 1946, vol 143, cols 1066-1067 (emphasis added).  
16 Ibid. 
17 Subsequent legislation on the NHS, both the National Health Service Act 
1977 and National Health Act 2006 preserved the duty to provide in both 
sections 1 and 3.  
 139 
not enforceable. In ex parte Hincks and others,18 the applicants sought a 
declaration of the court saying that the Secretary of State had not fulfilled 
his duty in section 1 (1) and section 3 (1) of the 1977 Act. Lord Denning 
MR responded that it was an attractive argument, as there were no express 
provisions to limit the expenditure of the duty to provide. But the problem 
was that the words ‘to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all 
reasonable requirements’ allow the Secretary of State the discretion to take 
into account economic resources when considering how to give effect to 
that obligation. In a more recent case, R v NHS Oldham (ex parte Booker),19 
Judge Pelling QC said in 2010 of the scheme in the National Health Service 
Act 2006: 
Section 1 (1) and (2) of the 2006 Act together establish as a target 
duty the provision of a comprehensive health service free to all at the 
point of delivery. However, Section 3 creates an enforceable duty to 
provide care facilities for those who are ill or have suffered illness 
subject to the qualification that the secretary of state or the PCT as 
his delegate need not provide such services where he or it does not 
consider they are reasonably required or would be necessary to meet 
a reasonable requirement. 
Although this later judgment seems to indicate that elements of the scheme 
are enforceable, the reality was that it appeared extremely difficult to 
establish a breach of the terms of the scheme due to the breadth of the 
discretion held by the Secretary of State.  
                                                
18 R v Secretary of State for Social Services, West Midlands Regional Health 
Authority and Birmingham Area Health Authority (Teaching), ex parte 
Hincks and others [1980] 1 BMLR 93, CA.  
19 [2010] EWHC 2593 (Admin). 
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Perhaps the most significant comment from R v NHS Oldham (ex parte 
Booker) was the characterisation of the scheme as a ‘target duty’. 20 A target 
duty is a policy aim, codified in statute.21 A recent prominent example of 
the use of target duties can be found in the Child Poverty Act 2010. The 
2010 Act contains a number of target duties, all of which should be 
achieved in the financial year beginning 1 April 2020. For example, section 
2 (1) (a) reads: 
It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the following 
targets are met in relation to the United Kingdom in relation to the 
target year -  
 (a) the relative low income target in section 3. 
A target duty is not meant to be judicially enforceable; rather, it is a political 
tool designed to provide a signal of intent and to act as a constraint on the 
political discretion of subsequent governments. A target duty is aspirational, 
it can set a target that might be considered unrealistic but is nonetheless 
valuable because it represents ends to which the Government should aspire. 
The two schemes are different because the scheme that in the 1946 Act does 
not include a specific date by which the goal must be achieved. Thought of 
as a target duty, the duty to provide in the 1946 Act provided a permanent 
duty to work toward specific policy goals, and it appears that the target duty 
served to complement and strengthen the convention of individual 
ministerial responsibility. 
                                                
20 Ibid.  
21 See A Lee and J Leslie, ‘Judicial Review of Target-Setting Legislation’ 
[2010] Judicial Review 236. 
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The convention of individual ministerial responsibility regulates a 
Minister’s political responsibility for his or her Department. The Ministerial 
Code codifies some of the convention’s content. It provides that: 
Minsters have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to 
account, for the policies, decisions and actions of their departments 
and agencies.22 
Tomkins explains that the core constitutional requirement of the convention 
is that a Minister is responsible to Parliament for ‘the minister’s own 
political decisions and actions, the minister’s private life and the actions and 
decisions of his department’.23 As a result of this, the Secretary of State for 
Health is therefore politically responsible for the decisions he takes and for 
those decisions made within his department. So while the scheme first 
included in the 1946 Act is not needed to establish the political 
responsibility of the Secretary of State for Health, the scheme does in one 
sense bolster it by specifying the conditions under which the holder of that 
office should be held to account. As it was not intended that this should be 
enforced by the courts, it seems reasonable to assume that the duty was 
supposed to be enforced by political means, by the Minister himself within 
his or her department, or via the political and parliamentary process. The 
target duty served as a commitment device to provide a form of 
entrenchment of the stated policy aims. Enacting sections 1 and 3 of the 
1946 Act meant that any subsequent Parliament that wanted to change the 
nature of the Secretary of State for Health’s role in relationship to the NHS, 
                                                
22 The Ministerial Code (2010), para 1.2 (b). 
23 A Tomkins, Public Law (Clarendon 2003) 144.  
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would have to amend the provision and evaluate how the role should be 
regulated by statute.  
 
4.2 The parliamentary debate 
The parliamentary scrutiny of the Health and Social Care Bill was 
exceptional. In effect the Bill had two public committee stages in the House 
of Commons, occurring either side of a listening exercise: the Future 
Forum. The Future Forum resulted in a large number of amendments being 
made in the House of Commons, and ensured that the Bill’s passage through 
Parliament was longer than normal, taking just under 14 months to be 
enacted. The debate on the constitutional effect of the Bill represents a small 
fraction of the total parliamentary debate on the Bill, and there were many 
aspects that were considered to be more controversial and significant in both 
Houses. This section only focuses on the debate on clauses 1 and 10 of the 
Bill, and as a result presents an incomplete picture.24 This is an unavoidable 
consequence of the focus upon the constitutional interpretation during the 
debate.  
 
This section analyses how parliamentarians used constitutional 
interpretation during the debates, and evaluates the contribution made by 
this practice to passage of the Bill through Parliament. It also seeks to 
examine the implications for the constitution. The change to the duty ‘to 
provide’ was fully articulated as a constitutional issue only when the 
                                                
24 For a fuller account see Davies (n 6); and N Timmins, Never Again? The 
Story of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (London: Institute for 
Government and The King’s Fund, 2012).  
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Constitution Committee reported on the Bill. Prior to that, although the 
change had been scrutinised and criticised in the Commons, the language of 
constitutionality had not been used. In part this is due to the basic problem 
surrounding the status of the relevant sections of the NHS Act 2006 and the 
implications of the changes proposed to them. Few parliamentarians who 
criticised the proposed change to sections 1 and 3 of the NHS Act 2006 
drew a connection between the change and individual ministerial 
responsibility, or analysed the purpose of the sections within the 2006 Act. 
This is not necessarily their fault, as both of these tasks were far from 
straightforward even for the most committed critics of the Bill.  
 
4.2.1 The House of Commons 
When introducing the Bill, Andrew Lansley MP (Conservative), Secretary 
of State for Health, did not address the clauses referred to above in much 
detail. However, he did make some comments that provided some 
explanation of why the Government wanted to alter the scheme. He stated: 
Until now, legislation on the NHS has more or less said, "The NHS 
is whatever the Secretary of State chooses to make it at any given 
moment." … I intend to be the first Secretary of State in the history 
of the NHS who, rather than grabbing more power or holding on to 
it, will give it away.25 
The point was again emphasised in the speech when he said that the Bill 
would cause a ‘shift in power away from politicians’.26 The Government’s 
desire to decentralise power in the NHS clashed with the Secretary of 
                                                
25 HC Deb 31 January 2011, vol 522, col 616. 
26 HC Deb 31 January 2011, vol 522, col 609. 
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State’s duty to provide services in the 2006 Act. The question for the 
Government was how would it ensure that the political accountability of the 
Secretary of State was not weakened by the removal of the statutory 
responsibility. 
 
During the first committee stage in the Commons, Derek Twigg MP 
(Labour) moved an amendment which would insert ‘and is accountable to 
Parliament for’ into clause 1. He explained that the amendment was 
designed to prompt the Minister to explain how the Bill would affect the 
accountability of the Secretary of State, as there was genuine uncertainty 
over how the changes proposed would affect the existing system. Twigg’s 
intervention was the first to identify the potential constitutional effect of the 
Bill.  In response the Minister, Simon Burns MP (Conservative), explained:  
New subsection (2)(b) covers the areas where other organisations 
will be responsible for particular activities. This includes all NHS 
care - that is, the services commissioned by the NHS commissioning 
board and consortia - and the local public health responsibilities of 
local authorities. In those cases, the functions of commissioning and 
providing services are given explicitly to front-line organisations, 
not the Department of Health, in line with our strategy for liberating 
the NHS, which says that commissioners and providers should be 
free from political interference and micro-management.27 
                                                
27 Health Bill Deb 15 Feb 2011 cols 187-188. 
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When pressed on how this would change the Secretary of State’s 
accountability, Simon Burns MP replied, ‘the Secretary of State’s 
accountability to Parliament is already integral to the Bill’.28 
 
Later in the debate another justification for the change within clause 1 (2)(b) 
emerged. Jeremy Lefroy MP (Conservative) put forward the following 
justification: 
We have had a contradiction in legislation, certainly in recent years. 
On the one hand, the Secretary of State has had quite clear direct 
responsibility for procuring health services; on the other hand, there 
has been a quite clear delegation - more than a delegation; a giving 
away - of power to foundation trusts. I believe that the clause is 
designed to deal with the tension between those two.29 
The Government argued that clause 1 (2)(b) and clause 10 would better 
reflect the real power structure within the Health Service. Rather than confer 
on the Secretary of State duties and powers, which he then delegates, the 
powers would be directly conferred upon the bodies that exercise the 
relevant powers. While it could be said that the Bill would create a clearer 
and more transparent power structure, it did not address the fact that the 
existing system was not an accident of history, it was a deliberately 
designed structure to ensure that power and duties remained with an 
accountable and elected member of the Cabinet. This point was made by 
Derek Twigg MP:  
                                                
28 Health Bill Deb 15 Feb 2011 col 182. 
29 Health Bill Deb 15 Feb 2011 col 192.  
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It has always been a fundamental principle of the NHS that at its 
head is an elected politician - a Secretary of State - who acts as a 
custodian and ultimately takes responsibility for the provision of 
high-quality and universal health care… I accept the Minister’s 
comment that many of those functions are currently devolved or 
delegated to bodies such as the strategic health authorities and 
primary care trusts, which will be abolished under the Bill. 
However, that remains the duty of the Secretary of State and, most 
importantly, he remains accountable to Parliament for the provision 
of services.30 
This argument directly challenged the Government’s logic. The Secretary of 
State’s duty to provide certain services was not the cause of political 
interference in the NHS - his powers are set out elsewhere in the legislation. 
The duty was exclusively designed to reinforce his accountability, and not 
to do anything else. Twigg’s intervention prompted the Government to 
explain its position in greater detail, but the overriding impression created 
by this early exchange was that both the Government and the opposition 
were unsure about how the proposed changes would affect the 
accountability of the Secretary of State. The Government saw the change as 
part of de-politicisation of the NHS, but also claimed that the removal of the 
responsibility ‘to provide’ would have no impact on the accountability of 
the Secretary of State. The Government argued that the statutory regulation 
should reflect the reality that the Secretary of State delegates the provision 
of services by conferring powers directly upon the relevant bodies, rather 
                                                
30 Health Bill Deb 15 Feb 2011 col 237. 
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than have them delegated by the Secretary of State. This conflicted with 
Bevan’s original justification for the duty to provide in 1946, but the 
practical implications for the relationship between Parliament and the 
Secretary of State were unclear.  
 
In an unusual move, the Government decided to conduct another listening 
exercise after the Bill had finished its Commons Committee stage. The 
Government appointed the Future Forum, composed of experts from across 
health and social care, to listen to concerns over the Bill and report back to 
Government. The Future Forum reported its findings on 13 June 2011. It 
made a number of detailed recommendations for changes to the 
Government’s reforms and legislation, including that the Bill should be 
amended to make clear that the Secretary of State would remain ultimately 
accountable for the NHS. This recommendation affirmed the point that 
proposed regulation of the accountability of the Secretary of State was 
unclear. The Government indicated in its response to the Future Forum’s 
report that it accepted this recommendation.31 On this basis it decided to 
recommit a number of important clauses to the Commons for further 
scrutiny in Committee. It explained that it wanted to give Parliament 
‘sufficient opportunity to scrutinise the Government’s proposed changes’.32 
 
When the Bill was recommitted, the Government tabled a new clause 1 ‘to 
remove any doubt that the Secretary of State remains ultimately accountable 
                                                
31 Department of Health ‘Government’s response to the NHS Future Forum’ 
(Cm 8113 2011). 
32 Written Ministerial Statement 14 June 2011.  
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for the NHS’.33 The important change from the original drafting of the Bill 
was in the wording of paragraph 1(2) of the new clause 1. It stated that ‘the 
Secretary of State must exercise his functions so as to secure that services 
are provided in accordance with this Act’.34 This change replaces ‘act with a 
view to’ with the mandatory ‘must exercise his functions as to’. For the 
Labour members of the Committee this did not go far enough, in that it did 
not fully revert to the wording of the NHS 2006 Act, in particular as it still 
omitted the words ‘to provide’.35 In response the Minister, Simon Burns 
MP, explained: 
A duty to provide involves having the premises and the staff 
necessary to offer health services directly. At present, the Secretary 
of State has a duty to provide, but even under the current system, 
that does not reflect the reality of a situation in which 
commissioning and provision rest with NHS bodies, not the 
Secretary of State... It is worth noting that, subject to a few 
exceptions, the duty in section 1(2) of the 2006 Act to “provide or 
secure the provision of services”, and the section 3 and 12 functions 
of providing or arranging the provision of particular services, have 
for many years not been fulfilled by the Secretary of State’s 
providing or commissioning services directly.36 
The Government seemed in effect to be arguing that the duty to provide did 
not carry with it any consequences for accountability, and therefore could be 
removed without significantly changing the Secretary of State’s 
                                                
33 Health Bill Deb 30 June 2011 col 138. 
34 Health and Social Care HC Bill (2010-2012) [221]. 
35 Health Bill Deb 30 June 2011 col 149.  
36 Health Bill Deb 30 June 2011 col 146. 
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accountability to Parliament or the Courts. The Government’s position was, 
the Minister explained, ‘The Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament 
for the health service, and that is not altered one jot by the Bill’.37 On this 
logic, the target duties within section 3(1) of the 2006 Act did nothing to the 
Secretary of State’s accountability. The value of the scrutiny of this change 
in the Commons was that it challenged this reasoning, and forced the 
Government to concede that the situation was unclear.  
 
On the legal accountability of the Secretary of State, the Minister explained 
that the Secretary of State would be subject to a claim for judicial review if 
he failed to carry out his statutory duty ‘to exercise his functions so as to 
secure the provision of health services in accordance with this Act’, and that 
he would no longer be subject to a claim for a failure to ‘provide or secure 
the provision of services in accordance with this Act’.38 As a result of the 
questions on the political and legal accountability of the Secretary of State 
for Health in the Commons, the Department of Health published a note 
explaining the consequences of changes to clause 1 of the NHS Act 2006 
for the future role and functions of the Secretary of State for Health.39 
 
During the report stage, the Government made an important concession. 
Paul Burstow MP (Conservative), a Minister of State at the Department of 
Health, stated that the Government would be willing to make further 
                                                
37 Health Bill Deb 30 June 2011 col 144.  
38 Health Bill Deb 30 June 2011 cols 144-145. 
39 Department of Health, Further information for legal professionals on 
clause 1 of the Health and Social Care Bill (2011) paragraph 9.  
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amendments to the clause to put the Secretary of State’s accountability for 
the NHS ‘beyond legal doubt’.40 The Bill then moved to the Lords.  
 
4.2.2 The first report of the Constitution Committee 
The Lords’ first scrutiny of the Bill came in the form of a report of the 
Constitution Committee. The headline of the report was that the Bill risked 
‘diluting the Government’s constitutional responsibilities with regard to the 
NHS’.41 The Committee argued that amendments ‘may well be necessary’ 
in order to preserve the substance of the accountability of the Secretary of 
State for Health.42 
 
The Committee based its conclusions upon an analysis of the NHS Act 
2006. The report explained that in the Committee’s view section 1 of the 
2006 Act, which includes the duty to promote the comprehensive health 
service and the duty to provide or secure the provision of services, is linked 
to the duty in section 3(1) of the Act. This lists a number of specific duties 
that the Secretary of State must provide.43 The authority for this claim is 
based upon the judgment of Lord Woolf in R v North and East Devon 
Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan.44 The Committee claimed that the fact 
that in practice these duties are delegated is not important; what matters is 
that it is the combination of these provisions within the 2006 Act which 
                                                
40 HC Deb 7 September 2011 vol 532, col 404.  
41 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Health and Social 
Care Bill (HL 2010-12, 197) para 4.  
42 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) para 5. 
43 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) paras 7-8.  
44 [2001] QB 213.  
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makes the Secretary of State ‘constitutionally responsible for NHS 
provision in England’.45 
 
The Committee argued that clauses 1 and 10 of the Bill risked breaking the 
chain of duties and responsibilities established by the Court of Appeal in 
Coughlan.46 Further, the Committee argued that clause 4 of the Bill, which 
imposed a new duty on the Secretary of State to promote autonomy, 
compounded this severance of the Secretary of State’s duties. 47  The 
Committee pointed out that there was a basic contradiction in the 
Government’s justification for clause 1(2)(b). The Department of Health 
claimed that the rewording would not affect the Secretary of State’s 
accountability for the Health Service, and yet the explanatory notes stated in 
clear terms that the Bill makes the NHS Commissioning Board, and not the 
Secretary of the State, responsible for commissioning and providing 
services.48 The report concluded that the clauses within the Bill ‘pose an 
undue risk either that individual ministerial responsibility to Parliament will 
be diluted or that legal accountability to the courts will be fragmented’.49 
The proposed solution was to retain both the duty to provide and the duty to 
secure from the 2006 Act, as the Government’s reasoning did not justify 
why the changes within the Bill were needed.50  
 
                                                
45 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) para 10. 
46 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) para 13. 
47 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) para 14. 
48 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) para 16. 
49 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) para 18. 
50 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 41) para 19. 
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The Government responded to the report in the form of a letter from the 
Minister in charge of the Bill in the Lords. It said: 
The Government accepts that replacing the Secretary of State’s duty 
to ‘provide or secure the provision of services’ with a duty ‘to secure 
that services are provided’ does alter the Secretary of State’s 
political accountability in so much as he will no longer have a 
statutory duty to provide or commission services which is at present 
delegated to NHS bodies. This does not reduce the overall 
responsibility that the Secretary of State has for the NHS. The 
Secretary of State retains political accountability for the NHS and 
legal accountability for the statutory functions placed on him.51 
The Government’s argument was unchanged. The duty to provide within 
either section 1(2) or section 3(1) of the 2006 Act had no effect on the 
political accountability of the Secretary of State. 
 
The Committee’s intervention was notable for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
it marked a change in the nature of the debate on this aspect of the Bill. 
While the Opposition in the Commons referred to change in the 
accountability of the Secretary of State, no-one had explicitly identified the 
change as ‘constitutional’. Secondly, the Committee considerably expanded 
the evidential basis for doubting the Government’s claim that the change 
would not weaken the accountability of the Secretary of State. The 
Committee based their criticism on detailed analysis of the 2006 Act, and on 
how it been interpreted in the courts. Thirdly, despite the quality of their 
                                                
51 Earl Howe, Letter to the Constitution Committee (10 October 2011).  
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analysis, the Committee remained hesitant to draw conclusions. The reason 
was that the case law cited did not conclusively show that sections 1 and 3 
of the 2006 Act were critical to the accountability of the Secretary of State 
for Health.  
 
4.2.3 Second reading in the House of Lords 
The Constitution Committee’s report featured prominently at second 
reading. The reason was that Lord Hennessy (Crossbench) and Lord Owen 
(Crossbench), who were not themselves members of the Committee, took 
the unusual step of tabling an amendment which would have committed the 
Bill to a special committee, following the precedent of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005. This would have had the specific task of examining the 
issues raised by the Constitution Committee’s report.52 The debate also 
showed that the Government was committed to working with its critics in 
the Lords to preserve the existing accountability of the Secretary of State for 
Health. 
 
When introducing the Bill, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
the Department of Health, Earl Howe (Conservative), offered further 
detailed justification for clause 1. He argued that the legal situation that had 
regulated the accountability of the Secretary of State for Health since the 
National Health Service Act 1946 was not sustainable.53 He explained that 
the Secretary of State’s delegation of his duty to provide to the PCTs had 
resulted in an accountability deficit, because no mechanisms were 
                                                
52 HL Deb 12 October 2011, vol 533, col 1716. 
53 HL Deb 11 October 2011, vol 533, col 1470. 
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developed to hold PCTs to account.54 He attributed this failure to the 
‘fiction’ that the Secretary of State is somehow responsible for all clinical 
decision-making in the NHS.55 When speaking to the clause he explained 
that the Government had responded to the Constitution Committee’s report 
by letter, and had again indicated that they were willing to make 
amendments to put the matter ‘beyond doubt’.56 
 
The Lords saw marked change to the Government’s attitude to changing the 
relevant clauses. While Derek Twigg’s criticisms were met with strong 
rebuttals, in the Lords the accountability of the Secretary of State was 
treated as a technical question, which the Government was happy to resolve 
by collaboration. As a consequence, those scrutinising the Bill no longer 
had to get the Government to accept the danger of their proposals; instead 
they had the more technical task of debating the merits of how to draft 
amendments to remove the constitutional risk from the Bill.  
 
The Government’s constructive attitude to the Lords was further evidenced 
within other contributions to the second reading debate. Lord Owen, who 
tabled the motion with Lord Hennesssy to commit the Bill to a special 
committee to consider the issues raised by the Constitution Committee’s 
report, revealed that they had both been engaged in lengthy negotiations 
with Earl Howe.57 
 
                                                
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 HL Deb 11 October 2011, vol 533, col 1472. 
57 HL Deb 11 October 2011, vol 533, col 1496. 
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On the second day of the second reading Lord Hennessy put the case for a 
special committee, explaining that it would be capable of solving the 
problem by finding the right form of drafting.58 A good number of peers 
spoke of their support for referral to a special committee, and this led the 
Minister to commit to host a meeting with all the peers interested in the 
accountability issue.59 Just before the vote on the amendment, Lord Owen 
explained the rationale behind the referral. At the core of the case for 
referral was that the special committee would have Parliamentary Counsel 
at its disposal, which would facilitate the improvement of what was a 
complex legislative problem. Lord Owen’s amendment was comfortably 
defeated by 330 to 262.  
 
4.2.4 The committee stage in the House of Lords 
On the first day of the committee stage, Baroness Williams of Crosby 
(Liberal Democrat), Baroness Jay of Paddington (Labour), Chairman of the 
Constitution Committee, and Lord Patel (Crossbench) moved an 
amendment which would include the wording from the 2006 Act, that the 
Secretary of State ‘must provide or secure’, in clause 1 of the Bill.60 
Baroness Williams set out a number of reasons for her amendment. First, it 
would make it absolutely clear that the Secretary of State’s ultimate 
responsibility is not impaired.61 Secondly, it would retain the trust of the 
public, by ensuring there is no reduction in the ultimate powers of the 
                                                
58 HL Deb 12 October 2011, vol 533, col 1677. 
59 HL Deb 12 October 2011, vol 533, col 1705. 
60 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 727.  
61 Ibid.  
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Secretary of State.62 Thirdly, it would ensure that Parliament could hold the 
Secretary of State to account for the vast sums of taxpayers’ money spent on 
the NHS.63 Williams referred to the alternative amendment tabled by Lord 
Mackay of Clashfern (Conservative), the former Lord Chancellor, and she 
confessed, ‘I, for one, will not stick with the wording in mine if the 
Committee feels that another amendment more correctly reflects the 
concerns I have expressed’.64 This captured the overall character of the 
negotiations. There appeared to be a genuine collaborative attitude towards 
finding a drafting solution to the problem identified by the Constitution 
Committee.  
 
The alternative amendment moved by Lord Mackay of Clashfern stated: 
‘the Secretary of State (a) retains ultimate responsibility to Parliament for 
the provision of the health service in England’. 65  It retained the 
Government’s wording ‘to secure that services are provided in accordance 
with this Act’ and did not re-introduce ‘provide’.66 This had the advantage 
of making clear that the Minister is accountable to Parliament but without 
creating a legal responsibility to provide.67 In response, Baroness Jay of 
Paddington argued that the words of the 2006 Act ‘to provide’ were crucial 
to the Secretary of State’s constitutional and legal responsibility.68 She 
rehearsed the arguments of the report to claim that the removal of duty 
                                                
62 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 728.  
63 Ibid.  
64 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 729.  
65 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 733. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
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combined with the change to section 3 (1) of the 2006 Act would break the 
chain of legal responsibility.69 Lord Mackay disagreed, claiming that the 
duty ‘to provide’ was not crucial to Lord Woolf’s judgment in Coughlan 
and that, instead, it was the duty to promote a comprehensive health service 
which was crucial to Lord Woolf’s chain of responsibility.70 Lord Woolf’s 
judgment in the case did not actually make reference to the duty ‘to 
provide’; however, Lord Mackay did not address the consequential change 
to section 3 (1) of the 2006 Act, which would clearly break Lord Woolf’s 
chain of responsibility. Lord Hennessy agreed with Lord Mackay that it 
would be better for the statute to reflect the reality of the responsibilities, 
and therefore he favoured the inclusion of the ‘ultimate responsibility’ 
clause.71 In contrast, Lord Harris of Haringey (Labour) supported Baroness 
Williams’ proposal because ‘it is the more established approach’, and he 
expressed concern over the meaning of ‘ultimate responsibility’.72 Lord 
Owen argued that the House should not vote on this clause until they had 
considered the rest of the Bill, describing the committee process as an 
‘education’ process.73  
 
When the committee stage resumed a week later, there was a noticeable 
increase in focus on the role of other clauses, particularly clauses 4 and 10, 
in changing the accountability of the Secretary of State for Health. Baroness 
Williams argued that clause 1 should be read with clauses 4 and 10, as the 
                                                
69 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 735. 
70 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 735.  
71 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 740. 
72 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, col 741. 
73 HL Deb 25 October 2011, vol 731, cols 742-743.  
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Constitution Committee had pointed out in its report.74 She also implored 
the House not to push the amendments to a vote, as, if they were defeated, 
the issue could not be considered at the report stage which was when she 
hoped the change would be made.75 Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames 
(Liberal Democrat) argued that special attention should be paid to clause 10, 
which transferred the specific duties from the Secretary of State to the 
commissioning board, whatever solution was found to the problem in clause 
1.76 The Government Minister, Earl Howe, indicated that he was willing to 
work with the authors of the amendments, the Constitution Committee and 
other interested peers, to draw up a solution before the report stage.77 
 
4.2.5 The second report of the Constitution Committee 
On 20 December, between the end of the committee stage and the start of 
the report stage, the Constitution Committee published its second report on 
the Bill.78 The report was the product of the Committee’s negotiations with 
the Government over the Secretary of State’s responsibility for the NHS.79 
A series of meetings were held between the Committee and the 
Government, and as a result the Committee proposed three 
recommendations for amendments in their second report. The Committee’s 
ability to re-enter the debate after the committee stage was central to 
                                                
74 HL Deb 2 November 2011, vol 731, col 1238. 
75 Ibid. 
76 HL Deb 2 November 2011, vol 731, col 1245. 
77 HL Deb 2 November 2011, vol 731, cols 1240-1241. 
78 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Health and Social 
Care Bill: Follow up (HL 2010-12, 240).  
79 N Timmins, Never Again? The Story of the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 (London: Institute for Government and The King’s Fund, 2012) 117.  
 159 
maintaining the relevance of constitutional interpretation to the debate on 
the Bill. 
 
The first proposed amendment was that the Bill should include a new 
subsection, which stated that the ‘Secretary of State retains ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service in 
England’.80 The Committee explained that the clause was designed to 
ensure that ministerial responsibility to Parliament was maintained but 
without allowing ‘political micro-management’, which the Government 
feared ‘to provide’ would allow. The report also noted that its solution was 
similar to that suggested by Lord Mackay of Clashfern during the 
Committee stage. However, the Committee explained that ‘ministerial 
responsibility’ was preferable to the term ‘ultimate responsibility’ used by 
the former Lord Chancellor.81 The clause proposed was an example of what 
this thesis has termed a ‘constitutional protection clause’. A constitutional 
protection clause is a provision expressly designed to protect a 
constitutional norm. This particular clause was expressly designed to protect 
the Secretary of State for Health’s ministerial responsibility for the NHS. 
The report included an appendix which sets out the Committee’s 
understanding of the constitutional convention of ministerial 
responsibility.82 The convention has changed considerably over time, and 
the report’s explanation is significant in the context of the proposed 
codification of the convention in the report. Appendix 1 explained that there 
                                                
80 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 78) para 8.  
81 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 78) para 7. 
82 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 78) Appendix 1. 
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is a difference between what a Minister is constitutionally responsible for 
and what the Minister actually does on a day-to-day basis. It explained, ‘it is 
because of a failure to bear this distinction in mind that much of the 
confusion about this matter has arisen’.83 The basic point was that many 
parliamentarians did not appreciate the nature of the relationship between 
the statutory duty and the convention.  
 
The proposed changes to clause 4 and clause 20 addressed the issue of the 
Secretary of State’s parliamentary and legal accountability. The changes 
proposed aimed to ensure that the duty to promote autonomy would not 
dilute the Secretary of State’s ministerial responsibility to Parliament or his 
duty to secure the provision of services.84 They would have made the duty 
subject to section 1 of the 2006 Act and replaced the requirement to 
promote autonomy with the words ‘… have regard to the desirability of 
securing …’.85 The third proposed amendment was to clause 10, which 
would make the proposed Clinical Commissioning Groups subject to a duty 
to promote a comprehensive health service, which would ensure that the 
chain of accountability in Coughlan, between section 1(1) and the provision 
of service would be re-established. 
 
                                                
83 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 78) para 5. 
84 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n 78) para 9. 
85 Ibid.  
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4.2.6 The report stage in the House of Lords 
During the report stage Earl Howe moved an amendment, which after Royal 
Assent would become part 1 section (1)(3) of the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012. It read:  
The Secretary of State retains ministerial responsibility to Parliament 
for the provision of the health service in England.86 
Earl Howe confirmed that this amendment was the product of the meetings 
with the Constitution Committee. He added that the scrutiny of this aspect 
of the Bill had ‘revealed the House of Lords at its best’.87 Baroness Jay 
spoke after the Minister and opened her speech by saying ‘this is not really a 
government amendment but an amendment by the Constitution 
Committee’.88 Those familiar with the House of Lords will recognise the 
significance of this remark. In most cases the best a peer moving an 
amendment can hope for is that the Government will accept the principle 
behind an amendment and then return with an amendment of its own 
drafting. That the Committee was directly involved in the process of 
drafting the amendment is extremely important, not just symbolically but 
also instrumentally, as it is doubtful that without its involvement the 
Government amendment would have reflected the Committee’s 
constitutional interpretation to the same degree. Baroness Jay’s speech also 
revealed to the House that it was the Committee’s legal advisers, Professor 
Richard Rawlings and Professor Adam Tomkins, who had formulated a 
range of legislative solutions; these were put to the Committee, and the 
                                                
86 HL Deb 8 February 2012, vol 735, col 298. 
87 Ibid.  
88 HL Deb 8 February 2012, vol 735, col 299. 
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Committee had agreed to the amendment before it. The Government later 
moved another amendment to clause 4 of the Bill, which closely resembled 
that suggested by the Committee. 89  Unlike in the case of the first 
amendment, Baroness Jay did not put her name to this amendment, because 
the wording is not exactly as the Committee proposed.90 The second day of 
the report stage saw a version of the Committee’s third proposed 
amendment moved by the Government.91 In summary, all three of the 
Committee’s proposals in its second report were acted upon, and the most 




At first sight, the debate on the proposed change to the Secretary of State for 
Health’s accountability appears to be a model of how parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation should contribute to the parliamentary 
legislative process. The Constitution Committee played a decisive role, 
leading the Lords’ deliberation on the Bill’s constitutional effect, which 
eventually resulted in an amendment that protected a constitutional 
principle. On closer inspection, the role of constitutional interpretation was 
more complicated than this simplified narrative would indicate. A number 
of factors influenced the character of the practice and affected the nature of 
the contribution it made to the legislative process. 
 
                                                
89 HL Deb 8 February 2012, vol 735, col 341. 
90 HL Deb 8 February 2012, vol 735, col 344. 
91 HL Deb 8 February 2012, vol 735, col 658. 
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In contrast to the Public Bodies Bill, constitutional interpretation was 
employed by MPs in the debate on the Bill in the House of Commons. The 
opposition identified that the change to the accountability scheme in the Bill 
was significant, and put a number of arguments that made use of 
constitutional interpretation to challenge the Government’s justification of 
the change to the 2006 Act. The probing amendment moved by Derek 
Twigg MP to insert ‘and is accountable to Parliament for’ into clause 1 was 
very close to the eventual solution drafted by the Constitution Committee 
and accepted by the Government. The main benefit of the use of 
constitutional interpretation in the public bill committee was that it 
prompted the Government to develop a more robust defence of the 
proposals, which in turn served to clarify its position on the Bill and the 
constitutional effect of the Bill. The Government revealed that it held a 
problematic position: that it was committed to a change that was 
inconsequential. This begged the question: if it did not matter, then why 
were they so keen to change it? It did not add up and served to provide 
reasoning with which the Lords and the Constitution Committee could 
engage. This shows that constitutional interpretation, even without the 
prospect of immediate or directly resultant amendment, can be of value. By 
the time the Bill was near to leaving the Commons, the Government 
appeared willing to concede that significant amendments might be needed to 
put the issue beyond doubt. The lack of significant change to clauses with 
constitutional effect in the Commons was not due to the absence of 
constitutional interpretation or well-crafted amendments, it was simply that 
the Government was not prepared to be as constructive in the Commons as 
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it was in the Lords.92 The arguments advanced by Derek Twigg MP may not 
have featured the same level of constitutional reasoning as those in the 
Lords, but the basic analysis was the same – the crucial difference was the 
Government’s change in attitude. 
 
The use of parliamentary constitutional interpretation in the debate on this 
Bill emphasised that one of its primary qualities was that it enabled 
parliamentarians to engage in deliberation on aspects of a Bill that were 
constitutionally significant, but might otherwise be overlooked. If 
parliamentarians had not identified within the debate that the scheme would 
impact on the way that a rule of the constitution operates, then the 
Government would not have justified, in such detail, why clause 1 of the 
Bill was changing this rule. The use of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation prompted the Government to give reasons to justify the 
impact of the clause, which were then subject to further debate and scrutiny 
during the debate. This shows that a significant benefit of the use of 
constitutional interpretation in this case was that it prompted the 
Government to develop its justification for altering the accountability 
scheme in the NHS Act 2006, which had been on the statute book for more 
than 50 years. This reasoning was examined and found to be deficient by 
many parliamentarians, leading to the negotiations in the Lords on how the 
clause could be improved, which ultimately led to a change in the Bill. The 
reality of legislative drafting is that Ministers are often not responsible for 
                                                
92 Timmins (n 79) 95. 
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many of the drafting decisions made,93 and one of the purposes of the 
legislative process is to ensure that the Government is nonetheless held to 
account for those choices. Parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
provides a framework for examining legislation that looks beyond the main 
policy issues within a Bill, and enables parliamentarians to hold 
Government to account for the effect that the Bill might have on the existing 
norms within the constitution. If the legislative process is working well and 
if the conditions of the existing constitution are valued, then a proposed 
provision with constitutional effect should at the least prompt the Minister 
to consult with the Bill team and make public the thinking behind the 
change. Constitutional interpretation can ensure that a ‘technical’ element of 
the Bill, which may have constitutional effect, receives the same level of 
justification as the elements of the Bill that relate to the substance of the 
policy. 94  In this sense the value of the practice is that it supplies a 
supplementary angle of disagreement and challenge, prompting the 
Government to reveal why it intends to make a change to the law that will 
have an effect upon the constitution.95 When a Bill is not of first class 
constitutional importance this is especially worthwhile, because the 
constitutional effect might otherwise go unnoticed. 
 
Another aspect of the practice is that it appears to facilitate the construction 
of constitutional protection clauses. The deliberations on how to codify 
ministerial responsibility in the Lords showed that peers’ understanding of 
                                                
93 D Greenberg, Laying Down the Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 54-63.  
94 Greenberg (n 93) 49.  
95 Ibid. 
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the principle could directly inform the process of drafting. The 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation was, in effect, directly 
responsible for the statutory recognition of the convention of individual 
ministerial responsibility. 96  That is important, because it allows 
parliamentarians to make a direct contribution to the content of the 
constitution. 
 
A distinctive feature of the constitutional interpretation during the debate on 
this Bill, certainly in contrast to the Public Bodies Bill, was the uncertainty 
and complexity that surrounded the norms that were all subject to 
interpretation. While the practice ensured that the reasons for the change to 
the NHS 2006 Act were developed and questioned, the use of constitutional 
interpretation also revealed that the Government and parliamentarians were 
themselves unsure of the meaning and implications of individual ministerial 
responsibility and the effect that the accountability scheme in the NHS Act 
2006 had upon it. In one sense the value of the practice, and particularly the 
interventions of Derek Twigg MP and the Constitution Committee, was to 
show that there was a problem over the clarity of the accountability of the 
Secretary of State for Health that needed to be resolved. These challenges 
pointed the Government to the fact that the constitutional effect of the Bill 
was not as clear as it should be. However, the cause of the problem was not 
so much the Bill, but rather the provisions within the Act that were subject 
to change.  
 
                                                
96 Davies (n 6) 575 
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The complexity and uncertainty that characterised the analysis of the 
constitutional effect of the Bill can partly be attributed to the lack of 
parliamentary justification of the scheme during the passage of previous 
NHS legislation. The NHS Act 2006 was a consolidating act, and so the 
accountability scheme was not scrutinised. The only parliamentary scrutiny 
of the scheme occurred during the passage of the National Health Service 
Act 1946, and even then there was not much parliamentary time devoted to 
it. Had the scheme been subject to sustained scrutiny and parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation during the passage of the NHS Act in 2006, 
there would have been much better opportunity to develop effective 
arguments to scrutinise the changes proposed in this new Bill. 
Parliamentarians’ ability to interpret effectively the constitutional norms 
within existing legislation is enhanced when that existing legislation has 
been debated thoroughly at the time it was originally enacted. In other 
words, the interpretability of the Act is not just a product of the drafting but 
also of the debate that precedes enactment.97  
 
The other major difficulty for parliamentarians was the complexity of the 
constitutional norms that the Bill engaged. Sections 1 and 3 of the NHS Act 
2006 are an intricate alteration to the constitutionally significant relationship 
between the Secretary of State for Health, Parliament and the National 
Health Service. The accountability scheme contains a number of different 
elements, each of which is complex in its own right. The target duties within 
the NHS Act 2006 served a symbolic and aspirational purpose that was 
                                                
97 See Chapter 6.  
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difficult to define. Even though the scheme appeared to be aimed at 
parliamentarians, in the sense that they were supposed to use the duty to 
provide to hold the Secretary of State to account, there was little in the way 
of tangible political effect that could be pointed to. Further the words ‘to 
provide’ were far from clear, in the sense that the plain meaning of the 
words revealed little.98 If a statute is not meant to be enforced by courts but 
instead is intended to communicate a declaratory protection of a principle, 
then surely it should prioritise clarity in order to maximise its ability to 
influence the political process. In the absence of a codified constitution, it 
can be difficult for Parliament and drafters to communicate how and why a 
particular provision should be understood as having a distinct constitutional 
effect. Nevertheless, the duty to provide certain services did add a degree of 
normative certainty to the precise terms of the Secretary of State’s political 
accountability. That this was missed in the debate is not a criticism of 
parliamentarians, but rather it is a criticism of the transparency of the 
original scheme. If the authors regarded the original scheme as important, 
then more should have been done to communicate, both through the law and 
parliamentary debate, its purpose and its relationship with the convention of 
individual ministerial responsibility. If the law had been clearer and subject 
to more intense scrutiny, then the constitutional interpretation during this 
debate on this Bill would have been able to do more to justify the change. 
This Act will not suffer from the same weakness. Future Parliaments will be 
able to benefit from this Act’s constitutional protection clause, section 1 (3), 
which was preceded by a parliamentary debate that clearly communicated 
                                                
98 WJM Voermans, ‘Styles of Legislation and Their Effects’ (2011) 32 
Statute Law Review 38, 40. 
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its purpose to ensure that ‘the Secretary of State retains ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament for the provision of the health service in 
England’.  
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5. The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill 
 
This enactment represents constitution-making at its worst.1 
Rodney Brazier 
 
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill is a prime example of a Bill of first class 
constitutional importance.2 It follows that the committee stage of the Bill 
was taken on the floor of the House of Commons. The Bill, although made 
up of only a handful of clauses, was loaded with far-reaching constitutional 
intent to alter constitutional norms that were central to the regulation of 
Parliament for generations. Constitutional change of this importance creates 
expectations in a constitutional democracy, namely that the process will be 
treated with special care. Yet for many the Government did not approach the 
enactment of this Bill in a way that met those expectations, as Brazier’s 
quotation above indicates. 3  This presented a major challenge for 
parliamentarians. Those engaged in the scrutiny of the Bill had to overcome 
the problems caused by the Government’s approach, namely that when the 
Bill was introduced to Parliament they did not present a well-developed 
case for some of the main clauses in the Bill. This chapter charts the role 
played by constitutional interpretation in the response to this challenge of 
constitutional change in difficult circumstances. The aims of this chapter are 
                                                
1 R Brazier, ‘A small piece of constitution history’ (2012) 128 Law 
Quarterly Review 315, 315.  
2 M Jack and TE May, Erskine May's treatise on the law, privileges, 
proceedings and usage of Parliament (24th edn, LexisNexis 2011) 566. 
3 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, The Process of 
Constitutional Change (HL 2010-12, 177); or in theoretical terms see: D 
Lutz, ‘Towards a Theory of Constitutional Amendment’ (1994) 88 
American Political Science Review 355.  
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the same as in the two previous case studies: to identify the main examples 
of the practice during the debate on the Bill, to critically analyse the 
normative components of those examples, and to evaluate the nature of the 
contribution that the practice made to the parliamentary process and to the 
constitution.  
 
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill sought to remove the Prime Minister’s 
power to recommend the date of a general election to the Monarch. The Bill 
extinguished the Monarch’s prerogative power to set the date and replaced it 
with a system of fixed-term five-year Parliaments. The Fixed-term 
Parliaments Bill was the fourth time that a Government had attempted to 
alter the statutory regulation of the length of a Parliament since the passage 
of the Bill of Rights in 1689.4 Despite representing a major change to the 
laws and conventions that regulate the duration of Parliaments, the 
Government sought to represent the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill as being in 
keeping with the substance of the very constitutional norms that the Bill 
sought to change. This claim was central to their justification for the Bill, 
which they argued was based on principle rather than pragmatism. 
Unsurprisingly the Coalition Government resisted any suggestion that the 
Bill sought to change the terms of the constitution to suit the Government’s 
own interests. 
 
                                                
4 The Triennial Act 1693, the Septennial Act 1715 and the Parliament Act 
1911.  
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5.1 The constitutional framework of the Bill 
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill contained new constitutional norms and 
sought to repeal significant constitutional norms. This is one of the reasons 
why it qualified as a Bill of ‘first class constitutional importance’.5 So while 
the two previous case studies examined the role of constitutional 
interpretation during the debate on Bills that had constitutional effect, by 
contrast this Bill’s main purpose was constitutional change. This added an 
extra dimension to the constitutional framework. It was not simply a 
question of assessing how the clauses in the Bill would affect existing 
constitutional norms, but it also involved analysing how the clauses would 
operate in relation to each other, and in the abstract this was far from 
straightforward. Furthermore, the subject of regulation, Parliament itself, 
added a further degree of complexity. As a consequence, despite its brevity 
and the simplicity of its form, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill inhabited a 
complex framework of constitutional norms. This section sets out the Bill as 
introduced and provides an analysis of the constitutional norms that were 
relevant to the Bill. 
 
The unusual origins of this proposal for constitutional change are key to 
understanding the parliamentary debate on its content. The Bill was not a 
manifesto commitment, instead it was the product of the negotiations 
between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats which led to the 
formation of the Coalition Government after the 2010 general election. 
These negotiations are described by David Laws MP (Liberal Democrat), in 
                                                
5 Jack and May (n 2) 566. 
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his book on the formation of the Coalition: 22 Days in May.6 His account 
explains the origins of some of the key constitutional norms within the Bill. 
Laws describes how they arrived at five-year terms: 
George Osborne made the point that five-year Parliaments were 
better, as they allowed governments to get into implanting their 
plans before having to start worrying about the timing of the 
electoral cycle.7 
This created a problem for the Government. The Bill appeared to be the 
product of a political deal, rather than a well-justified constitutional reform. 
The only way for the Government to rebut such claims would be to point to 
reasons for introducing fixed-term Parliaments that were not also reasons 
that this particular Coalition government might want fixed-term 
Parliaments. 
 
Fixed-term Parliaments had been regularly proposed by campaigners for 
political reform. In 1992 the codified constitution produced by the Institute 
for Public Policy Research and the Liberal Democrats contained a proposal 
for fixed-terms.8 In 2001 the former Labour MP Tony Wright introduced a 
private members bill providing for four-year fixed-terms.9 The Liberal 
Democrats have long been in favour of fixed-term Parliaments, and at their 
2007 Party conference a policy paper arguing for four-year fixed-terms was 
adopted.10 In October 2007, the then Liberal Democrat MP David Howarth 
                                                
6 D Laws, 22 Days in May (Biteback 2010).  
7 Laws (n 6) 98.  
8 IPPR, A Written Constitution for the United Kingdom (IPPR 1993).  
9 The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill HC Bill (2001-02) [134]. 
10 Liberal Democrats, For the People, By the People Autumn 2007 9.  
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introduced a Private Members Bill providing for four-year fixed-terms.11 
The Labour Party manifesto for the 2010 election contained a pledge to 
create fixed-term parliaments.12 
 
The weaknesses of the Government’s approach soon became apparent when 
it set out its initial proposal for early dissolution. In May 2010 the 
Government said the Bill would ‘provide for dissolution if 55% or more of 
the House votes in favour’.13 Laws explained how this norm was produced: 
After some work on Ed Llewellyn’s calculator, and consideration of 
the by-election risks, it was decided that a 55% vote of MPs would 
be required to provide for a dissolution. This was just greater than 
the combined opposition and Lib Dem parliamentary parties, thereby 
safeguarding the Conservative position.14 
When Parliament resumed, the proposals were subject to fierce criticisms 
within the House of Commons. Typical of these was this question from 
David Winnick MP (Labour) to the Prime Minister: 
Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the proposal for a 55% 
rule to prolong the life of this Parliament is totally unacceptable? It 
is a travesty of parliamentary democracy, and if it goes ahead we 
will see what the 2010 House of Commons is made of.15 
                                                
11 Fixed-term Parliaments Bill HC Bill (2006-027) [157]. 
12 Labour Party, The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A Future Fair for All 
(2010) 9:3.  
13 Cabinet Office, The Coalition; Our Programme for Government (2010) 
26.  
14 Laws (n 6) 184. 
15 HC Deb 25 May 2010, vol 510, cols 135-153.  
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It was not just the Labour party who were critical. David Davis MP 
(Conservative) and a former member of the Shadow Cabinet, said in a letter 
to the Daily Telegraph: 
The requirement for a 55 per cent majority to dissolve parliament, 
and thereby dismiss a government, dramatically reduces the ability 
of Parliament to hold the executive to account. It is a major 
constitutional change, possibly one of the greatest since 1911.16 
These criticisms appeared to make a major impact because on 5 July Nick 
Clegg MP (Liberal Democrat), the Deputy Prime Minister, announced that 
the Coalition Government had revised and clarified its proposals and that 
instead a majority of two thirds would be needed to dissolve Parliament.17 
Votes of no confidence would continue to require only a simple majority. 
Even though the Bill was not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny, it appeared 
that the arguments against the original proposals within Parliament had in 
part contributed to the shape of the Bill even before it was introduced. 
While in one sense it was positive that the Government accepted that it was 
not constitutionally acceptable to introduce a constitutional provision that 
was so nakedly based on its own specific short-term interests, the main 
impression from the episode was that the proposal needed pre-legislative 
scrutiny. 
 
                                                
16 David Davis MP, ‘Why limiting MP powers damages the monarchy’ 
Daily Telegraph (18 May 2010).  
17 HC Deb 5 July 2010, vol 513, col 24.  
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5.1.1 The Bill as introduced to the House of Commons  
The Bill was made up of five clauses, of which the first two were the most 
significant.18 Clause 1 created a new constitutional norm that Parliaments 
should, subject to exceptions, last for a fixed-term of five-years. Clause 1(2) 
set the date for the next general election, 7 May 2015, and clause 1(3) stated 
that subsequent general elections would be held on the first Thursday in 
May in the fifth calendar year following that in which the last general 
election took place. The other significant sub-section was clause 1(5), which 
gave the Prime Minister a power to change the date of the election by two 
months either side. The Prime Minister’s order would be subject to the 
affirmative procedure, and therefore would have to be approved by both 
Houses of Parliament. This clause was important for the passage of the Bill 
because it meant that the Bill was caught by section 2(1) of the Parliament 
Acts 1911 and 1949, as it would potentially extend the duration of a 
Parliament beyond five years. This meant that the House of Lords could 
have vetoed the Bill, and it could not have been passed by the special 
procedure within the Parliament Acts. This added a further element to this 
Bill’s interaction with the norms of the constitution.  
 
Clause 2 provided for two statutory procedures for bringing about an early 
general election. Clause 2(1) proposed to introduce entirely new means by 
which the House of Commons can bring about a general election. The 
clause would mean that if the House of Commons passed a motion ‘that 
there should be an early parliamentary general election’, which was then 
                                                
18 The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill HC Bill (2010-12) [64].  
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certified by the Speaker as being passed by two thirds (or greater) of the 
number of seats in the House, a general election would be called. The 
proposal was novel because it was the first time a Government Bill had 
proposed to introduce a special majority parliamentary procedure.19  
 
Clause 2(2) codified and altered the no confidence procedure. Under this 
new procedure, an early general election would be held if the Speaker of the 
House of Commons issued a certificate that the House of Commons passed 
a motion of no confidence in the Government on a specified day, and that 
since that day 14 days had passed without the House passing a motion of 
confidence in the Government. Clause 2(3) was an ouster clause. It said that 
the Speaker’s certificate, which applies to both mechanisms, is ‘conclusive 
for all purposes’. 
 
A central feature of the Bill was the inter-relationship between the 
provisions in clauses 1 and 2. For example the impact of clause 1 was 
dependent on the level of flexibility created by clause 2. If clause 2 did not 
create an effective restriction on the Government’s ability to trigger an 
election then the value of clause 1 would be reduced. In addition the 
significance of clause 2(1) needed to be understood in the light of clause 
2(2). This posed a major challenge for those engaged in the scrutiny of the 
Bill because the examination of the constitutional implications of this Bill 
                                                
19 The only other voting requirement other than a simple majority is set out 
in Standing Order No 37, which requires ‘no fewer than one hundred 
Members voted in the majority’. See House of Commons, Standing Orders 
of the House of Commons – Public Business (2010) New Parliament, April 
2010, HC 539 2009-10, Standard Order No 37. 
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was not just a question of applying external standards to the Bill, which is 
difficult enough. It also required scrutinising the proposed constitutional 
norms within the Bill against each other, and this represented a challenge 
because the legislative process is structured so that each clause is considered 
in turn, and this made it difficult to scrutinise the relationship between 
different provisions. 
 
5.1.2 The duration of a Parliament 
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill engaged with a range of existing 
constitutional norms. A mixture of statute, principle and convention 
regulated the duration of a Parliament and was therefore relevant to the 
clauses in the Bill, and this mixture added a degree of complexity to the 
evaluation of the constitutional effect of the Bill. 
 
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill proposed to repeal the Septennial Act 
1715, as amended by the Parliament Act 1911, a significant constitutional 
statute, which reads: 
That this present Parliament, and all Parliaments that shall at any 
time hereafter be called, assembled, or held, shall and may 
respectively have continuance for five-years and no longer. 
The 1715 Act set a time limit on the Prime Minister’s power to dissolve 
Parliament at the date of his choosing. The Act prescribed the outer limits of 
both the Government and Parliament’s discretion by setting a maximum 
length of time that a Parliament could last. 
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The 1715 Act was originally enacted to extend the maximum length of 
Parliament. The Triennial Act 1694 had set the limit at three years, and the 
1715 Act extended it to seven. Dicey described it as the ‘most significant 
single statute’ for the purposes of demonstrating the theory and practice of 
parliamentary sovereignty. 20  The 1715 Act showed that Parliament’s 
legislative capacity was not limited by its own enactments or by democracy. 
The fact that the electorate has elected a three-year Parliament did not 
prevent Parliament deciding that it wanted to extend its own authority.  
 
Section 7 of the Parliament Act 1911 amended the Septennial Act 1715 to 
set the maximum duration of a Parliament at five years.21 The 1911 Act also 
removed the Lords veto over ordinary legislation and replaced it with a 
delaying power of two years for ordinary bills. The significance of the 
change to the Septennial Act is sometimes overlooked, but it was a key part 
of that package of constitutional reform.22 The logic of the change was that 
shorter Parliaments would increase the power of suspensory veto over 
Government legislation, and would therefore mitigate the increase of the 
Commons’ legislative power.23 
 
During the parliamentary debate on the Parliament Act 1911, the 
Government indicated that it was not intended to result in five-year 
                                                
20 AV Dicey, Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution (Liberty 
Fund 1914) 6.  
21 C Ballinger, ‘Hedging and Ditching: The Parliament Act 1911’(2011) 30 
Parliamentary History 19, 21.  
22 Ibid. 
23 R Blackburn, The meeting of Parliament: a study of the law and practice 
relating to the frequency and duration of the United Kingdom Parliament 
(Dartmouth 1990) 22.  
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Parliaments per se, but rather to set five years as the maximum length. The 
point is clearly evident from two contributions to the parliamentary debate 
on the Bill made by the then Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. The first is 
from his speech made when introducing the Bill to the House of Commons 
for second reading:  
... we propose to shorten the legal duration of Parliament from seven 
to five years, which will probably amount in practice to an actual 
legislative working term of four years. That will secure that your 
House of Commons, for the time being, is always either fresh from 
the polls which gave it authority, or – and this is an equally effective 
check upon acting in confidence of the popular will – it is looking 
forward to the polls at which it will have to render an account of its 
stewardship.24 
The second is from a speech given by Asquith during the committee stage in 
the Commons: 
As to the duration of Parliament, if there were quinquennial 
Parliaments, I have always said that a Parliament would not last 
more than four out of the five years.25 
Despite the Prime Minister’s position, the legal reality was that what the 
Government in 1911 intended in terms of the precise length of a Parliament 
was not important. Under the system of a statutory maximum, the power of 
dissolution was effectively in the hands of the Prime Minister, which meant 
that the precise time frame was not possible to predict. Parliaments could, 
and did, last any time up to five years. The 1911 Act preserved the norm 
                                                
24 HC Deb 21 February 1911, vol 21, col 1749.  
25 HC Deb 1 May 1911, vol 25, col 85.  
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that the length of time would be a maximum. This obviated the need to 
debate the existing system. Thus in 1911, the Government was able to make 
a significant change to the constitution, in changing the maximum duration 
of Parliament, without significant parliamentary challenge. The problem is 
that without much challenge, the Government of the day did not develop its 
justification for the five-year statutory maximum. As Blackburn notes ‘a 
striking feature of the very protracted and lengthy debates attendant on the 
parliamentary passage of the Bill is that there was hardly any discussion at 
all on the limitation of the duration of Parliaments’.26 Had it been enacted 
separately, there would have more understanding of the advantages of a 
five-year maximum, and this debate could have informed and enhanced the 
debate on the proposal to repeal it.  
 
The defining feature of the system, which operated until 2011, was that it 
gave the Prime Minister the power to decide the date of the election and 
therefore determine the length of a Parliament. In law it was the Queen who 
called a general election, as the Monarch was vested with the legal power to 
dissolve and summon Parliament.27 The prerogative was not derived from 
any constitutional or parliamentary document, but from judicial recognition 
of activities of the Crown over past centuries.28 The legal basis of the power 
was the common law. However, by convention the Monarch’s legal power 
to dissolve was exercised in accordance with the advice of the Prime 
                                                
26 Blackburn, The meeting of Parliament: a study of the law and practice 
relating to the frequency and duration of the United Kingdom Parliament (n 
23) 22.  
27 R Blackburn, The electoral system in Britain (Macmillan 1995) 18. 
28 Blackburn, The electoral system in Britain (n 27) 19.  
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Minister. The Prime Minister never allowed Parliament to run to its 
statutory maximum, and always chose to exercise the power to call an 
election before the expiry of the five-year period. 
 
The main restriction on the Prime Minister’s discretionary power to call an 
election under the old system was through the confidence procedure. A 
central principle of the British system of parliamentary democracy is that 
the Government of the day must command the confidence of the House of 
Commons. The confidence procedure in the House of Commons, a 
convention, was a product of this principle. Confidence motions could be 
triggered by the Government, to test their support, but also by the Official 
Opposition. According to Blackburn, the procedure was part of the 
convention of collective ministerial responsibility.29 If the Government lost 
a vote of confidence or if a motion of no confidence was carried, this would 
send a message to the Prime Minister that a majority of the Commons did 
not support the Government. Therefore without any prospect of 
implementing its legislative programme, the Government could not 
continue.  
 
Despite the procedure’s importance, there was little certainty over the 
precise content of the rules on the form and applicability of confidence 
motions in Parliament. Understanding developed by convention, rather than 
through statute or the Standing Orders of the House. The clearest element of 
the convention was that the Government should find time for the debate of 
                                                
29 Ibid.  
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motions of confidence or no confidence. Erskine May described the 
convention in the following terms:  
From time to time the Opposition puts down a motion on the paper 
expressing lack of confidence in the Government or otherwise 
criticising its general conduct. By established convention the 
Government always accedes to the demand from the leader of the 
opposition to allot a day for the discussion of a motion tabled by the 
official opposition which, in the Government’s view, would have the 
effect of testing the confidence of the House.30 
The convention did not specify the form of words for censure motions and 
in practice they have taken a number of different forms. The convention did 
not dictate the specific consequences of losing a confidence motion. 
Although in reality there were only two options for a Prime Minister after a 
vote of no confidence had been carried, they could either resign or advise a 
dissolution. 
 
The convention of the confidence procedure was defined by its flexibility. 
The Government claimed that it did not intend the Fixed-Term Parliaments 
Bill to alter the substance of the procedure; however, it seemed inevitable 
that to transplant the existing procedure into the context of statutory fixed-
terms would result in some significant changes to the form and substance of 
the norm. 
 
                                                
30 Jack and May (n 2) 344.  
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5.2 The parliamentary debate 
This section identifies and critically analyses the key examples of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation during the debate on the Fixed-
term Parliaments Bill. The aims of this section are to highlight how 
parliamentarians interpreted the norms that made up the Bill’s constitutional 
framework, and to evaluate the contribution that the examples covered made 
to the passage of the Bill through Parliament and to the constitution. The 
complexity of this short Bill’s constitutional framework meant that those 
engaged in scrutiny of the Bill had a number of normative elements to 
consider. Firstly, to understand the Bill required a good grasp of the 
elements of the constitution that the Bill sought to change. Secondly, 
evaluating the Bill required analysis of the relationship between the 
different elements within the Bill, and understanding of the relationship 
between the Bill itself and the elements of the constitution that would affect 
how the Bill would operate. The general point is that it is difficult to 
evaluate how a particular constitutional change will fit within the wider 
constitution. Further, this difficulty can be exacerbated when the purpose 
and content of key elements of the constitutional framework are not easily 
accessible.   
 
For reasons of space, this account of the parliamentary passage of the Bill is 
highly selective. Much of the debate engaged in constitutional 
interpretation, but the focus here is on three particular debates: on 
entrenching fixed-terms within the constitution; on Asquith’s intention; and 
on the Speaker’s certificates. The account here does not cover a number of 
 185 
the important constitutional issues debated by Parliament. For example, it 
excludes scrutiny of the Government’s approach to the process of 
constitutional reform. Parliament’s criticism in this case was particularly 
fierce and frequent, and it is worth quoting one of the most significant 
criticisms to highlight the context in which the normative debates took 
place, when the first parliamentary committee to report on the Bill said:  
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill is ill-thought through, rushed and 
does not appear to provide a satisfactory solution, which ideally 
should be one around which there can be political consensus. It is 
unacceptable that a Bill of this legal and constitutional complexity 
has not been the subject of any prior consultation or pre-legislative 
scrutiny.31 
Although it took over a year to complete its parliamentary stages and 
receive Royal Assent, the failure to consult at the pre-legislative stage had 
consequences for the nature of the constitutional interpretation during the 
debate. The speed limited the Government’s ability to develop its 
justification for the Bill, while the failure to think through much of the detail 
in the Bill at the outset changed the nature of the task facing those 
parliamentarians intent on scrutinising the constitutional effect of the Bill.  
 
5.2.1 Entrenching fixed parliamentary terms within the constitution  
The Government flatly denied that the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill had 
anything to do with the insecurities of coalition. Instead the Government 
stated that the aims of the Bill were two-fold: firstly, to remove the Prime 
                                                
31 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fixed-term 
Parliaments Bill (HL 2010-12 69) para 5.  
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Minister’s power to decide upon the election date, and, secondly, to make 
fixed-term Parliaments part of ‘our constitutional arrangements’. 32  The 
proposal to use statute to regulate, with considerable precision, the 
dissolution of Parliament raised key questions over Parliament’s legislative 
capacity and the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. As Ryan explains, 
if Parliament is legally supreme, it is not legally possible to legislate for 
fixed parliamentary terms. 33  Parliamentary sovereignty means that the 
Government of the day could always legislate to bring about an early 
election in order to get around the terms of any Act providing for a fixed 
term. At the same time, the Government maintained that there was nothing 
extraordinary about the aims of the provisions of the Bill, or in its words: 
‘all Parliaments legislate for the future’.34 The questions for Parliament 
were: whether there was anything different about this Bill? And how would 
it affect the legislative capacity of future Parliaments? These are questions 
that get to the heart of debates surrounding the changing nature of the 
constitution, as they demand analysis of the extent to which statutory 
constitutional law can in practice limit the discretion of future Parliaments.  
 
In the House of Commons, the Government was pressurised by 
Conservative backbenchers who questioned why it was seeking to legislate 
for fixed terms. They argued that the aims of the Bill could be achieved 
through standing orders, which would not have the same risks of 
justiciability. In response the Government justified the use of statute by 
                                                
32 Mark Harper MP (Conservative) HC Deb 13 July 2011, vol 531, col 361.  
33 M Ryan, ‘The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011’ [2012] Public Law 213, 
215.  
34 HC Deb 13 July 2011, vol 531, col 361. 
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explaining the importance of the legal or constitutional effect of primary 
legislation in achieving the aims of the Bill: 
We think that putting the provisions in legislation is preferable to 
putting it in Standing Orders because the Government then have to 
get the Bill through both Houses of Parliament, in one of which they 
do not have a majority.35 
This statement indicates that the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was in part 
designed to make it difficult for future Governments and Parliaments to 
alter the arrangements for the dissolution of Parliament. By creating a 
system for setting the date of general elections whereby more of the rules 
are contained in statute than was strictly necessary, the Government 
deliberately aimed to make it more difficult for subsequent Governments 
(and Parliaments) to alter the normative system that it had designed.36 The 
legal status of the norms represented a key part of the Government’s plan, 
even though they were explicitly designed to be non-justiciable. This 
seemed to be in tension with the Government’s other argument that the 
Bill’s impact on future Parliaments was no different to any other Act. The 
problem with this analysis is that very few Acts prescribe a normative 
framework which Parliament itself must obey. The Government did not 
seem prepared to acknowledge that the Bill, by prescribing the statutory 
regulation for how Parliament should act, would affect the legislative 
capacity of Parliament differently than ‘ordinary’ legislation. 
 
                                                
35 Mark Harper MP HC Deb 24 Nov 2010, vol 519, col 349.  
36 HC Deb 1 Dec 2010, vol 519, col 865. 
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During the Bill’s report stage in the House of Commons Jacob Rees-Mogg 
MP (Conservative) introduced a new clause which would have amended the 
Parliament Act 1911.37 The clause extended section 2(1) of the 1911 Act to 
protect clause 1 of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill.38 This meant that the 
House of Lords would have been able to veto any amendment to the terms 
of the Bill.39 Rees-Mogg explained the reasoning behind the amendment: 
Either the Bill is serious and important, in which case it should be 
exempt from the Parliament Act 1911, or it is simply the contract for 
a marriage of convenience and so should fall at the next general 
election.40 
The constitutional logic of Rees-Mogg’s argument was sound. It was similar 
to the argument advanced to support section 2(1) of the Parliament Act 
1911, which itself was introduced as a result of scrutiny within Parliament.41 
In 1911 the Government of the day accepted the case for the exemption on 
the basis that it would facilitate making five-year Parliaments ‘necessary 
and inseparable from our constitutional system’. 42  In this case the 
Government rejected Rees-Mogg’s proposal on the basis that section 2(1) 
would protect the provisions in this Bill, without the need for special 
protection.43 Whilst it is correct that section 2(1) of the 1911 Act means the 
Lords approval would be needed to enact any Bill which sought to amend 
this Bill and to extend the life of a Parliament beyond the five years, it 
                                                
37 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, col 707. 
38 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, col 708. 
39 Ibid. 
40 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, cols 712-713. 
41 J Jaconelli, ‘The Parliament Bill 1910-1911: The Mechanics of 
Constitutional Protection’ (1991) 10 Parliamentary History 277.  
42 Ibid.  
43 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, cols 730-31. 
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would not prevent a Government using the Parliament Acts to alter the Bill 
to suit its own needs in other ways. While they rejected the idea that 
resolutions could be used to secure fixed-terms, they were not prepared to 
include any statutory measures that would explicitly safeguard the terms of 
the Bill. Rees-Mogg’s argument revealed the limits of the Government’s 
desire to make the provisions of the Bill part of ‘our constitutional 
arrangements’. 
 
Bill Cash MP (Conservative) introduced a new clause during the report 
stage in the Commons. Cash proposed a sunset clause that sought to restrict 
the impact of the Bill to the current Parliament. Cash’s justification for the 
sunset clause relied upon his interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty. He 
argued that the ‘very concept of a fixed-term Parliaments Bill is offensive to 
the hallowed principle - that simple constitutional principle - that no 
Parliament can bind its successors’.44 Or in other words he feared that the 
Bill might, despite the absence of any explicit measures designed to protect 
the Bill from amendment, become entrenched. His problem was with the 
substantive aim of the provisions in the Bill: ‘the essence of the argument is 
that there is no rational basis on which legislation should be regarded as 
relating to any future Parliament’.45 This last point appeared to be based 
upon a misunderstanding of the implications of constitutional legislation, as 
there are many examples of existing constitutional Acts which do relate to 
future Parliaments, the Parliament Acts being the best examples. The 
Parliament Acts, as this Bill proposed, set out in primary legislation a 
                                                
44 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, col 714. 
45 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, col 718. 
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normative system to which Parliament must adhere if it wishes to achieve 
certain ends. If Parliament wishes to depart from the terms of the 1911 Act, 
the Act must first be amended. The consequence of failing to adhere to the 
terms of the Act without first amending it was explored in Jackson.46 The 
value of Cash’s line of constitutional reasoning was that it highlighted that 
entrenchment, or at least the imposition of some form of normative limits on 
subsequent Parliaments, is not exclusively the result of ‘entrenching’ 
provisions. As Peterson argues, Parliament uses language in legislation as a 
‘commitment device’.47 The point about these legislative devices is that they 
do not rely upon judicial enforcement ‘in order to constrain future choices 
by the legislature’.48 According to Cash’s line of argument, limits can be 
achieved through the enactment of provisions that have the substantive aim 
of imposing normative limits on how future Parliaments should act. 
 
In response to Cash’s amendment, Chris Bryant MP (Labour) advanced an 
alternative interpretation of the effect of sovereignty upon Parliament’s 
legislative capacity: 
It is right to say that no Parliament is bound by its predecessor and 
no Parliament can bind its successor. However, there is one sense in 
which it can delay its successor, because it makes it have to re-
legislate if it wants to take away a part of statute law.49 
                                                
46 R. (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 
56; [2006] 1 A.C. 262 (HL). 
47 S Peterson, ‘Constitutional Entrenchment in England and the UK’ UK 
Const. L. Blog (25 March 2014) (available at 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/).  
48 Ibid. 
49 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, col 724. 
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Bryant’s point shows that the Diceyan orthodoxy was limited in its ability to 
explain the constitutional impact of this Bill. Parliament may not be able to 
bind itself, but Parliament can legislate in such a way that has a political 
impact upon its future legislative capacity. As someone who might hope to 
form part of a future Labour Government, Bryant was concerned that such a 
Government ‘would not want to have to introduce primary legislation to 
repeal this element of the Bill’.50 Bryant’s argument recognised the political 
reality that constitutional legislation can prove to be difficult to repeal or 
amend. The democratic logic of the Bill, the removal of the Prime 
Minister’s discretion was likely to become de facto irreversible, and 
therefore it was important for Parliament to recognise that the content of this 
Bill should not be seen as merely temporary.  
 
In response to these challenges in the Commons, the Minister in charge of 
the Bill, Mark Harper MP, explained that:  
The Government hope, although they cannot bind their successors, 
that the public and future Parliaments will find the arrangements in 
the Bill acceptable and will keep them in place.51 
It is difficult to know what to make of this justification. While every 
Government hopes that all its legislation will provide long-term solutions 
that stand the test of time, this does not mean that all legislation has the 
same impact on the legislative capacity of subsequent Parliaments. 
Constitutional legislation is not normally enacted to solve a short-term 
political problem, and in this sense it seems problematic for the Government 
                                                
50 Ibid.  
51 HC Deb 18 Jan 2011, vol 521, col 732. 
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to innocently claim that they ‘hope’ that the legislation will last beyond the 
current Parliament, when it knows that constitutional legislation is likely to 
prove difficult to repeal or amend for future Governments and Parliaments, 
and that as long it remains in force it will have a major impact on the way 
that future Parliaments operate. 
 
When the Bill began its passage through the Lords the Government 
maintained the same position on the Bill’s impact on future Parliaments. 
The Minister responsible for the Bill in the Lords, Lord Wallace of 
Tankerness (Liberal Democrat), said:  
What we are seeking to do is have fixed-term Parliaments on into the 
future. Other Parliaments can repeal that, but obviously it would take 
primary legislation to repeal a system of fixed-term Parliaments… I 
very much hope that… fixed-term Parliaments would become the 
norm.52 
Just as in the Commons, the Government played down the potential impact 
of putting the provisions in this Bill onto the statute book. At the very least, 
fixed-term Parliaments would be the norm until a future Parliament could 
pass legislation that amended or repealed the provisions in this Bill. The 
picture created by the idea that Parliament would ‘be free to repeal’ fixed-
terms is misleading. Again, this highlights the limitations of examining the 
constitutional implications of the Bill through the prism of the Diceyan 
orthodoxy. The constitutional reality is that such legislation could not be 
easily produced and passed. This argument also seemed in tension with the 
                                                
52 HL Deb 21 March 2011, vol 726, col 508.  
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Government’s argument that it was choosing to pursue the goal of fixed-
terms through primary legislation, rather than through resolutions of the 
House, because it recognised that primary legislation was needed to make 
fixed-terms part of the constitution.  
  
In the Lords, the analysis and scrutiny of the Bill’s ambition to make fixed-
terms part of the constitution was notably more focused and strategic than it 
was in the Commons. On the first day of report, Lord Pannick (Crossbench) 
moved an amendment, on behalf of himself, Baroness Boothroyd 
(Crossbench), Lord Butler of Brockwell (Crossbench) and Lord Armstrong 
of Ilminster (Crossbench), which had the aim of ensuring that future 
Parliaments would not be automatically bound by the terms of the Bill.53 
The amendment altered the clause so that each new Parliament would only 
be affected by the provisions in the Bill if both Houses passed a resolution 
approving that they should apply. If they did not then the terms of the Bill 
would not apply, although it remained unclear with what it would be 
replaced. Lord Pannick termed it a ‘sunrise’ clause. Lord Pannick explained 
that the amendment ‘would ensure that the coalition Government will have 
their way as to the criteria governing this Parliament, but would leave future 
Parliaments to decided for themselves whether to apply the provisions in the 
Bill’.54 Lord Pannick’s argument for his amendment rested on the simple 
idea that the Government had failed to justify why the terms of the Bill 
                                                
53 HL Deb 10 May 2011, vol 737, col 822. 
54 Ibid.  
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should apply to Parliaments beyond that of 2010. 55  Lord Butler of 
Brockwell explained his concern:  
The Government have a perfect right to commit themselves to a 
fixed-term for the present Parliament… What I do challenge is their 
right by making a permanent change to bind future Parliaments.56  
Baroness Boothroyd also argued that the Bill ‘seeks to bind future 
Parliaments to the same legal restraints intended primarily for the lifetime of 
this coalition’.57 The constitutional reasoning used to support the sunrise 
clause strikes at the heart of the constitutional implications of the Bill. 
While it would have a similar effect to the amendment proposed by Cash in 
the Commons, the Pannick amendment was supported by sound 
constitutional reasoning. Although in strictly legal terms the idea that the 
Bill would enact a ‘permanent change’ that would ‘bind’ was incorrect, the 
Crossbench group were right to challenge the idea that the possibility of 
repeal or amendment meant that the Bill would not amount to a 
constitutional restriction on future Parliaments.  
 
In response, Lord Wallace of Tankerness reiterated that the Government 
‘hoped the provision would become part of our constitutional 
arrangements’.58 He also questioned whether it would be politically possible 
for a Government to argue that they should revert to controlling the election 
date: 
                                                
55 HL Deb 10 May 2011, vol 727, cols 823-4. 
56 HL Deb 10 May 2011, vol 727, col 832-833. 
57 HL Deb 10 May 2011, vol 727, col 825.  
58 HL Deb 10 May 2011, vol 727, col 838 
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How would they react if a Minister came to the Dispatch Box of 
your Lordships’ House and said that the Government wanted to 
return to the Prime Minister of the day being able to make a decision 
to suit his party interest rather than sticking to fixed-terms?59 
Lord Wallace also cast doubt on whether it would legally be possible to 
revert to the prior situation, as it was unlikely that the prerogative power 
could be resurrected, and therefore the Pannick amendment would need 
further amendments.  
 
When Baroness Boothroyd and Lord Butler talk of Parliament being bound, 
they are referring not to what Diceyan orthodoxy would call entrenchment 
but to what Ryan, and others, refer to as ‘political entrenchment’,60 the idea 
being that a constitutional Act can restrict Parliament in a way that ordinary 
legislation does not. Put more simply, a constitutional law can, in practice 
rather than in law, restrict the legislative capacity of Parliament. Despite the 
Government’s failure to justify the constitutional implications of creating 
constitutional law, the value of the Pannick amendment and its justification 
was that it forced the Government to confront this point. The persuasiveness 
of the case advanced was confirmed when the House of Lords voted for the 
amendment and against the Government by 190 to 184.61 It was the first 
parliamentary defeat suffered by the Government on the Bill. 
 
                                                
59 HL Deb 10 May 2011, vol 727, col 841.  
60 Ryan (n 33).  
61 HL Deb 10 May 2011, vol 727, col 845.  
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The House of Commons then considered the Pannick amendment. The 
Minister, Mark Harper MP, argued the amendment undermined the central 
purpose of the Bill, which was to make fixed-term Parliaments ‘an 
established part of our constitutional arrangements’.62 Harper also struggled 
to explain, in precise terms, the constitutional impact that the Bill would 
have. He again denied that the Bill aimed to bind future Parliaments, and 
emphasised that a future Parliament would be able to repeal this 
legislation.63 This argument confirmed that the Government was not willing 
to defend the long-term implications of the Bill and its potential political 
entrenchment. Harper’s argument certainly did not persuade Bill Cash MP, 
who reiterated that in his view the Bill would entrench Fixed-term 
Parliaments, and he added: ‘This is fundamentally an attack on our 
sovereignty… it is unconstitutional’.64 The Commons did not display the 
same enthusiasm for the amendment and it was reversed by a vote of 312 to 
243. 
 
On 18 July, the Lords considered the Commons rejection of the Pannick 
amendment. The Minister, Lord Wallace, put forward a detailed argument 
for rejecting the amendment that went beyond the reasoning that the 
Government had previously offered. The democratic mandate of the House 
of Commons was central to his constitutional reasoning. He noted that while 
the Lords had passed the amendment by a majority of six, the Commons had 
                                                
62 HC Deb 13 July 2011, vol 729, col 360. 
63 HC Deb 13 July 2011, vol 729, col 367. 
64 HC Deb 13 July 2011, vol 729, col 379. 
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voted against them by a majority of 69.65 His other main line of attack was 
to criticise the workability of the amendment.66 In particular he pointed to 
the uncertainty that would result from a motion that failed to sunrise the 
Act. Would the prerogative power of the Monarch be reinstated? Further, 
the very idea of an Act’s validity being dependent on the motions of both 
Houses, and in particular the unelected Lords, was a novel procedure, and 
one that would appear to challenge the balance of power between the two 
Houses.67 
 
Lord Wallace then turned to the Government’s position on the status of 
constitutional legislation. He referred to the passage of the European Union 
Bill, another important constitutional Bill from the 2010-12 session, where 
the Government rejected a sunset provision on the basis that primary 
legislation should not be able to be repealed by a resolution. To support the 
idea that primary legislation should only be repealed by primary legislation 
he quoted the words of the European Scrutiny Committee: 
All Parliaments legislate for the future. Laws passed by one 
Parliament do not contain a sunset clause at the Dissolution. The real 
point is whether a government can, in law, make it difficult for a 
future Parliament to amend or repeal the legislation it has passed; in 
our view it cannot. Our conclusion therefore is straightforward, an 
Act of Parliament applies until it is repealed.68 
                                                
65 HL Deb 18 July 2011, vol 729, col 1076. 
66 HL Deb 18 July 2011, vol 729, cols 1076-77. 
67 HL Deb 18 July 2011, vol 729, col 1077. 
68 European Scrutiny Committee, The EU Bill and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty (HC 2010-12 633-I) para 90.  
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The implication of the Government’s argument was that there was no need 
to make it easier to repeal constitutional legislation by inserting sunset or 
sunrise clauses, because constitutional legislation is no harder to repeal than 
ordinary legislation. Or in other words it is simply not possible to make 
some legislation harder to repeal than other legislation. The European 
Scrutiny Committee is right that parliamentary sovereignty means that 
attempts to entrench legislation by inserting provisions that are expressly 
designed to make the legislation harder to amend might be ineffective. If a 
Parliament passed an Act with such provision, a subsequent Parliament 
could repeal it using the ordinary procedure, and it is extremely unlikely 
that the courts would be able to enforce the entrenching provision after it 
was repealed. If they did it would represent a radical departure from the 
existing constitutional position. 69  In the context of the referendum 
requirements within the European Union Act 2011, it is understandable why 
the Committee sought to make this point. 70  Responsibility for the 
effectiveness of the referendum ‘locks’ in the 2011 Act depends upon 
Parliament and the Government. Nevertheless, the Committee’s reasoning 
could be seen as an oversimplification of entrenchment. Part of the Bill’s 
intent, although not stated expressly, was to limit Parliament and the 
Government’s ability to decide the date of a general election. The 
Government did not want the courts to enforce the provisions in the Bill, 
and so in one sense, the Bill implicitly demands that Parliament itself gives 
                                                
69 See J Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty Parliamentary 
Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (CUP 2010) Chapters 9 and 10.  
70 See P Craig, ‘The European Union Act 2011: Locks, Limits and Legality’ 
(2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1955; J Murkens, ‘The European 
Union Act 2011: A Failed Statute’ (2012) 3 Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel 
Recht 396. 
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effect to the Bill. Any entrenching effect that the Bill might have is 
therefore primarily political, which means that the Diceyan logic of the 
European Scrutiny Committee does not capture the potential politically 
entrenching effect that the Bill might have. 
 
The House was not persuaded by Lord Wallace’s plea and it insisted on the 
Pannick amendment; the Government was again defeated by 259 to 219, a 
majority of 40, a notable increase on the vote at report stage.71 The Pannick 
amendment returned to the Commons on 8 September. Mark Harper MP 
continued his mirroring of the arguments of Lord Wallace. The real 
significance was that he offered a concession to the Lords, in the form of an 
amendment in lieu that would create an obligation to set up a commission in 
2020 to investigate how the scheme was working.72 The Commons voted to 
accept the Government’s concession in lieu of the Pannick scheme by 253 
to 190.73 
 
The amendment in lieu was then considered by the Lords. The Government 
restated its case, again emphasising that the Lords should now give way to 
the will of the ‘elected Chamber’.74 Lord Pannick made the case for his 
amendment for a final time. He reminded the House of the constitutional 
position of negotiations. At this stage, as the Lords and the Commons had 
disagreed twice, ‘the Government are obliged to accept our amendments, 
                                                
71 HL Deb 18 July 2011, vol 729, col 1103. 
72 HC Deb 8 September 2011, vol 532, col 581.  
73 HC Deb 8 September 2011, vol 532, col 596. 
74 HL Deb 14 September 2011, vol 730, col 809.  
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lose the Bill, or produce…alternative proposals’. 75  He described the 
amendment in lieu as equivalent to ‘burying it [the Lords’ concerns] in a 
time capsule’ and as ‘derisory’.76 Lord Elystan-Morgan made the important 
point that in his view the House of Commons does not have primacy on the 
issue of the length of parliamentary terms, and cited the 1911 Act as 
evidence.77 The House then voted on the Pannick amendment; it was 
defeated by 188 to 173, a majority of 15. 
 
The sustained scrutiny of the impact of this Bill upon the constitution 
beyond 2015, in spite of parliamentary sovereignty, did not produce a 
significant amendment to the substance of the Bill. The statutory review in 
2020 could be a catalyst for change, and would therefore prove to be a more 
significant concession than at first sight. The significance of the 
constitutional interpretation within Parliament on this point extends beyond 
the impact on the Bill. The Government introduced this significant 
constitutional change to Parliament with no pre-legislative scrutiny, and 
little in the way of reasoned justification for the potential long-term impact 
of the Bill. As a result, the quality of the deliberation that preceded this 
change depended on the nature of the questions asked and amendments 
moved by parliamentarians. The parliamentarians responsible for the 
scrutiny described above would have known that the chances of securing a 
major concession on this particular aspect of the Bill were unlikely, but the 
strength of their arguments did expose the weaknesses of the Government’s 
                                                
75 HL Deb 14 September 2011, vol 730, cols 810-11 
76 Ibid. 
77 HL Deb 14 September 2011, vol 730, cols 814-815. 
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reasoning. This prompted the Government to develop its justification for the 
impact of the Bill on the constitution, and for such a significant change this 
was a key contribution to the quality of the process. It served to publicise 
the reasoning behind the Bill, and to expose further its potential effect upon 
the constitution. The reasoning on entrenchment was particularly important 
because of the self-enforcing nature of the provisions. The Bill envisaged 
that it would be Parliament that would give effect to the Bill, and therefore 
the debate served to explain what the provisions entailed for Parliament. As 
we saw in the analysis of the Health and Social Care Bill, this can be crucial 
to the effectiveness of the provisions that rely exclusively on political 
enforcement.  
 
5.2.2 Asquith’s intention  
The Bill’s provision for five-year rather than four-year fixed-terms 
provoked more debate in Parliament than any other issue within the Bill. 
For many parliamentarians, particularly Labour MPs, the problem with 
clause 1 of the Bill was that in opting for the longer of the two possible 
lengths, and thereby making general elections less frequent, the Government 
was making Parliament less accountable primarily to suit the needs of the 
Coalition to last a full five years. This sub-section focuses on one particular 
strand of this debate. The Government repeatedly justified the decision to 
opt for five years on the basis that it was in keeping with existing 
constitutional norms, in particular the Septennial Act 1715 as amended by 
the Parliament Act 1911. A number of parliamentarians challenged this 
interpretation, and the debate on this particular justification provides insight 
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into the role of parliamentary constitutional interpretation within the process 
of constitutional change.  
 
The first time the Government attempted to justify the five-year term in 
these terms was in the oral evidence given by the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Nick Clegg MP (Liberal Democrat), to the Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee (PCRC). Clegg argued before the Committee that the 
provision for five-year fixed-terms ‘goes with the grain’ of the foundation 
texts of the constitution, namely the Septennial Act 1715.78 In response, the 
Committee challenged the notion that the idea that a five-year maximum 
can be used to justify the creation of five-year fixed terms.79 To support the 
point the Committee quoted the words of Herbert Asquith, who during the 
second reading of the 1911 Act said that the five-year limit would probably 
amount to a ‘working term of four years’.80 The Committee suggested that 
the notion that the Bill is ‘going with the grain’ underplays what is 
‘significant change’.81 They pointed out that by moving to five-year fixed 
terms the Bill gives the full five-year term a new integrity that it did not 
have under the existing arrangements.82 The Committee’s analysis revealed 
the problems with Clegg’s claim, which reinforced the impression that the 
Government had not sufficiently developed its case for the Bill. 
 
                                                
78 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, The Fixed-term 
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At second reading in the Commons, despite the report of the PCRC, Clegg 
continued to argue that five-year fixed terms were in ‘keeping with our 
current arrangements’.83  Clegg used Asquith’s words, the same words 
quoted by the PCRC to show that he was wrong, to again justify the 
decision to opt for five-year fixed terms. His argument was that Asquith’s 
use of the words ‘a working four-year term’ referred to the fact that the last 
year of Parliament is often lost to preparations for the election, rather than 
suggesting that a general election would be called after four years. For 
Clegg this meant that the same logic could be applied to a five-year fixed 
term. 84  Five-year fixed terms are justified because, like a five-year 
maximum, they too will result in a working term of four years. The most 
obvious difficulty with this argument is that it appeared to misrepresent the 
point Asquith was making. In response, Jack Straw MP (Labour) said that 
Clegg ‘cannot use that quotation to justify something that was never the 
sense that Asquith was putting across’.85 Straw’s critique again highlighted 
the weakness of the Government’s justification for this key element of the 
Bill. 
 
This disagreement over Parliament’s intention in 1911 reveals an important 
element of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. As we have already 
seen in the previous case studies, well reasoned constitutional interpretation 
can prompt the Government to develop its own justification for the 
constitutional norms it is attempting to enact. Although Clegg’s justification 
                                                
83 HC Deb 13 September 2010, vol 515, col 625. 
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was weak, he was limited by the complexity of the normative system that 
the Bill sought to change and the absence of further clear statements by the 
Government on the change to the Septennial Act 1715 in 1911. In the 
absence of judicial constitutional interpretation the legislature is the primary 
interpreter of the constitutional norms in the 1911 Act, and this reliance 
meant that in the absence of parliamentary scrutiny of the provision, there 
was little to guide the Parliament of 2010’s understanding of the five-year 
statutory maximum. Had there been further scrutiny of the provision in 1911 
there might be constitutional interpretation to inform the debate on the 
proposal to repeal the Septennial Act 1715.  
 
 Perhaps more importantly, the whole framework of existing constitutional 
norms, which were crucial to analysing the significance of the change, was 
difficult to interpret. The style of drafting used, and the absence of much in 
the way of travaux preparatoire, made it difficult for parliamentarians to 
assess both the Government and Parliament’s intention in 1911. There was 
little to help to explain the reasoning behind the relationship between the 
statutory maximum and the Prime Minister’s ability to call an election. This 
might be because the normative framework was not the result of a well-
designed plan, but instead the product of a pragmatic compromise. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting how this constitutional pragmatism impacts 
upon the process of constitutional change within Parliament. 
 
Throughout the parliamentary debate supporters of the Bill continued to 
justify the decision to opt for five-year fixed terms on the basis that the Bill 
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conformed with the very constitutional norms it was repealing and 
replacing. Eleanor Laing MP (Conservative) said, ‘there is no expectation 
that a Parliament should run other than for five years… there is a law and it 
says five years’. 86  Central to this argument was the idea that the 
Government did not need to enact legislation to stay in office until 2015, a 
point made by Louise Bagshawe MP (Conservative).87 Mark Harper MP, 
speaking for the Government, added to this line of argument; he said, ‘the 
Bill has nothing to do with extending the term of this Parliament’.88 This 
line of reasoning revealed that the Government was unwilling to admit fully 
the full constitutional implications of the Bill. The existence of a statutory 
maximum did not justify that maximum length being chosen as the basis for 
fixed-terms, a point emphasised by Tristram Hunt MP (Labour), a member 
of the PCRC:  
Coalition members do not understand the difference between the 
norm and the maximum.89 
The failure to make this distinction was a key weakness in the 
Government’s justification for the Bill. If anything the existing norms could 
only be used to justify a four-year fixed-term, a point made by Professor 
Blackburn, who in evidence to the PCRC said:  
The proposal for fixed-term parliament as a whole should fit as 
closely as possible into existing constitutional expectations, and the 
idea that four years is about the right time between elections is very 
prevalent. It was the period expressly approved of as being in 
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practice, when the Parliament Act set the period of five years as a 
maximum.90  
It was almost as if the Government was reluctant to admit the extent to 
which the system in the Bill was a departure from the status quo. Without 
acknowledging the extent to which the Bill represented a departure from 
existing norms it was difficult to build a more convincing case for the Bill. 
This weakness was exposed by the scrutiny in the Commons that used the 
analysis of the existing constitutional arrangements.  
 
At third reading the Deputy Prime Minister returned to the issue of five-year 
terms. It appeared that since second reading the Government had moved on 
from the idea of continuity:  
We (the Liberal Democrats) were in favour of fixed-term 
Parliaments above and beyond all else, and always accepted that the 
issue of whether it was four or five years was a matter of 
judgment… Personally I would not fetishize about 12 months one 
way or another in a term of four or five years.91 
He seemed to imply that the Government’s position to opt for five years was 
not based on a desire to preserve continuity but rather simply a ‘judgment’. 
 
In the Lords the constitutional reasoning behind the decision to opt for five 
years continued to come under fire. In line with the PCRC, the House of 
Lords Constitution Committee made the important point that there is a 
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major ‘difference between a five-year maximum and a five-year norm’.92 At 
second reading the Minister in charge of the Bill, Lord Wallace of 
Tankerness, repeated the line used by the Deputy Prime Minister at third 
reading in the Commons: ‘It is not an exact science; it is a question of 
judgment’.93 However, this did not prevent him from trying to mount a 
principled defence of five years. He again pointed out that five-year terms 
are in line with existing constitutional norms and argued that they represent 
a degree of continuity with recent practice.94 Again it was key to the 
Government’s argument that the Bill would not extend the period between 
elections.95 To support this he claimed that an advantage of five-year fixed-
terms would be that the final year would not be lost to electioneering: 
‘under this Bill, it will be possible for a Government to plan properly for a 
full five-year term’.96 This would appear to contradict what Clegg had 
argued at second reading in the Commons. Then during the committee stage 
of the Bill, Lord Wallace appeared to change course and to support the 
Deputy Prime Minister’s interpretation of Asquith:  
Clearly he did not say that the term would be for four years but that 
the practical legislative working term would be four years was 
referring to the fact that a five-year term would be in effect a four-
year term because the final year would be lost to electioneering.97 
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His argument was that Asquith’s reasoning supports a five-year fixed-term 
because a four-year fixed-term would result in a working term of three years 
that would be too short.98  
 
The scrutiny of this aspect of the Bill also demonstrated how the form and 
clarity of the constitutional norms subject to interpretation, and the debate 
that underpins their enactment, may influence the nature of constitutional 
interpretation within Parliament. As with debate on entrenchment, the 
Government may never have been at risk of defeat over the length of the 
fixed-term, but again the weakness of the Government’s position needed to 
be exposed and unpicked. Parliamentarians’ ability to use constitutional 
interpretation played a central part in that process. Constitutional legislation 
such as the 1911 Act, which is not expected to be enforced by the courts, 
should perhaps do more to ensure that it can be clearly understood and 
interpreted by those that are responsible for its effectiveness, namely 
parliamentarians. This means that the provisions themselves should be 
designed so that they are accessible, but also that the documents and the 
parliamentary debates that underpin their enactment maximise their 
potential to identify the reasoning that lies behind the legislation.  
  
5.2.3 Speaker’s certificates  
Clause 2 of the Bill contained two complimentary mechanisms to allow the 
House of Commons to bring out about an early general election.99 Both of 
these mechanisms relied upon a system of ‘Speaker’s certificates’. This sub-
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section critically analyses parliamentarians’ use of constitutional 
interpretation in the debate on this element of clause 2. A number of 
constitutional norms featured prominently in the debate namely: 
parliamentary privilege; the neutrality of the Speaker of the House of 
Commons; and the convention of the confidence procedure.  
 
The Clerk of the House of Commons, Sir Malcolm Jack, was the first to 
highlight the constitutional implications of the system of Speaker’s 
certificates. In written evidence to the PCRC, Jack claimed that the 
certificates within clause 2 of the Bill risked allowing the courts to 
adjudicate on the internal workings of Parliament.100 His view of the Bill 
was based upon his interpretation of the House of Lords case of Jackson.101 
Jack said that the case ‘indicates the extent to which matters affecting the 
internal jurisdiction of the Houses may become adjudicated in the courts 
once they are embedded in statute’.102 He argued that by placing the internal 
proceedings of the House of Commons into statute, the Bill left open the 
possibility that the courts could be called upon to interpret their meaning. 
This meant that the provisions in the Bill could affect both the ‘established 
privileges of the House of Commons’ and ‘the essential comity which has 
been established over a long period between Parliament and the courts’.103 
The PCRC did not endorse his view.104 Its report on the Bill noted that other 
experts did not share Jack’s concerns over the justiciability of the 
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provisions. Nevertheless, Jack’s concerns made a significant impact on 
Parliament’s scrutiny of the Bill. It is important not to lose sight of the 
significance of the Clerk’s intervention. The Clerk of the House of 
Commons is a significant authority on matters of privilege and 
parliamentary procedure, and it is rare for a Clerk to give evidence on a 
Government Bill in this way. It is surprising that the Committee did not give 
more weight to his views, especially as only three other experts were 
consulted. 
 
During second reading in the Commons Clegg made reference to the 
Clerk’s views and said: 
We are satisfied that the courts will continue to regard matters 
certified by the Speaker as relating to proceedings in Parliament and 
therefore falling under the protection of article 9 of the Bill of 
Rights.105 
He added that he disagreed with the Clerk’s interpretation of the Jackson 
case, claiming that the case is authority that the courts will consider the 
validity of an Act, and not the internal proceedings of Parliament.106 This is 
right in the sense that Lord Bingham said in Jackson that the case did not 
require the Court to ‘investigate the workings and procedures of 
Parliament’.107 However, one wonders if that deals with the entirety of the 
Clerk’s argument, because Lord Bingham also said in Jackson that the 
question of validity of the Act had to be addressed because it was ‘a 
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question of law which cannot, as such, be resolved by Parliament’.108 It is 
not inconceivable, should such a dispute arise over whether the procedures 
in the Bill had been followed correctly, that the same point could not be 
made by a court about this Bill’s provisions. It is not unheard of for a court 
to depart from existing precedent, and it could be reasonably argued, as the 
Clerk of the Commons did, that such an occurrence is made more likely by 
Parliament passing legislation that is unprecedented.109 The Government 
gave a more detailed response to the view of the Clerk in its response to the 
PCRC’s report on the Bill.110 The response, written by Mark Harper MP 
(Conservative), confirmed the interpretation of Jackson given by Clegg 
above, and rejected the idea that the Courts might ignore the ouster clause. 
In relation to the ouster clause, Harper claimed that unlike in Anisminic, the 
courts have no existing jurisdiction to consider parliamentary proceedings 
and therefore would not try to get around the clause. Harper also argued that 
he saw no reason why the Bill would lead the Courts to depart from 
established precedents on the justiciability of internal parliamentary 
proceedings. 
 
During the committee stage in the Commons, the PCRC put forward an 
amendment to the system of Speaker’s certificates.111  The amendment 
removed the Speaker’s certificate system and replaced it with a provision 
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that would require agreement between the leaders of the main parties. The 
mover of the amendment, Eleanor Laing MP, a member of the PCRC, said 
that she did not support the amendment.112 The proposed alternative system 
was criticised by a number of MPs for being poorly constructed.113 This 
highlighted the importance of drafting to the success of amendments. Even 
if an amendment is unlikely to convince the Government to change the Bill, 
in order to generate support within the chamber amendments need to be well 
drafted. 
 
Tristram Hunt MP was not satisfied by the Government’s response to the 
Clerk’s concerns over justiciability: 
… because the certificate would be laid out in statute law, any 
disputes about whether the Speaker had been right to issue the 
certificate would have to be settled in the courts.114 
He argued that the courts could ignore the ouster clause in clause 2(4), as 
they did in Anisminic.115 Hunt also quoted from Chaytor to highlight the 
changing nature of privilege.116 Bernard Jenkin MP (Conservative) moved 
an amendment that would bolster the ouster clause preventing the Courts 
from questioning the Speaker’s certificate. 117  Like Hunt, Jenkin was 
mystified by the way that the Government treated the opinion of the Clerk. 
He supported the Clerk’s analysis and thought that the entire Bill should be 
achieved through standing orders. In response, Harper explained that the 
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Chaytor case was not relevant, because it related to expenses, over which 
the House has never asserted control, and that the Bill’s aims could not be 
achieved through standing orders.118 He also repeated that he agreed with 
the three other experts consulted by the PCRC, who said it was extremely 
unlikely that the courts would be able to enforce the provisions in the 
Bill.119 
 
Another issue with the system of Speaker’s certificates was that they could 
potentially risk the impartiality of the Speaker of the House of Commons. 
Part of the problem with the proposed system of certification was that the 
existing conventional procedure did not provide a precise definition of what 
qualified as a vote of no confidence. The system in clause 2 would require 
the Speaker to decide whether a vote was a vote of no confidence based 
upon the existing convention. It would seem that the Government decided 
against defining the form of a vote of no confidence in order to preserve 
some continuity with the conventional system. But by making the Speaker 
decide which motions would be worthy of certificate, it would put the 
Speaker in a difficult political position. Chris Bryant MP argued that the 
Bill should define the form of words needed to qualify as a motion of no 
confidence and he tabled an amendment to that effect.120 It was opposed by 
the Government and defeated.121 He also argued that the timing of the 
issuing of the certificate would be problematic. Harper dismissed these 
claims, explaining that they would expect the Speaker to take a literal 
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approach, and added that it was no different to the procedure for the 
certification of a money Bill under the Parliament Act 1911.122 In response 
Bryant pointed out that the Lords do contest what qualifies as a Money Bill 
under that Bill, and that the decision when to hold a general election could 
be extremely contentious.123 
 
In their report on the Bill, the Constitution Committee questioned the merits 
of the system of Speaker’s certification for the new confidence procedure.124 
The Committee’s primary concern was that the lack of clarity over what 
constitutes a vote of no confidence would put the Speaker in a difficult 
position in issuing the certificate. They recommended that the Government 
amend the definition to clarify its scope. The Committee also stated that it 
did not share the Clerk’s concerns over justiciability, and therefore their 
concern was based solely on the effect it would have on the neutrality of the 
Speaker. 
 
In the Lords the Government, in stark contrast to its attitude in the 
Commons, indicated from the outset that it was willing to make changes to 
the mechanics of the Bill. During the committee stage, Lord Howarth of 
Newport (Labour) moved an amendment to the Speaker’s certificate system, 
which would mean that the certification would occur before the motion was 
debated.125 In his speech to support his amendment, he pointed out that the 
problem with Harper’s comparison with the certification of Money Bills in 
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the 1911 Act was that the characteristics of Money Bill are described within 
that Act. He then outlined three key constitutional problems with the 
Speaker’s certificate system as it applies to the no confidence clause. 
Firstly, a motion of no confidence is difficult to define. Secondly, the 
procedure could bring the Speaker into political controversy. Thirdly, the 
system is open to legal challenge. In response Lord Wallace, the Minister, 
indicated that they would return to the matter, but that the Government’s 
view was these concerns were unfounded, and that there was nothing 
exceptional about what the system was asking of the Speaker.126 
 
Lord Howarth moved a second probing amendment to remove the system of 
Speaker’s certificates from the Bill. 127  This amendment prompted 
significant contributions from two former Speakers of the House of 
Commons. Baroness Boothroyd (Crossbench), Speaker from 1992 to 2000, 
made a number of criticisms of the system of speaker certificates in the 
Bill.128 She argued that the system would risk putting the Speaker in a very 
difficult political situation, namely because the interpretation of what 
qualifies as vote of no confidence is so difficult. This statutory role, she 
argued, would extend the Speaker’s role in a way that would fundamentally 
affect the office. In her view it would ‘jeopardise his independence and 
impair his responsibilities to defend the rights and reputation of 
Parliament’.129 She also endorsed the views of the Clerk, and argued that the 
Bill would allow the courts to adjudicate on Commons procedure. Lord 
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Martin of Springburn (Crossbench), Speaker from 2000 to 2009, also 
attached great weight to the advice of the Clerk, and said that it should be 
treated with respect as it represents ‘the collective point of view of the 
constitutional experts we have in the House of Commons.130 He also 
concurred with Baroness Boothroyd that the clause 2(1) procedure would 
put the Speaker under a great deal of undesirable political pressure. Many 
other peers concurred with the words of the former Speakers, and Lord 
Falconer (Labour) even suggested that the Lords might refuse to give the 
Bill a third reading, which was an indication of the seriousness of the Lords’ 
constitutional concerns over this aspect of the Bill.131 
 
The Government’s response to this debate demonstrated the impact of the 
former Speakers’ use of constitutional interpretation. Lord Wallace said that 
the Government would be willing to amend the system of Speakers’ 
certificates in order to prevent the Speaker being drawn into political 
controversy.132 This marked a change in the Government position, which up 
to this point maintained that the Speaker’s certificates would not risk the 
Speaker’s neutrality. However, on the potential intervention of the courts 
Lord Wallace mounted an in-depth defence of the Government’s position, 
which went much further in terms of constitutional justification than any 
explanation given thus far. He explained that the role of the certificate was 
to emphasise that the subject matter of clause 2 was a matter exclusively for 
Parliament. Further, he added the certificate was designed to make sure that 
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it was not the Government which determined whether there has been a vote 
of no confidence. He said it was designed to make it ‘legally certain’ that 
the terms of the Bill have been met.133 This did acknowledge that the 
questions were in fact linked, because the likelihood of a legal dispute was 
related to the certainty of the procedure within the Bill.  
 
During the committee stage, Lord Cormack (Conservative) made another 
attempt to alter the no confidence procedure in clause 2, with an amendment 
that sought to define a motion of no confidence. 134  His amendment 
contained four different forms of no confidence motions. Lord Howarth of 
Newport then introduced an amendment to Lord Cormack’s definition, 
which would remove two of the forms of motion suggested. 135  Lord 
Howarth argued that the whole system of Speaker’s certificates was flawed 
and that it was impossible to define the existing no confidence procedure in 
legalistic terms. Lord Wallace, the Minister, again gave a constructive 
response to the debate, and he explained that the Government had decided 
against definition for precisely the reason that Lord Howarth had criticised 
Lord Cormack’s amendment.136 Lord Wallace agreed to meet with all the 
Peers interested in clause 2, with the aiming of drawing up a more 
acceptable solution. 
 
During the report stage, Lord Howarth moved an amendment that 
introduced a new version of clause 2, and removed the process of Speaker 
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certification from both forms of early dissolution.137 The new clause set out 
the specific words that must be used for both a motion of confidence and for 
a motion of no confidence. The new clause was the product of a meeting 
between the Minister and interested parties since the end of the committee 
stage. The Minister added his name to the new clause. The clause marks a 
clear change to nature of the confidence procedure. Lord Howarth 
explained: 
Motions understood politically to relate to confidence could in future 
still be debated and voted on in a multiplicity of forms, just as they 
have in the past. But for the purposes of establishing constitutionally 
and legally, in the new context of this fixed-term parliaments 
legislation and provision within it for an early parliamentary 
election, whether a Motion of confidence or no confidence has or 
has not been passed, the Motion must be tabled in the precise terms 
prescribed in the new clause.138 
He also said that the simpler system made the chances of court intervention 
less likely. The Commons accepted the changes, although Chris Bryant MP 
pointed out that the Government had opposed very similar amendments in 
the Commons.139 
 
The development of the debate in the Lords showed how constitutional 
interpretation facilitates the analysis of clauses with constitutional effect. At 
first sight, the Speaker’s certificates system maintained continuity with the 
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existing conventions of the confidence procedure by not defining the form 
that a motion of confidence must take. However, by applying the principle 
of the political neutrality of the Speaker and parliamentary privilege to the 
relevant clauses, parliamentarians were able to show that the clauses, and 
the Government’s reasoning in support of them, were problematic. The 
solution crafted made the procedure clearer and more certain, which may 
reduce the risk of the courts’ intervention, and therefore mitigate Jack’s 
concerns with the original system.140 Peers in the Lords were able to use 
their understanding of constitutional norms to design a solution that 
improved the clarity of the procedure and maintained aspects of the original 
convention. On a different note, it was noticeable that most parliamentarians 
did not think that judicial enforcement could provide a solution to the 
difficulty of designing a system of breaking the fixed-term that was not 
easily abused.141 As Youngs and Thomas-Symonds point out, having an 
independent body decide on whether the provisions have been used 
correctly seems like a logical way of preventing abuse.142 
 
Conclusion 
Constitutional interpretation played a key role in each of the debates 
examined above. This is to be expected. Not only was it a Bill of first class 
constitutional importance, it was also a Bill directed at Parliament and 
parliamentarians. The substance of the Bill sought to regulate Parliament. 
The scrutiny of the Bill therefore provided parliamentarians with an 
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opportunity to make use of their own experiences, their understanding of the 
parliamentary process, and most importantly for these purposes, some of the 
most significant norms of the constitution. The basic point is that in contrast 
to the two previous case studies, analysis and scrutiny of the entire 
substantive content of this Bill depended upon constitutional interpretation. 
This reliance on constitutional interpretation highlighted a number of factors 
that affect how the practice contributes to the legislative process and the 
constitution. 
 
Of the three case studies, the debate on this Bill demonstrated, more than 
any other, the limitations of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. 
More parliamentarians in both Houses engaged in constitutional 
interpretation than in each of the two previous case studies; however, this 
Bill showed the Government at its least constructive, and this demonstrated 
the extent of the Government’s control on the nature of the debate. The first 
major problem was the absence of any formal pre-legislative scrutiny. 
Although the Bill was short, the implications for the constitution were 
profound and complex, and the timetable did not allow either the 
Government or Parliament the time to generate the background analysis that 
was needed to inform the scrutiny of the Bill in the House of Commons. 
The first consequence of this was that when the Government introduced the 
Bill in the House of Commons, the arguments in favour of the key clauses 
in the Bill were notably under-developed. They neither engaged with any of 
the existing debate in favour of fixed-terms, nor anticipated the most 
obvious objections. But most significantly, their arguments did not address 
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the detail of the Bill itself or how it would fit within the constitution. Some 
of the reasons advanced misrepresented the reality of the change that they 
were seeking to enact. While in the two previous case studies it was possible 
to understand why the Government did not have well-developed arguments 
to support the constitutional effect of the relevant clauses at the outset, in 
the sense that they were secondary to the substance of the policy pursued, in 
this case constitutional interpretation was central to the substance of the 
Bill. Therefore the absence of a well-justified case for some of the key 
provisions in the Bill meant that much of the constitutional interpretation 
was simply concerned with getting the Government to face up to the 
implications of its own Bill, rather than actually engaging with the 
Government’s justification.  
 
The Government’s failure made the task of constitutional interpretation 
more difficult for parliamentarians engaged in scrutiny of the Bill, and at the 
same time it made their use of the practice all the more important to the 
quality of the process. Parliamentarians and committees from both Houses 
did rise to the occasion and forced the Government to confront the 
implications of the detail of the Bill. The passage of this Bill demonstrates 
some of the key differences between the approaches in the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords to the scrutiny of the constitutional effect 
of a Bill. The intervention of the PCRC was particularly important. 
Departmental Select Committees do not regularly produce reports on 
Government Bills, and in a short time frame the committee was able to 
produce a report which made a number of significant criticisms of the Bill, 
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analysed the normative framework, and contained influential evidence from 
the Clerk of the House of Commons and leading academics. During the 
debate in the Commons, a number of parliamentarians constructed 
amendments and arguments that used constitutional interpretation. 
However, despite the significance of the Bill, the scrutiny was markedly less 
effective than in the Lords. The problems with the Commons’ approach was 
typified by Eleanor Laing MP, who moved a probing amendment that she 
did not herself support, and that was ineffective because critics of the Bill 
found the amendment to be unworkable. Even when MPs produced well-
argued critical analysis of the Bill, the absence of any prospect of defeat 
meant that the Government did not provide much in the way of a reasoned 
response. 
 
Constitutional interpretation also helped the Government to ensure that the 
drafting of the Bill matched its stated aims. For example, in relation to the 
confidence procedure, the Government stated that it did not intend to change 
the substance of the convention. However, when confronted with the reality 
of what it proposed and how that departed from existing arrangements, it 
accepted the need to devise an alternative set of clauses. The ability of 
parliamentarians to translate their concern into workable alternatives clauses 
made a major difference to the impact of their constitutional interpretation. 
This resulted in a clause that protected a value of the existing constitution: 
the neutrality of the Speaker of the House of Commons. Even the 
unsuccessful attempt to insert a sunrise clause in the Lords showed that the 
ability of peers to capture the essence of their arguments in the form of an 
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amendment is central to the ability of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation to add to the debate. Peers were able to translate their concern 
over the impact of the constitutional provisions over subsequent Parliaments 
into an amendment that provoked a Government defeat, and prompted the 
Government to develop significantly its case for the Bill. 
 
The parliamentary constitutional interpretation in this Bill also showed how 
the qualities of the relevant constitutional norm contribute to its ability to be 
applied within the legislative process. For example, the lack of accessible 
justification for the amended form of the Septennial Act 1715 resulted in a 
lack of clarity over the effect of its repeal. In relation to the Speaker’s 
certificate, the lack of clarity over the rules of no confidence procedure 
made it hard to pin down the precise effect of the attempt to codify it. The 
basic point is that the better the norm is justified, the clearer its form and the 
more transparent its purpose, the easier it is for parliamentarians to interpret 
it for the purposes of scrutinising the constitutional effect of Government 
Bills. This highlights one of the effects of a heavy reliance on uncodified 
and under-justified constitutional norms. In an ideal situation, the 
Government would help to mitigate this difficulty by outlining how the 
clauses relate to the relevant constitutional norms. It did not, but 
parliamentarians were able to use constitutional interpretation to scrutinise 
each of the key clauses within the Bill, and to offer alternative 
interpretations of the constitutional effect of those clauses; this ensured that 
by the end of the process the Government’s reasoning on the constitutional 
effect of the main elements of the Bill had developed considerably. This, 
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ultimately, was the main achievement of the parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation during the debate. Parliamentarians were able to fill the gap 
left by the Government’s lack of engagement with the existing normative 
framework, and this provided vital insight into what the Bill sought to do. 
Without this scrutiny, the process would have not been able to analyse the 
Government’s justification for the constitutional effect of the Bill, and this 
would have resulted in a process of constitutional change that would be 
almost impossible to defend. 
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6. The Value and Character of Parliamentary 
Constitutional Interpretation 
 
This chapter uses the three preceding case studies to outline the value and 
character of parliamentary constitutional interpretation. The chapter addresses how 
and why the practice contributes to the legislative process and the constitution. 
Waldron rightly declares that scholars in both law and politics have failed to 
develop the standards by which the performance of parliamentarians in the 
legislative process should be judged.1 The weaknesses of the legislative process in 
Parliament are well-known, but in order to develop the standards that can guide 
critical analysis and improve parliamentary performance, the practices that 
strengthen the process need to be identified and their potential value articulated. 
 
The aim here is to develop an understanding of the potential value of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation. Rather than basing this account on 
abstract ideals, it is built on analysis of how the practice operates. By dissecting 
the features of the practice and articulating what it achieves, the chapter intends to 
outline a sense of why it is important and why the realisation of its potential 
would enhance the legislative process and the constitution. The interpretation of 
constitutional norms may not, in itself, decide legislative outcomes in Parliament, 
in the sense that the constitution does not require that the substance of the law 
conforms to existing constitutional norms.2 However, this does not deprive the 
substance of the constitution of an instrumental role within the parliamentary law-
                                                
1 J Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (CUP 1999) 1.  
2 D Oliver, ‘Constitutional Scrutiny of Government Bills’ (2004) 4 Macquarie 
Law Journal 33, 54.  
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making process. There is increasing awareness that the majoritarian structure of 
the parliamentary legislative process does not prevent the substantive content of 
the constitution playing an important role, particularly in respect to human and 
constitutional rights.3 This chapter draws on a range of literature on the legislative 
process, including that on rights, to shape the account of what makes 
constitutional interpretation valuable. 
 
As Jennings explains, the strength of the majority does not deprive Parliament of 
the power of effective criticism.4 The Government can limit the time available and 
the influence of scrutiny, but it cannot directly limit the quality of the arguments 
contained in the speeches, amendments and reports advanced in the parliamentary 
process. Feldman observes that constitutional norms, including constitutional 
rights and principles, supply the external standards that make for particularly 
effective legislative scrutiny.5 To scrutinise the constitutional effect of a Bill, 
Parliament needs to be able to identify, explore and if necessary challenge how 
any clause interacts with the substance of the constitution before it becomes law. 
To do this, parliamentarians and parliamentary committees must be able to 
interpret the norms of the constitution and the constitutional effect of Bills. This 
thesis argues that this practice is the key active ingredient in Parliament’s role in 
enacting Bills with constitutional effect. This chapter seeks to explain what this 
activity, when used effectively, can achieve.  
 
                                                
3 S Gardbaum, Commonwealth Constitutionalism (CUP 2013).  
4 I Jennings, Parliamentary Reform (University of London Press 1934) 36. 
5 D Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ [2002] 
Public Law 323, 328.  
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section sets out the basic 
features of constitutional interpretation in Parliament. The second section details 
how the practice raises the level of justification within the legislative process. The 
third section explains how the practice facilitates a distinct parliamentary 
involvement in the negotiation of the constitution.  
 
6.1 The character of the parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
The context of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is responsible for 
determining its character, and informs the value of the practice.6 The aim of this 
section is to move beyond the technical question of what counts as parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation, and instead to focus on how the parliamentary and 
legislative context informs the distinctive features and characteristics of the 
practice. The case studies have shown that constitutional interpretation is utilised 
by a number of parliamentary actors, that it serves to contribute to a number of 
different communicative purposes within the legislative process, and that a 
number of factors influence its effectiveness.  
 
6.1.1 Three parliamentary factors 
This sub-section highlights three particular aspects of the parliamentary context 
that are central to the character of the practice. There are many more factors that 
could be mentioned, but those detailed here are the ones that stood out in the case 
studies. 
 
                                                
6 C Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (OUP 1996) 167; C Sunstein 
and A Vermeule, ‘Interpretation and Institutions’ (2003) 101 Michigan Law 
Review 885. 
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The first and most important factor is the nature of the Government’s approach to 
the legislative process. 7  The parliamentary structure creates an adversarial 
relationship between the Government on the one hand, and those parliamentarians 
who are not members of the Government, on the other. The Government is the 
dominant force in the relationship. But that observation does not paint a complete 
picture. The nature of the relationship is complicated, and different aspects of the 
relationship play a key role in influencing constitutional interpretation within 
Parliament.  
 
If the Government takes a proactive attitude towards the process, by seeking to 
inform and to engage those involved in scrutiny, then the adversarial nature of the 
process becomes a strength as the combination of principled argument with 
disagreement produces an effective scrutiny process. This allows parliamentarians 
to hold the Government to account for the content of its legislative proposals.8 
The debate in the House of Lords on the Public Bodies Bill and the Health and 
Social Care Bill demonstrates this point.9 If the Government takes a defensive 
attitude towards the process, by not providing sufficient information or time to 
engage in the detail of the Bill, then the adversarial nature of the engagement 
becomes a weakness, and the capacity for principled scrutiny of the detail is 
limited. As Hunt explains, the quality of the information provided by the 
Government to explain the reasoning behind legislative provisions is vital to 
                                                
7 D Feldman, ‘The impact of human rights on the UK legislative process’ (2004) 
25 Statute Law Review 91, 105.  
8 Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ (n 5) 328-
329. 
9 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
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effective scrutiny.10 The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill shows that a Government in 
a hurry can squeeze the platform needed for constitutional interpretation to play a 
significant role.11 The analysis of the constitutional effect of a Bill can often be 
complicated, and the more time and information given to support the process, the 
more likely it is that the difficult constitutional questions in the detail of the Bill 
will be formulated and put to the Government.12  
 
One of the most significant manifestations of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
adversarial system within the legislative process for constitutional interpretation is 
the role of the Minister responsible for piloting the Bill through the relevant 
chamber. A strength of this arrangement is that a competent and proactive 
Minister can transmit the reasoning behind the detail of a Bill. Even though the 
Minister will not be the one personally responsible for the particular clause in 
question, the system allows the thinking of those who were responsible, the civil 
servants, lawyers, and parliamentary counsel, to transmit that information via the 
Minister into a political, public and transparent forum.13 A positive attitude from 
the Minister will often result in a process whereby the quality of the analysis put 
to the Government translates into the development of the reasoning offered to 
justify the Bill. In each of the case studies, the Minister in the Lords showed this 
element of the process working well. However, this arrangement works badly 
when the Minister takes a defensive attitude to the process. If the Minister does 
                                                
10 M Hunt, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ in A Horne, D Oliver and G 
Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart 2013) 229.  
11 See Chapter 5. 
12 For an account of a slower approach to parliamentary law-making see T Bull 
and I Cameron, ‘Legislative Review for Human Rights Compatibility: A View 
From Sweden’ in M Hunt, H Hooper and P Yowell (eds), Parliament and Human 
Rights: Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart 2014). 
13 D Greenberg, Laying Down the Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 51.  
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not treat the arguments put to him or her seriously, or does not appreciate the need 
to develop the substance of the reasoning already put forward, then the presence 
of disagreement and the adversarial model are not conducive to effective 
constitutional interpretation or Government accountability, which both rely upon 
the Government’s willingness to develop its case for the clauses within a Bill.  
 
The second factor is bicameralism. Parliamentary constitutional interpretation is 
very different in the House of Lords from the House of Commons. This is not 
surprising, but it is worth noting some of the principal distinguishing features. The 
influence of parliamentary constitutional interpretation witnessed in the case 
studies is a product of the political context in the current House of Lords. The 
Government’s strategy for navigating legislation through the Lords is 
fundamentally different from the strategy in the Commons.14 In the Lords, the 
Government’s negotiating position is often far more open and proactive than in 
the Commons.15 As Russell demonstrates, this is the product of the relative 
weakness of the Government’s position. The real possibility of defeat means that 
the Government in many cases has to ‘win the argument’ on the substance of the 
Bill.16 Another key factor is the absence of the time constraints imposed by the 
Government on the Commons’ legislative scrutiny. The distinct role of the 
Government within the House of Lords supplies the opportunity for the form of 
proactive negotiation upon which the practice depends.17 
                                                
14 M Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords (OUP 2013) 178.  
15 Ibid. 
16 D Pannick, ‘Respect for law and sausages": how Parliament made Section 31 of 
the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 on the sale of employment rights’ (2014) 
85 The Political Quarterly 43, 47. 
17 J Waldron, ‘Bicameralism and the Separation of Powers’ (2012) 65 Current 
Legal Problems 31, 43-48.  
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The strength of the House of Lords throws the weakness of the House of 
Commons into sharp relief. The Government is known to resist changes in the 
Commons, in anticipation of the more proactive dynamic in the Lords. A 
notorious example came during the debate on the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005, which was rushed through the Commons; the Government justified this on 
the basis that there would be more time in the Lords.18 Sathanapally reports that 
there was ‘hostility to the idea that MPs should be satisfied with expected scrutiny 
in the House of Lords as an alternative to Commons deliberation’.19 During the 
debate on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, Chris Bryant MP (Labour) complained 
that the arguments relating to the flaws with the system of Speaker’s certificates 
were rebutted in the Commons, only to be later accepted in the Lords.20 Saving 
concessions for the Lords is a common legislative tactic. However, the Bryant 
complaint shows that the limited impact of the Commons is not due to the lack of 
principled scrutiny. The basic point is that principled scrutiny requires effective 
political support. In the Commons, during the critical stage of the process for 
principled analysis of the detail of a Bill, the Public Bill Committee, it is very 
difficult for critics of a Bill to garner the necessary support to make the 
Government take the analysis seriously.21 
                                                
18 See M Shephard, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny and Oversight of the British “War on 
Terror”: From Accretion of Executive Power and Evasion of Scrutiny to 
Embarrassment and Concessions’ (2009) 15 The Journal of Legislative Studies 
191; F Davis and F De Londras, ‘Controlling the Executive in Times of 
Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms’ (2010) 
10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19.  
19 A Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement (OUP 2012) 200-201.  
20 See 5.2.3. 
21 L Thompson, ‘More of the Same or a Period of Change? The Impact of Bill 
Committees in the Twenty-First Century House of Commons’ (2012) 66 
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The third factor is the role of amendments. The bulk of the parliamentary 
legislative process involves clause-by-clause analysis of the Bill. In the committee 
and report stages the primary mechanism of scrutiny is through the tabling of 
amendments. The case studies show that the effectiveness of an amendment 
depends on the ability to translate legislative reasoning into a competent 
amendment. Support for a well-argued criticism might be lost if the proponent 
cannot translate the point into a workable amendment. Defenders of the legislative 
process stress that one of its strengths is that it approaches political and moral 
issues free of the technicalities associated with legal reasoning.22 There are 
reasons to be careful about such claims. After a Bill has passed the second reading 
stage, the scope of amendments is limited by the parameters of the Bill in both 
Houses.23 In the Commons, this is policed closely.24 The general point is that a 
large proportion of parliamentary debate on a Bill, particularly in the Lords, does 
not examine competing policy options, but instead analyses the merits of the Bill 
itself, and whether its clauses are suited to achieving the stated aims. For this 
reason, the role of ‘technicalities’ should not be underestimated.  
 
The relative technicality of the process means that the ability to draft well-crafted 
amendments that correspond to the supporting analysis is a central feature of 
constitutional interpretation in Parliament. In each of the case studies, the ability 
                                                                                                                                 
Parliamentary Affairs 459; D Greenberg, Laying Down the Law (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) 108-109.  
22 J Waldron, ‘Judges as Moral Reasoners’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 2, 19.  
23 M Jack and TE May, Erskine May's treatise on the law, privileges, proceedings 
and usage of Parliament (24th edn, LexisNexis London 2011) 604 for the rules of 
on the Lords, 575, 590 and 595 on the Commons. 
24 Ibid; Greenberg (n 13) 88-89. 
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of parliamentarians, for example Peers such as Lord Pannick and Lord Lester of 
Herne Hill, to translate their concerns into amendments was central to the role of 
the practice within the process.25 There are a number of points that arise from this 
feature of the practice. Firstly, amendments can be used as tools to highlight the 
problems within a Bill and how they can be improved. In other words, if a 
parliamentarian can show how a constitutional problem should be solved through 
an amendment, this is likely to strengthen the appeal of the argument relating to 
the constitutional effect of a Bill, both in relation to the Government and to those 
who may vote upon it. Secondly, in a related point, an amendment provides a 
focal point within the debate, something the relevant House or committee can vote 
upon. This tends to focus the mind of the Government, particularly in the Lords. 
The real prospect of defeat and amendment is a central part of what makes 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation relevant to the enactment of a Bill. As 
Russell explains, it is routine for the delegated powers in a Bill to be amended in 
the Lords.26 Thirdly, such changes, as occurred in the Public Bodies Bill, depend 
upon the ability of peers to be able to draft amendments that bolster the 
constitutional propriety of delegated powers. In other words, this factor shows the 
significance of legislative expertise. The constitutional analysis of a Bill might be 
more suited to the process of amendment than general policy analysis, which is 
limited by the nature of parliamentary debate after the second reading stage. The 
relative technicality of the process does not make it any less political. On the 
contrary, in terms of scrutiny, technical legislative skills are a key tool for 
expanding the basis of disagreement and enhancing political accountability within 
the legislative process. A targeted amendment can transform what appears to be 
                                                
25 See for example 3.2.4. 
26 M Russell, The Contemporary House of Lords (OUP 2013) 218-220.  
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an innocuous detail of a Bill into an issue of constitutional principle.27 In this 
sense the quality of the amendments is a crucial part of holding the Government to 
account for the detail buried within a Bill. These questions will sometimes relate 
to parts of the Bill that the Government would rather not debate.  
 
None of these factors will surprise seasoned observers of the legislative process. 
Nonetheless it is important to appreciate how they influence the nature of 
constitutional interpretation within Parliament. The number of Bills analysed is 
not large enough to make confident generalisations on which political factors 
determine the effectiveness of the practice. The case studies were selected to show 
how the practice contributes to the legislative process in Parliament, but on other 
occasions during the parliamentary session of 2010-2012 the factors outlined 
above will have limited the role of constitutional interpretation. 
 
6.1.2 Committees 
The case studies have shown that the legislative scrutiny committees in the House 
of Lords, particularly the Constitution Committee but also the DPRRC, are a key 
part of how Parliament interprets the constitution. As was noted in chapter one, 
the nature of the impact of legislative scrutiny committees, particularly the JCHR, 
has been explored in the existing literature. The aim here is to highlight the 
institutional features of these committees, evidenced in the case studies, that 
enhance the practice of constitutional interpretation.  
 
The first institutional feature is the ability to deliver an in-depth analysis of the 
                                                
27 Greenberg (n 13) 51.  
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constitutional implications of a Bill within a report published during the early 
stages of the passage through the Lords. The ability to issue reports on a Bill puts 
committees in a privileged position within the Parliament-Government dialogue. 
The report format provides a unique opportunity to use constitutional 
interpretation in the analysis of a Bill. Each of the Constitution Committee’s 
reports examined in the case studies shows that the Committee uses analysis in 
their reports that otherwise would not have the opportunity to be heard, as a 
speech in a debate does not provide the same type of opportunity to set out an 
analytical position on a Bill. Within a report, a committee is able to address the 
detail of a Bill using sources and evidence. Further, a report from a parliamentary 
committee can become a point of reference within parliamentary debate in a way 
that is more difficult for a speech. This fills an important gap in legislative 
reasoning within Parliament.28 The ability of a committee (through its clerks and 
advisers) to write what is effectively an ‘essay’ or ‘judgment’ on the constitutional 
effect of a Bill, means that Parliament has its own internal source of constitutional 
analysis and is not reliant on the Government or the view of individual 
parliamentarians. The availability of well-reasoned analysis from a respected 
parliamentary source creates an opportunity for those on the floor of the House of 
Lords to respond by proposing amendments. Transmitting sophisticated 
constitutional analysis from a report to the scrutiny on the floor of the House is a 
central element of the committees’ contribution to the practice of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation.  
 
                                                
28 M Tushnet, ‘Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts; Incentives and 
Institutional Design’ in R Bauman and T Kahana (eds), The Least Examined 
Branch (CUP 2006) 371-372.  
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The second feature is the prompting of Government responses.29 It is normal 
practice for a committee report to prompt a direct Government response after the 
report is published. 30  The Government response often shows that those 
responsible for the Bill, within the Bill team, have contributed to the analysis. 
Prompting such a response is an important contribution to the legislative process, 
where information on the Government’s position is crucial to the quality of the 
scrutiny. The Government response to the Constitution Committee’s report on the 
Health and Social Care Bill is a case in point.31 Further, the Committee’s reports 
also serve to generate a response from Government indirectly. For example, when 
peers introduce amendments that directly respond to the points made in the 
Constitution Committee’s reports, this can then prompt an indirect Government 
response. Examples of this can be seen in the debates on both the Public Bodies 
Bill and the Health and Social Care Bill.32 The DPRRC prompted a number of 
amendments, sometimes moved by members of the Committee, during the debate 
on the Public Bodies Bill. The combination of the ability to issue reports that 
contain analysis of the content of a Bill and the presence of parliamentarians 
willing to move amendments to follow up points made is central to how 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation works within Parliament, and in the 
House of Lords in particular. 
 
The third feature is the presence of constitutional expertise. Within the 
Constitution Committee there are two types of experts. First, there are the 
                                                
29 Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ (n 5) 333.  
30 M Jack and TE May, Erskine May's treatise on the law, privileges, proceedings 
and usage of Parliament (24th edn, LexisNexis 2011) 836.  
31 See 4.2.5. 
32 See Chapters Three and Four.  
 237 
members of the Committee, which in 2010-2012 contained prominent lawyers 
such as Lord Pannick, and other experts such as Lord Norton of Louth; and 
second, there are the legal advisers to the Committee who play a central role in 
producing the analysis within the reports.33 The JCHR and the DPRRC are both 
served by a combination of the expertise of their members and their staff. 
Expertise is particularly important because of the limited capacity of 
parliamentarians, in the sense that they are ‘part-time legislators’ who fulfil many 
other roles, and because of the lack of professional legal expertise available to 
parliamentarians within Parliament.34 The concentration of this expertise is central 
to the quality of the analysis, which is able to build the reputation of a committee, 
and to provide a reference point for amendments moved in the Committee and 
Report stages. 
 
The fourth feature is the ‘legisprudence’ of the reports of each Committtee.35 The 
absence of a codified constitution has made the Constitution Committee’s remit 
more difficult than it might otherwise have been. Over the course of the past ten 
years it has built up a considerable body of constitutional analysis, upon which it 
can draw to facilitate its scrutiny. The most prominent example of this practice 
covered in the case studies came in the Committee’s report on the Public Bodies 
Bill, which drew on its previous report on the Legislative and Regulatory Reform 
Bill.36 The ability of the Constitution Committee to build precedents has enabled 
                                                
33 A Le Sueur and J Simson Caird, The House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution in A Horne, G Drewry and D Oliver (eds) Parliament and the Law 
(Hart 2013).  
34 Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ (n 5) 327. 
35 D Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: the Case for Standards and 
Checklists’ [2006] Public Law 219, 243. 
36 See 3.2.1. 
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the Committee to mitigate some of the challenges of interpreting the UK 
constitution.  
 
6.1.3 The interpretability of constitutional norms 
Interpretability is a term borrowed from an article by Melton, Elkins, Ginsburg 
and Leetaru who ‘define the interpretability of law’ as ‘the ability to produce 
inter-subjective agreement about the meaning of a text’.37 Or, in other words, 
Melton et al are concerned with judging the accessibility of constitutional rules. 
They point out that it is a basic requirement of the rule of law that constitutions 
should not be difficult to interpret, and furthermore that a lack of clarity will 
reduce the likelihood of effective enforcement. There is a range of identifiable 
benefits attached to a constitution that is made up of norms that are accessible and 
suited to interpretation in a variety of institutional contexts. 
 
Interpretability is a key term for understanding the character of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation. In each of the three case studies the interpretability of 
the norms influenced the role of constitutional interpretation within the 
parliamentary process. There are a number of factors identified in the case studies, 
which appear to affect interpretability. 
 
All constitutions present interpretive challenges; the absence of codification 
sometimes makes the process of interpreting the United Kingdom constitution 
particularly difficult. The precise implications stemming from the absence of 
                                                
37 J Melton, Z Ekins, T Ginsburg and K Leetaru, ‘On the interpretability of law: 
lessons from the decoding of national constitutions’ (2012) 43 British Journal of 
Political Science 399, 400. 
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codification are hard to identify. Bogdanor says that the constitution has changed 
from a ‘system of tacit understandings’ to ‘a system where the rules are 
increasingly clear and are consistently articulated within Parliament’.38 Even if 
this is correct, the absence of codification means that the use of constitutional 
interpretation and the understanding of the constitution is less widespread and 
more reliant on a limited number of experts than it would be if the constitution 
was the product of a constitutional convention and more ingrained in the political 
culture. The absence of a codified constitution means that the norms of the 
constitution are less well-known and less prominent in political debate than they 
would be if the United Kingdom had a codified constitution.  
 
As a consequence of the absence of codification, many of the constitutional norms 
that are interpreted are found in the statute book.39 In some situations, this aids 
interpretability, for example in the comparative analysis between the Legislative 
and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 and the Public Bodies Bill. In that situation, the 
strength of the debate on the 2006 Act and the principles behind the concessions 
secured were able to inform the interpretation of the Public Bodies Bill. However, 
in relation to both the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill and the Health and Social Care 
Bill the obscurity of the provisions being replaced, and the absence of identifiable 
authoritative analysis to explain the reasoning behind them, presented a major 
challenge for the debate on the relevant clauses of both Bills. This raises the point 
that it is not necessarily the absence of codification that weakens interpretability, 
but rather the absence of authoritative and accessible material to explain the basic 
                                                
38 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart 2009) 276-290.  
39 R Hazell, ‘Time for a New Convention: parliamentary scrutiny of constitutional 
bills 1997-2005’ [2006] Public Law 247, 247.  
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principles and reasoning which lie behind the norm in question. Many statutory 
provisions have broader constitutional principles imbedded in their purpose; the 
key is to be able to identify them.40 The absence of travaux preparatoires or more 
detailed preambles does not help the situation. Explanatory notes can help, but 
often they add little to the text of the Bill, in the sense that they explain the clause 
rather than explain the reasoning behind it.41 The general point is that the 
accessibility and interpretability of a Bill is not just a question of drafting, but it is 
also a question of how the Bill is communicated.42 The quality of the justification 
offered by the Government can make a difference to the way that the relevant 
legislation operates within the political sphere. This means that the parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation that precedes enactment can enhance the 
interpretability of statutory provisions, and I return to this point below (6.2.3), as 
this is a key value of the practice. 
 
Another important factor in relation to interpretability for the purpose of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation is the subject matter of the norm. In the 
case study on the Public Bodies Bill, it was clear that parliamentary actors could 
harness their insight into the norms that underpin the parliamentary law-making 
procedure in order to analyse the constitutional effect of the Henry VIII powers in 
that Bill. Certain parliamentarians and committees are able to use their awareness 
of their own constitutional role in the legislative process to supply the standards 
for the principled scrutiny, which is defined as constitutional interpretation in this 
                                                
40 H Isol-Miettinen, ‘The Principled Legislative Strategy: Rationality of Legal 
Principles in the Creation of Law?’ in L Wintgens and A Oliver-Lalana (eds), The 
Rationality and Justification of Legislation (Ashgate 2013) 33-52.  
41 Greenberg (n13) 230-231. 
42 W Voermans, ‘Styles of Legislation and Their Effects’ (2011) 32 Statute Law 




The final point is that some norms are hard to interpret both because they are 
uncodified and there is a lack of an authoritative body of interpretation to build 
upon. The interpretation of the confidence procedure during the debate on the 
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was challenging because the convention was 
uncodified and had been used infrequently. The passage of that Bill also showed 
how authoritative interpretation enhances the nature of constitutional 
interpretation during debate. The Clerk of the House of Commons’ intervention 
on parliamentary privilege provoked a large amount of effective scrutiny of the 
elements of the Bill relevant to that constitutional principle.43 Equally, if there is a 
body of case law that may be drawn upon, this will also enhance the 
interpretability, and this is shown in the Clerk’s intervention during that debate. 
Many of the most important constitutional norms for the purposes of the 
legislative scrutiny are rarely interpreted by the courts, and this means that in 
many cases parliamentarians have to look elsewhere for authoritative sources of 
interpretation. 
 
6.1.4 Political constitutional interpretation 
This sub-section argues that parliamentary constitutional interpretation is political 
by character, despite its reliance upon both constitutional principles and legal or 
legislative analysis. The process of constitutional interpretation or ‘principled 
scrutiny’ raises important questions about the balance of law and politics in the 
legislative process.  
                                                
43 See 5.2.3.  
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Feldman argues that principled legislative scrutiny is separate from examining the 
policy merits of a particular Bill.44 Feldman separates scrutiny into three types: 
scrutiny of the policy objectives, scrutiny of mechanisms for achieving those 
objectives, and scrutiny of drafting.45 Scrutiny of policy objectives is described as 
‘essentially political’, whereas scrutiny of the mechanisms to meet those 
objectives is said to combine political and technical considerations. Horrigan, 
writing about constitutional rights scrutiny in Australia, explains the division in 
the following terms:  
At a broad level, we can easily distinguish between Parliament’s political 
decision about the merits of any proposed rights-infringing legislation and 
a lawyer’s legal decision about whether and how a proposed law affects 
rights in terms of standards established in legal benchmarks like bills of 
rights and precedents. For this purpose, the decision that proposed 
legislation does or might infringe a right is the relevant legal decision. The 
decision that any such infringement is justified is the relevant political 
decision.46 
The case studies support Feldman and Horrigan’s analyses in the sense that 
constitutional interpretation relies upon what may be described as ‘technical’ or 
‘legal’ or ‘legislative’ analysis. However, within the practice of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation these elements cannot be cleanly separated. Almost 
                                                
44 Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ (n 5) 332.  
45 Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ (n 5) 336-
338.  
46 B Horrigan, ‘Improving Legislative Scrutiny of Proposed Laws to Enhance 
Basic Rights, Parliamentary Democracy, and the Quality of Law-Making’ in T 
Campbell, J Goldsworthy and A Stone (eds), Protecting Rights Without A Bill of 
Rights (Ashgate, 2006) 81. 
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all of the examples of the practice examined in the case studies are directed to the 
question of whether the constitutional effect of a clause is justified. The absence 
of legal analysis in the form referred to by Horrigan and Feldman might be as a 
result of the exclusion of the interpretation of rights from the case studies, but 
even in the rights context drawing such a clear distinction seems problematic. The 
analysis of the merits of a clause is informed by technical legislative analysis, but 
this does not trump the overall political character of constitutional interpretation 
within the parliamentary context. The contributions of parliamentarians and 
committees during the legislative process are directed to the question of whether 
the Bill should be enacted in its existing form. The parliamentary legislative 
process is a forum whereby the Government should be held to account, by testing 
the strength of their case for changing the law. Within a forum of political 
accountability, it is hard to regard any input into that process as non-political in 
character, even if it is not political in the sense of being party-political. If law 
forms part of politics, as Loughlin suggests, then constitutional and legal analysis 
should be regarded as part of, rather than separate from, politics within the 
legislative process in Parliament.47  
 
The danger with Horrigan’s analysis is that it implies that the legal analysis of 
whether a Bill conforms to constitutional standards is a non-political form of 
analysis. On this point, Dworkin’s analysis of constitutional interpretation by 
judges is instructive.48 The relevant constitutional norm provides certain limits as 
                                                
47 M Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between 
Law and Politics (Hart 2000) 6.  
48 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (Harvard University Press 1996) 1-38; For a 
helpful analysis of Dworkin see T Gyorfi, ‘In Search of a First-Person Plural, 
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to how it can be interpreted, but within those limits there are a number of possible 
interpretations that will be possible.49 The interpretation that is chosen will depend 
on how the interpreter understands the political arguments that underpin the 
relevant principles. For example, the question of whether a particular Henry VIII 
power is adequately framed will be informed by how the interpreter views the 
nature of the relationship between Parliament and Government that underpins the 
relevant norms. As constitutionality is not a condition of legality within the UK, 
to argue that constitutional norms should be respected within a Bill is to endorse 
the political logic of the relevant norms. In this sense constitutional interpretation 
is not an apolitical form of analysis, even if it is technical in the sense that it relies 
upon analysis of constitutional (including legal) norms. The general point is that 
constitutional interpretation, whether it is viewed as objective or subjective, 
cannot be regarded as divorced from questions of politics.  
 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation is not used to support determinations of 
questions of law in the same way that constitutional interpretation is used in the 
judicial context. The legislative process is forward-facing. Assessing the future 
effects of a proposed Bill is difficult to predict.50 In the absence of constitutional 
laws that set boundaries of legality, the answer to the question of how a Bill might 
fit within the wider constitutional framework is unlikely to be straightforward. 
This is reflected in the fact that the view of an individual parliamentarian or a 
parliamentary committee does not in itself decide the meaning of the constitution. 
                                                                                                                                 
Second-Best Theory of Constitutional Interpretation’ (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal 1077. 
49 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (Harvard University Press 1996) 8-11.  
50 S Laws, ‘Legislation and Politics’ in D Feldman (ed), Law in Politics, Politics 
in Law (Hart 2013) 99-102.  
 245 
The Constitution Committee and parliamentary actors approach the task of 
assessing the constitutional effect of a Bill without the burden of having to make 
an authoritative judgment. A parliamentary committee, according to Feldman: 
… approaches the constitution on the footing that it may have multiple 
meanings or, to be more accurate, that it is not the committee’s job to 
make an authoritative choice between meanings; and its work and reports 
are conducted accordingly. By contrast, a constitutional court must make 
an authoritative choice between possible constitutional interpretations, and 
may therefore have to consider carefully the practical consequences of 
interpreting the relevant provisions in one way rather than another.51 
Even if one objective answer is possible, it would not, of itself, determine the 
outcome of the parliamentary legislative process. This flows from the fact that 
constitutional interpretation in Parliament does not formally trump other political 
questions. In this sense, it remains only part of the political process of deciding 
what the content of the law should be.  
 
This particular political character of the practice of constitutional interpretation is 
also a product of parliamentary sovereignty. As Goldsworthy points out, 
parliamentary supremacy can and does co-exist with constitutional norms that 
influence legislative decision-making.52 The key distinction is that the absence of 
any special legal status means that parliamentary constitutional interpretation has 
to compete in the same way as every other form of legislative politics. This 
                                                
51 D Feldman, ‘Factors affecting the Choice of Techniques of Constitutional 
Interpretation’ in Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien (ed), L’Interprétation 
Constitutionnelle (Dalloz 2005) 4-5.  
52 J Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (CUP 
2010) 302-303.  
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ensures that questions of constitutionality and the use of constitutional 
interpretation remain open to disagreement.53 While to some this might be a 
weakness, it may also be understood as a strength of this form of the practice. 
Parliamentary supremacy leaves the content of the constitution open to 
renegotiation through the legislative process.54 While this leaves the norms that 
underpin democracy and the constitution vulnerable, it also presents 
parliamentarians with the opportunity to engage with the norms of the existing 
constitution as part of the ordinary legislative process. When they are asked to 
consider a Bill with constitutional effect, parliamentarians are presented with the 
responsibility to assess existing arrangements and the proposal to change them. 
This allows parliamentarians to engage with the existing constitution in a way that 
would not be possible if constitutional norms were taken outside of the legislative 
process, via constitutional entrenchment or strong judicial review.55  
 
The practice of parliamentary constitutional interpretation, as described in the 
case studies, shows that parliamentarians can take the rules of the constitution 
seriously despite parliamentary supremacy. It is possible to leave the rules of the 
constitution open to change through the ordinary legislative process and to have 
certain expectations of how that process should be conducted. By including 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation as part of its ‘constitutional 
machinery’, through the committee structure, Parliament has shown that 
                                                
53 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) 310-312.  
54 G Gee and G Webber, ‘What is a political constitution?’ (2010) 30 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 273. 
55 Strong judicial review refers to the form of review whereby a court holds the 
power to invalidate primary legislation, and the legislature holds limited power to 
override court decisions see: M Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial 
Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton 
University Press 2007). 
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parliamentary constitutional interpretation and parliamentary supremacy can co-
exist. The Government or Parliament may not always meet the standards 
expected, but in principle, the two are not mutually incompatible. 
 
The practice of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is defined by the 
recognition that there is a category of constitutional norms that are relevant to the 
content of legislation, but which do not have special legal status and therefore do 
not trump, in any formal sense, other concerns within legislative deliberations. 
They must compete with other concerns for attention, but they do benefit from 
having specialist legislative committees dedicated to interpreting and applying 
them to legislative proposals. The Government knows that the constitutional 
effect of a Bill is likely to attract comment from a committee capable of using 
constitutional interpretation effectively. Thought of in this way, the practice 
provides an extra deliberative hurdle for a Government to face in the legislative 
process. An individual’s view on the value of the practice is likely to depend on 
what someone considers to be the appropriate balance ‘between deliberation and 
inclusiveness on the one hand, and expeditiousness and decisiveness on the 
other’.56 The value to this particular balance is that it creates a significant role for 
constitutional interpretation within the legislative process, but without the cost of 
artificially elevating constitutional reasoning above ordinary legislative politics.  
 
6.2 Justification 
The first element of the value of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is that 
it serves to enhance the level of justification during the legislative process. There 
                                                
56 I Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘Lawmakers as Lawbreakers’ (2010) 52 William and Mary 
Law Review 805, 816.  
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is increasing recognition that constitutionalism, in any shape or form, should 
result in a ‘culture of justification’ within the legislative process in a Parliament or 
legislature.57 This recognition has occurred in a number of different academic 
disciplines: through political theorists writing on ‘deliberative democracy’ and the 
relationship between deliberation, justification and legitimacy;58 constitutional 
lawyers articulating with the role of constitutional rights within the legislative 
process;59 and legal theorists critically engaging the role of the legislative process 
and parliamentary debate.60 This section puts forward the argument that the 
interpretation of all forms of constitutional norms, and not just rights, plays a 
major role in the process of justifying the constitutional effect of a Bill prior to 
enactment, and that this contributes both to the legitimacy of the legislative 
process and to the relevance of constitutionalism to the legislative process.  
 
6.2.1 Justification and parliamentary law-making 
All legislatures, including the UK Parliament, make law in a way that does not 
meet the expectations of deliberative democrats or constitutional theorists. 
                                                
57 E Muranick, ‘A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ 
(1994) 10 South African Journal of Human Rights 31, 32; see also D Dyzenhaus, 
‘Law as Justification: Etienne Muranik’s Conception of Legal Culture’ (1998) 10 
South African Journal of Human Rights 11; D Dyzenhaus, ‘Are Legislatures 
Good at Morality? Or Better at it than Courts?’ (2009) 7 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 46; D Dyzenhaus,‘Aspiring to the rule of law’ in T Campbell, 
J Goldsworthy and A Stone (eds), Protecting Human Rights: Instruments and 
Institutions (2003) 209. 
58 G Gaus, Justificatory liberalism: an essay on epistemology and political theory 
(OUP 1996); E Rossi, ‘Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls 
Political Liberalism Versus Gaus’ Justificatory Liberalism (2014) 20 Res Publica 
9.  
59 M Hunt, ‘Reshaping constitutionalism’ in Morison, K McEvoy and G Anthony 
(eds) Human Rights, Democracy and Transition: Essays in Honour of Stephen 
Livingstone (Oxford, OUP 2007). 
60 L Wintgens and A Oliver-Lalana (eds), The Rationality and Justification of 
Legislation (Ashgate 2013). 
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However, evidence of weak performance should not deter those who argue that 
deliberation and justification matter from making the case for how a legislature 
should enact legislation. This sub-section outlines the basic arguments to support 
the view that what parliamentarians do to contribute to justification is particularly 
significant to the legitimacy of the legislative process. Legitimacy is not, as Nicol 
puts it, an ‘all-or-nothing affair’.61 The purpose of using it as a tool of analysis is 
to determine what forms of conduct are relevant to reaching a higher standard of 
process than that which is achieved by simply complying with the basic rules or 
expectations. In this sense the value of the idea of legitimacy is that it allows 
observers of a process to work out the standards of conduct that go beyond those 
articulated by the internal regulations of the institution. 
 
Treating parliamentary deliberation and justification as relevant to the legitimacy 
of the legislative process is based on the idea that the legislative process is more 
than a mechanical process for aggregating preferences and political bargaining. It 
is certainly the case that, in certain circumstances, legislatures operate like a 
‘counting machine’, whereby what is said during debate appears to make little or 
no difference to the final result.62 Close examination of the legislative process in 
Parliament shows that, even though the aims of legislative policy are generally not 
decided during the parliamentary legislative process, a good deal of parliamentary 
debate is dedicated to analysing how the clauses within a Bill should achieve the 
ends which were voted upon at the second reading stage. It is in these 
circumstances that the justification of how a Bill fits within the existing 
                                                
61 D Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialisation of British Politics (OUP 2001) 
17.  
62 P Yowell, ‘Practical Reason and the Separation of Powers’ (unpublished DPhil 
thesis Oxford University 2010) 71. 
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constitutional framework becomes particularly important. Dworkin, Rawls and 
Waldron all recognise that ensuring that legislative proposals are shown to ‘fit’ 
with constitutional fundamentals is central to both legitimacy and integrity of a 
constitutional system. In Law’s Empire, Dworkin argues that integrity demands 
that legislative proposals should fit with the principles of a constitutional 
system.63 In Political Liberalism, Rawls puts forward a conception of public 
reason, which states that the liberal principle of legitimacy requires that exercises 
of public power, including legislative power, should be shown to conform to the 
principles and ideals within a constitution.64 Waldron argues that legislators act 
with integrity, when they engage with the principles that underpin the 
constitutional system.65 It is dangerous to assimilate these points, as each rests on 
complex foundations, but they all support the view that parliamentarians should 
use their position within the law-making process to question the extent to which 
any legislative proposal conforms to the existing constitutional framework. The 
integrity and the legitimacy of a constitutional system depend upon the normative 
ingredients of that system being used to frame legislative debate. If this is a proper 
function of the legislative process, then it should be seen as a forum for testing the 
coherence of a legislative proposal, as well as serving to aggregate preferences. 
Or, as Yowell explains, ‘the authority of the legislature cannot be reduced to 
either deliberation or voting’; it depends on both.66 
 
                                                
63 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1998) 217-219.  
64 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press 1996) 217-218.  
65 J Waldron, ‘Legislating with Integrity’ (2003-2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 
373.   
66 Yowell (n 62) 163.  
 251 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation is the activity used within the UK 
Parliament to resolve questions relating to how a legislative proposal fits with the 
existing constitutional framework. In order to appreciate why this raises the level 
of justification within the legislative process and why this is important, the 
legislative process needs to be seen as a forum of justification. Webber states:  
The theory of parliamentary democracy conceives of the legislative forum 
as a forum of justification. Through the exchange of reasons, legislators 
seek to justify to each other why the proposition for legislative action they 
favour should be adopted by the assembly… The legislature’s activity in 
debating bills and motions, in enacting, amending and repealing law, in 
questioning the performance of the executive, all testify to the legislature 
as a forum of justification.67 
This presents a balanced account of what the legislative process can achieve. 
Webber does not pretend that deliberation will always improve the output of the 
legislative process or that it should aim to produce consensus, as some 
deliberative democrats claims.68 The legislative process is understood as having 
the potential to act as a deliberative and justificatory forum, rather than to claim 
that the processes or constitutional norms themselves actually guarantee anything. 
This corresponds with Webber’s account of the constitution as an ‘activity’.69 
Webber rebuts the notion that constitutional rights should be conceived as shields 
against legislation, and instead argues that in a democratic constitutional state, the 
legislature is charged with specifying the rights in the constitution through 
legislation. This approach can be extended to constitutional norms that are not 
                                                
67 G Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: on the Limitation of Rights (CUP 
2009) 150. 
68 J Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (CUP 1999) 152. 
69 Webber (n 68) 13.  
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constitutional rights - understood in the sense that the constitution is not an end 
state or a completed project, but an activity that is constantly being renegotiated 
via the legislative process. If the constitution is an ‘activity’ and the legislative 
process is the primary process by which it is specified, then this also suggests that 
justification is a vital part of the legislative process, because it is needed to 
explain how the norms of the constitution relate to the legislative proposal in 
question.  
 
To return to the central point for this sub-section, justification enhances the 
legitimacy of the legislative process because it represents a basic standard of 
legislative reasoning. For legislative deliberation to create ‘a culture of 
justification’ it must engage with the detail of the legislative proposal. 
Justification is not just about advancing reasons that support why a Bill should be 
enacted, it also demands that those reasons be engaged with and contested before 
a Bill becomes law. Parliamentarians should test the strength of the reasoning 
behind the Bill. Justification demands that the reasoning behind a Bill is 
challenged so that more than one account of a Bill is heard within the political 
process before it is enacted.70 To summarise, the idea that the legislative process 
should aspire to be a ‘forum of justification’ means that parliamentarians’ 
deliberation should focus upon the substance of the legislative proposal at hand, 
and should seek to challenge the reasons put forward by those responsible for the 
proposal. Put simply, if parliamentarians achieve this then they enhance the 
legitimacy of the legislative process. 
 
                                                
70 P Petit, Republicanism (OUP 1999) 189.  
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Some go further and claim that the legitimacy of the law itself, and not just the 
process as is claimed here, is related to the content of parliamentary deliberations 
that precede enactment. Oliver-Lalana argues that: 
The legitimacy of laws cannot solely derive from certain procedural 
conditions (legality), but it is also bound to the rationality of the 
argumentation that justifies them, that is, to parliamentary 
argumentation.71 
This perspective on deliberation relies upon seeing parliamentary argumentation 
as ‘aiming for justification’ and should be assessed ‘as a pattern for legislative 
rationality and legitimacy’.72 This understanding of the object of the legislative 
process is close to the position that is outlined in this chapter. Justification is a 
reasonable and realistic goal for legislative deliberation in Parliament. Regardless 
of the Government’s strength within Parliament, the process should be seen as 
providing an opportunity for participants to contribute to the justification of the 
enactment of the Bill, by both defending and criticising the reasons advanced for 
supporting the effect of the Bill.  
 
The idea that Parliament’s deliberation should aspire to justify the content of a 
legislative proposal is not merely academic or theoretical. In the case of Hirst 
(no2), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated that the absence of 
effective parliamentary deliberation on the enactment of an automatic blanket ban 
on prisoner voting was relevant to finding that ban to be disproportionate: 
                                                
71 A Daniel Oliver-Lalana, ‘The sources of legitimacy of political decisions: 
between procedure and substance’ in L Wintgens (ed), The Theory and Practice 
of Legislation: Essays in Legisprudence (Ashgate 2005) 239. 
72 Ibid.  
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There is no evidence that Parliament has ever sought to weigh the 
competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the 
right of a convicted prisoner to vote… it cannot be said that there was any 
substantive debate by members of the legislature on the continued 
justification in light of modern-day penal policy and of current human 
rights standards for maintaining such a general restriction on the right of 
prisoners to vote.73 
The proportionality analysis used by courts to assess the compatibility of 
legislation makes the presence, or the absence, of justification for legislation 
during the legislative process a justiciable issue. According to Kumm, the use of 
proportionality institutionalises the idea that the legitimacy of law is ‘plausible 
only if the law is demonstrably justifiable to those burdened by it in terms that 
free and equals can accept’.74 Another example of this practice is the principle of 
ministerial estoppel as referred to in Wilson (no2), which says that the 
Government should not rely in judicial review proceedings upon an interpretation 
of legislation which is incompatible with an explanation given by the Government 
during the debate which precedes enactment.75 In Animal Defenders in the House 
of Lords76 and the ECtHR77 the presence of extensive deliberation on the question 
of freedom of speech was referred to as a factor relevant to the judgment that the 
                                                
73 Hirst v United Kingdon (no 2) (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 41 para 79. 
74 M Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The 
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interference with the right was proportionate.78 Hunt, Hooper and Yowell report 
that the JCHR’s criticisms of the Government’s inadequate justification of the 
derogation that accompanied the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
formed an important part of the Appellant’s arguments in the Belmarsh case.79 
They argue that it was significant that such evidence was not ‘improper’.80 In a 
number of different contexts, constitutional norms serve as the basis for 
demanding that the Government should offer a certain standard of justification for 
their actions. Constitutional norms provide a framework for analysing the 
Government’s justification for legislative proposals. Returning to the 
parliamentary context, the Constitution Committee has often asked the 
Government for a particular level of justification for departures from 
constitutional principle.81 For example, in its report on the Banking Bill, the 
Committee stated that retrospective provisions should only be used when there is 
a compelling reason to do.82  
 
For the purpose of the claims made here, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the 
nature of the deliberation within the legislative process, the actions of 
parliamentarians, can enhance the legitimacy of the legislative process. By 
contributing to the increasingly prominent standard of justificatory accountability, 
whereby the Government is held to account for the detail of its legislative 
proposal and the arguments it puts forward to support that detail, parliamentary 
                                                
78 See A Kavanagh, ‘Proportionality Parliamentary Debates: Exploring Some 
Forbidden Territory’ (2014) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1.  
79 M Hunt, H Hooper and P Yowell, Parliaments and Human Rights (AHRC 
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80 Ibid.  
81 See 3.2.1. 
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constitutional interpretation enhances the legitimacy of the enactment of a Bill 
with constitutional effect. The practice creates a connection between the substance 
of the constitutional effect of the legislation being proposed and the process by 
which the legislation will be enacted. Justification is the source of that connection. 
 
6.2.2 Justifying the constitutional effect of a Bill 
A Bill with constitutional effect creates distinct justificatory demands upon the 
legislative process. A central claim of this Chapter, and of this thesis, is that 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation is the form of justification that can 
meet those demands and therefore enhance the legitimacy of the process of 
enacting Bills with constitutional effect. This sub-section outlines the reasons why 
the justification of the constitutional effect of a Bill, through constitutional 
interpretation, is so important to the legislative process and the UK constitution. 
One of the functions of a constitution is to supply a normative framework, which 
can enhance the deliberation during the legislative process.83 Constitutional norms 
enable legislators to identify those legislative proposals that have the potential to 
alter the existing constitutional settlement. The idea that the process of enacting 
legislation with constitutional effect, or amending a constitution, should be 
qualitatively different from other forms of legislative change is familiar to 
constitutional democracies that have codified and supreme constitutions. The 
logic of creating distinct procedural hurdles and constraints is that they might 
increase the likelihood that the proposal will be deliberated carefully and 
                                                
83 C Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Harvard University Press 2001) 
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properly.84 However, this same logic is not necessarily incompatible with the UK 
constitution simply because it does not have either a formal process for amending 
the constitution, nor a power for courts to strike down primary legislation on the 
basis of departing from the norms of the constitution. The UK constitution can 
still be structured in such a way that constitutional questions receive distinct 
treatment, commensurate with their significance, within the ordinary legislative 
process. The legitimacy of the process of enacting legislation with constitutional 
effect, be it in the form of formal amendment procedure or via the ordinary 
legislative process, is not purely dependent on sticking to the relevant rules, but 
rather also depends on how those who participate in the process act - in particular, 
how they examine and debate the substance of the proposal in question. As the 
previous sub-section argued, this applies to all legislative proposals. In this sub-
section I build on this general point and argue that justification is particularly 
important for the legitimacy of the process of enacting a Bill with constitutional 
effect. 
 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation is a form of reasoning that provides a 
practical tool that parliamentarians can use to respond to the particular challenge 
of examining and enacting a Bill which effects the norms which constitute the 
democratic process in which they are participating. The principal value of 
constitutional interpretation in this context is that it can be used to identify the 
reasons that explain the constitutional effect of the Bill. Revealing those reasons is 
how the process can meet the standard of justification. Nicol captures the point 
that the legitimacy of the process is determined by whether there is a connection 
                                                
84 D Lutz, ‘Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment’ (1994) 88 The 
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between the substance of a Bill with constitutional effect and the content of the 
deliberation that precedes enactment, when he says: 
The greater the enormity of the constitutional change legislators are asked 
to sanction, the greater should be their understanding of its implications.85 
While ideally all parliamentarians should treat any legislative change with due 
care and seriousness, one of the distinguishing features of a Bill with 
constitutional effect is that it can ask parliamentarians to sanction a change to the 
rules of the political system in which they are participating. This coincidence of 
interests, however remote, is central to what makes the justification, which can be 
achieved via parliamentary constitutional interpretation, particularly significant to 
the legitimacy of the process. Firstly, as those responsible for participating in the 
democratic law-making process, parliamentarians have a responsibility to show a 
degree of care in relation to that existing process, in the sense that they should be 
able to use the knowledge and experience of the internal normative order in their 
analysis of the substance of constitutional change. 86  That knowledge and 
experience can be directed through parliamentary constitutional interpretation. 
Secondly, the potential risks associated with any majority altering the constitution 
to suit its own ends are great, and this means that parliamentarians should 
challenge the reasoning behind the constitutional effect of a Bill, to check that 
short-term political interests do not result in a weakening of the democratic 
credentials of the constitution.87 As Brest notes, it seems reasonable to demand 
that the law-making process take explicit account of the constitutional values 
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threatened by pending legislation.88 In particular, parliamentarians should be 
watchful to ensure their own role is not diminished. This was precisely the 
scenario during the debate on the Public Bodies Bill, where the Henry VIII 
powers within the Bill were designed to circumvent the primary law-making 
process in Parliament. The responsibility for protecting constitutional rights is 
shared with the courts, but Parliament has the primary responsibility for ensuring 
that the norms that underpin the legislative process are reflected in the legislation 
it enacts. Thirdly, the vulnerability of the UK constitution to change by the 
political majority of the day makes it especially important that parliamentarians 
identify the constitutional effect in any Bill introduced to Parliament, so that the 
democratic credentials of the constitution are not eroded without public debate. 
The scenario of possible departure from or change to existing constitutional norms 
makes the justification supplied by effective parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation especially valuable to the legislative process.  
 
The regular practice of parliamentary constitutional interpretation, in particular 
through the combined work of committees and Peers on the floor of the House of 
Lords, creates a distinct track for constitutional issues within the legislative 
process. Informal channels of constitutional debate serve the same ends as formal 
channels, such as constitutional amendment procedures, which promote 
commitments to constitutional and legal clarity.89 The use of constitutional norms 
to frame legislative debate in this track focuses justification upon aspects of a Bill 
that may not be significant in a party political sense, but should be debated. In this 
                                                
88 P Brest, ‘The conscientious legislator’s guide to constitutional interpretation’ 
(1974-1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 585, 588. 
89 R Dixon, ‘Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective’, 
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sense, one of the contributions of the practice is to contribute to disagreement on 
aspects of legislation that might otherwise not attract political attention.90 In this 
sense, the practice of constitutional interpretation uses the norms of the 
constitution to identify aspects of a Bill that ought to be given attention during the 
legislative process. 91  Each of the case studies demonstrated this feature of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation. The Health and Social Care Bill is 
perhaps the best example. The norms of the constitution, namely individual 
ministerial responsibility and the existing statutory regulation of the relationship 
between the Secretary of State for Health, the National Health Service and 
Parliament, served as an analytical prism for identifying a potential issue within 
the Bill that might otherwise have been overlooked.92 
 
At its most effective, parliamentary constitutional interpretation is used by 
multiple parliamentary actors to challenge the Government’s justification for the 
constitutional effect. The presence of a range of interpretive accounts of the 
constitutional effect of a Bill makes it more likely that the strongest reasons for 
enacting the change will be identified prior to enactment. 93  Parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation is a form of reasoning that can be used to create a 
form of Socratic contestation between alternative interpretive accounts of the 
constitutional effect of a Bill.94 This competition between alternative interpretive 
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accounts is the ideal that the culture of justification represents. For the interpretive 
accounts to make a justificatory impact, the Government needs to take them 
seriously. During Parliament’s consideration of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, 
the presence of competing accounts of impact of the Bill upon Parliament’s 
legislative capacity did not produce many amendments to the substance of the 
Bill, but it did prompt the Government to significantly develop its reasoning for 
the Bill.95 Even those arguments that did not prompt much direct Government 
response and were rejected without a well-reasoned explanation served to draw 
attention to the reasoning that the Government did not accept, and therefore by 
process of elimination shed some light on the reasoning behind the constitutional 
effect of the Bill. Identifying the strongest reasons to support the constitutional 
effect of a Bill is important because it enhances the transparency of the Bill and 
the norms of the constitution.96 This contribution to transparency is particularly 
worthwhile for legislation that can alter the normative basis of the constitution. 
One of the principal findings from the case studies was the way in which the 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation that precedes the enactment of a Bill 
can inform how subsequent parliaments engage with the resultant provisions. 
Voermans’ observation that the effectiveness of legislation depends on how it is 
communicated, as well as how it is drafted, seems particularly apposite here.97 For 
the purposes of political forms of interpretation, which are not constrained by 
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Pepper v Hart,98 parliamentary reasoning is a vital interpretive aid. The level of 
justification that precedes an enactment, for example the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2006, will improve the ability of its provisions to act as 
the basis of constitutional analysis.99 If the strongest reasons for the constitutional 
effect of a Bill are identified, then even if they are not apparent on the face of the 
Bill, those reasons can inform how that legislation is interpreted in a political 
context. 
 
The final point about the value of constitutional interpretation as a form of 
justificatory reasoning in the legislative process is that it can make an impact 
upstream in the legislative process; in other words, it can affect the Government’s 
approach to legislation at an earlier stage. 100  The presence of committees 
dedicated to the interpretation of human rights and constitutional norms are 
central to this ‘upstreaming’ effect. However, it is important to emphasise that it is 
the use of constitutional interpretation, the substance of both the committees’ 
legislative reasoning and those within Parliament who respond to the committees’ 
arguments in their scrutiny of the detail of the Bill, that produces this response. 
Put another way, the informal channel within Parliament, which means that 
constitutional issues are subject to a distinct standard of justificatory analysis, is 
the product of the substance of the content of the questions and arguments put to 
Government. For example, as a result of the combined scrutiny of the Public 
Bodies Bill by Constitution Committee, the DPRRC and Peers, future 
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Governments will have a clear guide to the boundaries of constitutionality that 
regulate the use of Henry VIII powers. If the Government knows its proposals will 
be subject to vigorous analysis that applies constitutional norms to its legislation, 
then this might have a positive effect on the way that Governments approach 
designing and justifying the constitutional effect of primary legislation. 
 
Within Parliament, the Government is in control of the legislative process, but this 
does not mean that the Government wants to enact Bills with constitutional effect 
without challenge. In a parliamentary system, it is Parliament’s responsibility to 
subject legislative proposals to critical examination. When the Bill in question has 
constitutional implications, if parliamentarians can use constitutional 
interpretation to support their analysis of the Bill, this can have the major benefit 
of testing the Government’s justification for changing the constitution in a public 
forum. If the end result is that the Government responds in good faith, by 
changing its position or by developing its own case for the proposal, then the 
practice has facilitated a dialogue that allows the ordinary legislative process to 
reflect the distinctive needs of the constitutional effect of a Bill. This dialogue is a 
form of justificatory accountability that enhances the legitimacy of the 
parliamentary legislative process.  
 
6.2.3 Justification and constitutionalism 
According to Sunstein, a basic function of constitutionalism is to enhance reason-
giving and therefore contribute to the achievement of one of the ideals of 
deliberative democracy.101 David Feldman (2001-2004) and Murray Hunt (2004-), 
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the first two legal advisers to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, have taken 
up this deliberative approach to constitutionalism. They have both argued that 
justification and reason-giving are central to constitutionalism. This sub-section 
uses their analysis of constitutionalism to argue that parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation contributes to the realisation of constitutionalism, conceived of a 
standard of justificatory accountability, within the legislative process. By 
enhancing the level of justification for the constitutional effect of a Bill, 
parliamentarians are able to make the normative content of the constitution 
relevant to the process of shaping the content of the law – a basic feature of the 
form of constitutionalism defended by Feldman and Hunt. 
 
Feldman argues that constitutionalism should be conceived of as a process. 
Constitutionalism demands that the conditions are in place for the public 
justification of state power, but does not require adherence to a particular set of 
normative values.102 Feldman suggests that it is better to see constitutionalism ‘as 
a commitment to using distinctively constitutional modes of argument’ or a 
‘commitment to political-legal justification’.103 Feldman captures this point when 
he argues: ‘Constitutionalism is lived; it is how one behaves if one takes 
constitutions seriously’.104 A key feature of Feldman’s conception is that it does 
not require constitutional argument to form part of the imposition of legal 
constraints upon the Government or the legislature, and thus fits within the UK 
parliamentary context:  
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The issue of limitation of political power is, in the UK, itself one of the 
controversial questions of constitutional debate, to be debated as part of 
the process of constitutionalism rather than being pre-empted by a specific 
set of values about the limitation of power, stipulated as a large part of the 
definition of constitutionalism.105 
Feldman’s argument is that constitutionalism is a ‘sine qua non for the effective 
operation of a constitution’.106 Parliamentary constitutional interpretation fits the 
profile of an activity that meets the standard of Feldman’s constitutionalism. Part 
of the value of constitutional interpretation is that it is a form of parliamentary 
reasoning that demonstrates a commitment to political-legal justification. By 
contributing to the process of justifying the constitutional effect of a Bill, 
constitutional interpretation demonstrates a commitment to the constitution within 
the legislative process.  
 
Constitutionalism demands that the norms of the constitution figure as part of 
political debate. This justificatory form of constitutionalism sets a basic standard 
that, in the process of enacting law with constitutional effect, those empowered to 
enact and scrutinise the changes should engage with the relevant existing 
standards of the constitution, whatever they may be. This corresponds with 
Waldron’s notion of integrity within the legislative process. 107  That 
parliamentarians demonstrate reflection upon the basic principles of the 
constitution is valuable to the legislative process beyond its ability to secure 
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certain substantive outcomes. It is valuable because it is shows that 
parliamentarians take the normative structure of the democratic law-making 
process seriously. 
 
Hunt argues that the constitutional-norm based scrutiny of the JCHR and the 
Constitution Committee conforms to an understanding of constitutionalism that 
privileges a culture of justification.108 Hunt’s conception of constitutionalism sees 
the culture of justification as the standard supplied by constitutionalism. Hunt’s 
argument is that the work of the JCHR shows that the fact of parliamentary 
sovereignty is not necessarily a barrier to the presence of constitutionalism, in the 
form of a culture of justification, within the legislation process. Indeed the 
Constitution Committee illustrated this point when it used parliamentary 
sovereignty as the basis for demanding Government justification of the use of 
Henry VIII powers that would transfer legislative power away from Parliament in 
the debate on the Public Bodies Bill. 109  However, for Hunt’s form of 
constitutionalism to flourish participants in the process must abandon any reliance 
on parliamentary sovereignty as a reason to avoid justification based on 
constitutional norms. For Hunt constitutionalism does not necessarily require 
effective legal limits, instead it relies upon the idea that ‘exercises of power that 
infringe human rights require public justification by reference to reasons, that is 
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rational explanations for why a decision has been taken’.110 The same point 
applies to constitutional norms other than rights. To see constitutionalism as 
requiring justification for decisions affecting constitutional rules, rather than 
necessarily the enforcement of constitutionally formalised limits, shows that the 
justification supplied by parliamentary constitutional interpretation is central to 
the relevance of constitutionalism within the legislative process.  
 
According to both Hunt and Feldman, constitutionalism requires that 
constitutional norms be used as part of the process of justifying the constitutional 
content of legislation in the legislative process. This conception of 
constitutionalism reinforces the idea that constitutional interpretation should not 
be judged only on the impact it has upon the content of legislation, but whether it 
prompts those responsible for the Bill to develop their justification for that 
content. Hunt and Feldman’s conception provides further understanding of what 
makes constitutional interpretation valuable. However, the main criticism to be 
made of this conception of constitutionalism is that it is rather thin. Murkens 
offers a powerful critique of the idea that constitutionalism can be reduced to a 
process of justification.111 Murkens argues that constitutionalism should not refer 
to a context where the constitution is ‘nothing other than a reflexive process, 
especially to a process that can be altered by each new generation’.112 Murkens 
denies that a process of self-limitation, if it takes the form of political justification, 
should be understood as an example of constitutionalism. Murkens explains that 
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constitutionalism requires ‘effective restraints upon government action’.113 Using 
constitutional norms as part of the debate on the constitutional effect of a bill 
should not be considered an example of constitutionalism: 
Linking constitutionalism with quasi-normative notions of governmental 
practice (such as auto-limitation) holds the integrity of the entire legal 
order hostage to political morality (as opposed to constitutional legality). 
The entire scope of constitutionalism, from the constitutionality of laws to 
restraints on governmental action, is made contingent upon the 
heteronomous quality of law (law must be accepted by the members of a 
community) and upon parliamentary abstinence from its alteration… 
Where constitutional limits ultimately depend on the good will of public 
officials, and cannot of themselves and in a way that is internal to the 
polity guarantee that their requirements are met, constitutionalism is a 
fiction.114 
Murkens’ argument implies that constitutionalism is not relevant to a 
constitutional system where the norms of the constitution can be changed by the 
ordinary political process and the sanctity of the norms of the constitution are not 
‘guaranteed’ by the system itself. The danger of Feldman and Hunt’s approach, as 
highlighted by Murkens’ argument, is that to regard constitutionalism as a process 
might deprive the concept of any original meaning. The strength of Murkens’ 
analysis is that it shows that the concept of constitutionalism as a procedural ideal 
needs to be placed on thicker normative foundations.115 It certainly cannot rest on 
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certain conceptions of liberal constitutionalism, and the next chapter seeks to 
locate them within political constitutionalism. 
 
6.3 Negotiating the constitution within Parliament 
The second element of the value of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is 
that it enables parliamentarians to negotiate the meaning of the constitution within 
Parliament. There are two connected dimensions to this form of negotiation. The 
first is that the practice exposes the meaning of the norms of the constitution. By 
interpreting and applying the constitution to legislative proposals, the practice is 
able to thicken understanding of how the constitution works and what the relevant 
norms mean in practice. The second dimension is that the practice is used to shape 
constitutional norms that are applicable in the legislative process. Both of these 
dimensions highlight the negotiability of the UK constitution.116 Many of the 
norms of the constitution require what Webber calls ‘specification’, and this, 
within the parliamentary legislative process, can be achieved through 
constitutional interpretation.117 
 
6.3.1 Exposing the normative content of the constitution 
The first dimension is that the practice serves to expose the hidden normative 
‘wiring’ of the UK constitution.118 Within the United Kingdom’s political system, 
Parliament and the legislative process are at the frontline of constitutional debate. 
It is Parliament that considers and formally decides many of the major 
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constitutional questions of the day. As the case studies demonstrated, Parliament 
has to consider questions such as: whether fixed-term Parliaments should be 
adopted, whether significant legislative powers should be granted to Government 
Ministers to decide the fate of public bodies, and whether a statutory provision 
that defines ministerial accountability for the NHS should be changed. These 
questions are not decided by the constitutional interpretation of individual 
parliamentarians, but the practice does contribute to how these norms are 
understood, which in turn can increase their effectiveness. 
 
If the constitution is best conceived of as an activity, then it is only when we see it 
in action rather than in the abstract that we really understand how it works. As 
Perry explains, the meaning of a norm is determined by how it is applied in 
practice.119 The case studies show that when parliamentarians use the legislative 
process to explore the constitutional implications of a Bill, the resulting 
negotiations can be significant. The current meaning of the norms of the British 
constitution are not found from studying the principles in the abstract, but comes 
from analysing how they shape real political decisions. Parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation is a form of reasoning that allows parliamentarians to 
reveal their own understanding of what the norms of the constitution mean in 
practice. In the legislative context, what parliamentarians - and in particular those 
who form part of the Government - think and say it means, is crucial to 
determining the nature and output of the law-making process. That the norms of 
the constitution are subject to disagreement between parliamentarians inside and 
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outside Parliament is also a sign of their continued relevance to political decision-
making and accountability.120 
 
The numbers of citizens who read Hansard may be small, but it is important to 
remember that many constitutional norms are supposed to apply to the 
Government and to parliamentarians. To return to Voermans’ point again, the way 
in which norms, including legislative provisions, are applied and understood is not 
just a question of the clarity of the norm itself, but also how they are 
communicated.121 Constitutional norms stand a better chance of influencing the 
behaviour of parliamentarians and the Government if they are clearly articulated 
within the legislative process. As Davis’ important analysis of the passage of the 
Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill shows, the legislative process within 
Parliament presents an opportunity for the defence of the very values that 
underpin the legislative process.122 The analysis of clauses that challenge the 
principles which underpin the rules and procedures of the legislative process 
within the process itself represents a precious opportunity for parliamentarians to 
expose to the Government, to fellow parliamentarians and to citizens the practical 
and legal implications of the ‘internal normative order’ of the parliamentary law-
making process.123 It is the Government’s responsibility to outline the case for 
how the law should be changed, but it is Parliament’s responsibility to highlight to 
the Government the implications of changing the norms that constitute the 
procedures within the institution from which they derive their own power. Within 
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a parliamentary system, it is vital that parliamentarians demonstrate their loyalty 
to Parliament by defending its procedures; without such institutional loyalty, the 
integrity of the system is at risk.124 
 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation can serve to improve the transparency 
and accessibility of a constitutionally significant provision, if it either prompts the 
Government to explain its purpose or if the Government uses it itself, 
unprompted, to explain the purpose of the provision.125 A significant finding of 
the case studies is that the interpretability of a particular constitutionally 
significant provision does not just depend on the clarity of its drafting, but is also 
influenced by the debate that preceded its enactment. The debate on the Fixed-
term Parliaments Bill showed that parliamentary debate is an important source for 
the constitutional interpretation of subsequent Parliaments.126 If an important 
statutory provision is not subject to debate, then it is likely to weaken Parliament’s 
ability to analyse the provision when it subsequently comes to debating whether it 
should be amended or repealed, or when it is relevant to debate it for any other 
reason. Parliamentarians use constitutional interpretation to harness the input of 
their forebears and to put the logic of previous majorities to the existing 
Government.127 Testing how the reasoning behind existing legislation fits with or 
departs from a legislative proposal is an effective approach to scrutiny. In the 
absence of judicial interpretation, articulating the reasoning behind an enacted 
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provision can help to expose the reasoning, or lack of it, behind the clauses of a 
Bill.  
 
The case studies have shown that parliamentary constitutional interpretation can 
produce a distinctive form of analysis that helps explain the significance of the 
constitutional effect of clauses within a Bill. By applying an external normative 
standard to a clause, and by contrasting a proposed clause with the norms that it 
would replace, the debate is able to highlight important features of the proposed 
Bill that might otherwise go unnoticed. The value of this process, in terms of 
raising the level of justification, has already been noted, but it is worth adding that 
this is often also the point that appears to instigate a Government amendment. So 
when Lord Woolf explains that an aspect of a Bill contravenes both the principle 
of the rule of law and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Government is 
more likely to listen.128 When there is clear contravention of a constitutional 
principle, then exposing the implications of the principle within debate can serve 
to prompt Government action. 
 
The debate on the Health and Social Care Bill demonstrated another aspect of 
exploring the meaning of constitutional norms during debate. The constitutional 
norms that were subject to interpretation, and the questions to which they gave 
rise, let alone the answers, were far from clear. This was in part because the nature 
of the norms involved was unclear and uncertain. The Constitution Committee 
was able to mitigate the problems of the uncertainty of the relationship between 
the relevant clauses within the Health and Social Care Bill and the convention of 
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individual ministerial responsibility by exploring the relationship between them in 
their two reports on the Bill.129 The reports do not offer a definitive account of the 
implications of the relationship; if anything, they simply highlight the uncertainty 
and subjectivity of the constitutional question within that particular debate. The 
absence of a definitive ruling as a product of their interpretative analysis should 
be seen as a strength of their approach. The report served to expose a weakness 
both in the provisions Bill and in the constitutional norms that were relevant to the 
Bill, and the exposure of this weakness played a key role in the subsequent 
parliamentary debate on how to clarify the role of constitutional norms within the 
Bill. This example shows that parliamentary constitutional interpretation can 
highlight weaknesses of certain constitutional norms, and this exposure may also 
prove to be a catalyst for action. 
 
6.3.2 Contributing to the normative content of the constitution 
The second dimension of parliamentary constitutional interpretation’s 
contribution to the negotiation of the constitution is that it enables Parliament to 
contribute to the normative content of the constitution. The practice is used to do 
this in a number of different ways: to specify standards, to identify principles, to 
set precedents and to prompt amendments. Some of the most important norms of 
the UK constitution are abstract principles that cannot be directly applied to the 
content of a legislative proposal,130 but are what Sunstein labels ‘abstractions’.131 
The basic goal of most parliamentary constitutional interpretation is to explain the 
constitutional effect of a Bill, and this will often involve applying such 
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‘abstractions’ to the text of a Bill. To apply an abstraction, a parliamentarian will 
in many cases have to specify its meaning through interpretation. On the other 
side of the spectrum, parliamentarians may also have to identify the principles 
behind specific constitutional rules in order to develop the standards that can be 
applied to legislation. The specification of constitutional principles extends 
beyond the rights context analysed by Webber, and is an important part of the 
practice examined in the case studies. 132  The Constitution Committee is 
particularly well placed to use constitutional interpretation to develop normative 
standards that can then be applied to particular clauses within Bills. The 
Committee and individual parliamentarians sometimes work together, or 
separately, to develop specific tests and sub-rules to the text of the Bill, to apply a 
precedent or to argue for an amendment that is designed to protect a particular 
constitutional norm. Before examining each of these examples, it is important to 
note how the parliamentary context affects how the practice contributes to rule 
making. 
 
Parliament has special responsibility for the interpretation and specification of the 
constitutional principles that regulate the democratic law-making process. 
Parliament is the only body that can develop standards that relate to the 
appropriate parliamentary procedure for Henry VIII powers. As Devins and Fisher 
have pointed out, in the United States constitutional interpretation within the 
legislative process is likely to apply constitutional norms that are not applied by 
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courts.133 Parliamentarians use constitutional interpretation to develop principles 
that serve to protect and enhance their role within the constitution.134  The 
specification and interpretation of constitutional norms extends beyond rule of law 
and rights concerns, and involve protecting values that are central to the political 
character of the constitution.135 Parliament engages in a range of constitutional 
norms, and its use of norms that underpin the democratic law-making process is 
particularly valuable to Parliament’s integrity.136 Further, when parliamentarians 
make use of these constitutional tools to specify sub-norms that can be applied in 
the legislative process, this may have a ‘legitimating effect’.137 The fact that 
Parliamentarians are themselves taking ownership of the norms of the constitution 
may indirectly improve the legitimacy of certain aspects of the constitution. 
Finally, by developing non-binding standards, parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation emphasises that the normative content of the constitution is flexible 
and is constantly being renegotiated.   
 
In terms of developing the meaning of the constitution, the Constitution 
Committee is in a special position within Parliament. Unlike individual peers or 
MPs, as was noted above, the Committee has a body of work, and some of these 
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reports contain standards which the Committee use in its Bill scrutiny.138 While 
the Committee is not under any obligation to follow the examples of its 
predecessors, its previous reports contain precious examples of standards and 
positions that can be used to justify its arguments. Kahana argues that this form of 
reflection is an important part of constitutional interpretation within the legislative 
process:  
If legislatures are to interpret the constitution, consistency requires them to 
institutionalize reflection on past legislative interpretations. Consistency is 
of course not the only value that legislators should consider in their 
interpretive process, but if they choose to adopt an interpretation of the 
constitution that is inconsistent with past interpretation, they should be 
aware of it and have good reasons for doing so.139 
The Constitution Committee does ‘institutional reflection’ in this sense, and it is 
an important part of what makes the committee’s constitutional interpretation so 
valuable. The Committee’s institutional memory has advanced Parliament’s 
ability to develop the meaning of constitutional norms through its legislative 
scrutiny. The key active ingredient in the development of those norms is 
constitutional interpretation. Using a proactive approach to constitutional 
interpretation, whereby the Committee goes beyond technical reasoning, to 
explain how principles are specified in their analysis of particular Bill has 
beneficial long-term consequences. The Committee can then draw upon previous 
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reports in order to develop their analysis of the constitutional effect of a particular 
Bill.  
 
In the debate on the Public Bodies Bill, the Constitution Committee demonstrated 
how it develops standards and set precedents.140 In its report on the Bill, the 
Constitution Committee used a test for the appropriateness of Henry VIII clauses 
that they had originally articulated in an earlier report on the Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform Bill. The test is derived from the basic principle that only 
Parliament should be able to amend or repeal primary legislation. The test is a 
clear example of the process of specification that is central to parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation. It enables parliamentarians to translate broad 
principles into a form that may then be applied to the terms of a Bill within the 
legislative process. By applying these principles in this way, parliamentarians 
serve to remind the Government and others that these principles are relevant to the 
task of policy making. 
 
The debate on the Public Bodies Bill also showed how parliamentarians use 
existing Acts of Parliament as legislative precedents that serve to inform their 
scrutiny.141 During that debate, the DPRRC, the Constitution Committee and 
individual Peers all used the provisions within the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006 as a legislative precedent to compare and contrast with those in 
the Public Bodies Bill. The reason that many parliamentarians regarded the 
provisions within the 2006 Act as a precedent is partly because many of the 
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provisions were themselves the result of negotiations within the Lords.142 In the 
debate on the 2006 Bill, peers had established basic principles for how Henry VIII 
powers should be limited, and this made a major impact on the debate on the 
Public Bodies Bill.  
 
The use of the provisions in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 as 
tools for legislative scrutiny also serves the third and final way that parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation develops the meaning of the constitution – by 
prompting the introduction of a ‘constitutional protection clause’ into a Bill.143 In 
each of the case studies, the negotiations prompted by parliamentarians’ 
constitutional interpretation resulted in amendments to each Bill that sought to 
limit any potential damage to a constitutional principle. In the Public Bodies Bill 
numerous clauses were added to limit the potential for the Henry VIII powers to 
be used in such a way that usurps Parliament’s role in relation to primary 
legislation. During that debate constitutional protection clauses like the sunset 
clause were added, which meant that the substance of Bill contained provision 
that were designed to enhance the values that underpin the parliamentary process. 
By embedding constitutional norms that enhance parliamentary involvement in 
the legislative process, Parliament is able to protect and even extend its existing 
role.144 In the Health and Social Care Bill, a clause was added to the Bill to clarify 
that the Secretary of State for Health remains politically responsible for the 
                                                
142 See A Le Sueur and J Simson Caird, ‘The House of Lords Select Committee 
on the Constitution’ in A Horne, G Drewry and D Oliver (eds), Parliament and 
the Law (Hart 2013). 
143 A ‘constitutional protection clause’ is a clause in a Bill which is drafted with 
the purpose of protecting a constitutional principle, see 3.2.2. 
144 Goldoni (n 134) 402.  
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NHS.145 And finally, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill saw a clause inserted which 
will require the Act to be reviewed in 2020, which will provide an opportunity for 
problems with the legislation to be raised and debated.146 These clauses are 
valuable for the Bills themselves in that they serve to ensure that constitutional 
principles are reflected in primary legislation, but they are also important because 
they can be used, like standards and precedents, to inform subsequent legislative 
scrutiny. A good example of this use of constitutional protection clauses came 
during the debate on the Public Bodies Bill, when Lord Woolf used the judicial 
independence clause in the CRA to argue that the Public Bodies bill was 
incompatible with the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.147 There was another, 
albeit unsuccessful, example of a constitutional protection clause being used as a 
tool of constitutional interpretation in the debate on the Fixed-term Parliament 
Bill. Jacob-Rees Mogg MP argued that s2(1) of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 
1949, also added as a result of debate in the Lords, should be extended to protect 
the terms of Fixed-Term Parliament Bill. 148  Even outside the Constitution 
Committee, when parliamentarians engage in constitutional interpretation they 
look to the standards of their predecessors. This challenges characterisations of 
parliamentary supremacy that imply that Parliament legislates into a normative 
vacuum. When Parliament is considering the constitutional effect of legislation, 
the judgment of previous Parliaments is anything but irrelevant.  
 
                                                
145 See 4.2.6. 
146 See 5.2.1. 
147 See 3.2.1.  
148 See 5.2.1. 
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Conclusion 
Both elements of the value of parliamentary constitutional interpretation serve to 
enhance the level of justificatory accountability within the parliamentary process 
of enacting legislation with constitutional effect. The first element of the practice 
adds a deliberative hurdle to the process that can produce analysis that can inform 
subsequent constitutional interpretation. The second element provides a 
distinctive parliamentary contribution to the content of the constitution that feeds 
parliamentary scrutiny of the Government’s justification for its legislative 
proposals. These two elements are entwined.  
 
In the abstract it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the nature of the 
contribution of the practice to the nature of the legislative process depends upon 
the approach of the Government. In contrast to a formal process of constitutional 
amendment, the practice is not supported by counter-majoritarian constitutional 
constraints that provide a firm platform for the consideration of constitutional 
questions within the legislative process. A constructive attitude from the 
Government to challenges on the constitutional effect of a Bill is central to the 
practice reaching its potential. At the same time, a constructive attitude would not 
necessarily produce the level of negotiation and justification necessary for a 
distinctive parliamentary contribution to the norms of the constitution, if 
parliamentarians do not use the different tools at their disposal - reports, speeches 
and amendments to present arguments - based on constitutional interpretation 
during the debate. In this sense, the adversarial nature of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation can be both a strength and a weakness. As Feldman 
notes, in the UK parliamentary context consensus may weaken the process, as 
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without the disagreement the Government is not prompted to develop its case for 
its proposals.149 Disagreement is a major part of how parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation contributes to justification. The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill shows 
how even in the face of serious disagreement the Government can stifle the 
contribution of debate. The speed of the debate and the Government’s limited 
attempt to develop a sophisticated analysis of some aspects of the Bill meant that 
the potential contribution of the practice was not realised. 
 
The interpretation of constitutional norms during the legislative process supplies a 
form of disagreement that expands the basis of disagreement during legislative 
negotiations in Parliament. There will always be many possible reasons for 
justifying or criticising a Bill. The UK’s constitutional framework does not 
provide a formal hierarchy or legal method for distinguishing those reasons; 
nonetheless, the parliamentary legislative process operates within a constitutional 
framework, and by using it to analyse a legislative proposal parliamentarians are 
able to expand the scope of political debate. This is particularly important in 
relation to specific clauses of a Bill, as policy analysis is not necessarily suited to 
analysing the merits of a particular clause. Approaching a particular clause though 
the prism of a constitutional norm can link detail to some of the most fundamental 
norms in the UK’s constitutional system. These norms do not necessarily trump 
other reasons, but they may add depth to the nature of the debate, make the 
Government’s intentions more transparent, and therefore increase Parliament’s 
ability to hold the Government to account for its legislation. Constitutional 
                                                
149 Feldman, ‘Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights’ (n 5) 328. 
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interpretation fits a positive, rather than negative, account of constitutionalism.150 
The practice does not stop Government from legislating contrary to constitutional 
norms. Instead the practice serves to create informal channels for constitutional 
change within the majoritarian decision making process within Parliament. This 
form of constitutional practice, which appears to be based on a political form of 
constitutionalism, and does not create secure limits on the scope of Government 
legislation, does nonetheless have consequences for the substance of the 
constitution. By making the case for clauses that secure the relevance of 
Parliament within the constitution, such as sunset clauses, and by thickening 
parliamentary conceptions of the rule of law and other constitutional principles, 
the practice serves to allow parliamentarians to make a distinctively parliamentary 
contribution to the constitution. That appears to be precisely what Tushnet had in 
mind when he refers to the benefits of combining constitutionalism and the 
democratic law-making process.151 The combination is about more than the 
presence of the interpretation of constitutional norms within a democratically 
accountable institution, it also enables the substance of the principles of the 
constitution to play a positive role in determining the content of the law. 
 
                                                
150 S Holmes, Passions and Constraints (Chicago University Press 1997) 1-10.  
151 M Tushnet, ‘Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts: Incentives and 
Institutional Design’ in R Bauman T Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: 
The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (CUP 2006) 355.  
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7. Parliamentary Constitutional Interpretation and 
Political Constitutionalism 
 
Political constitutionalism directly engages with and defends the role of the 
parliamentary legislative process within the UK constitution. 1 This makes 
the model central to understanding the role of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation within the UK constitution. Unlike the account of 
constitutionalism provided by Feldman and Hunt, 2  the political model 
advocates the constitutional features that are central to the character of 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation in the UK: parliamentary 
supremacy and the absence of entrenched constitutional law. Political 
constitutionalism argues in favour of a ‘flat’ constitution, and rejects the 
idea that the UK should adopt a ‘hierarchical’ constitution, which would 
mean that constitutional laws have higher legal status. 3  Despite the 
relevance of political constitutionalism to the constitutional context in 
which parliamentary constitutional interpretation operates, the practice 
poses some difficult questions of existing approaches to political 
constitutionalism that this chapter seeks to explore. By relating 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation to political constitutionalism, this 
chapter seeks to broaden and to develop the analysis of the role of the 
practice within the legislative process and the United Kingdom’s 
                                                
1 M Goldoni, ‘Constitutional reasoning according to political 
constitutionalism’ (2013) German Law Journal 14 (8) 1053, 1054-1055.  
2 See 6.2.3. 
3 M Elliott, ‘The Constitutional Role of the Judiciary if There Were a 
Codified Constitution’ (University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series Paper No. 51/2013) 2.  
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constitution, and at the same time, make a contribution to debates on the 
nature of political constitutionalism.  
 
This thesis argues that constitutional interpretation is instrumental for 
parliamentarians and parliamentary committees in the legislative process, as 
it can be used both to raise the level of justification during the legislative 
process and to facilitate a distinctive parliamentary contribution to the 
constitution. The substance of the normative content of the constitution 
should be used to both strengthen the legislative process, and to guide 
primary law-making and constitutional change. The core of the argument in 
this chapter is that the values of the practice strengthen political 
constitutionalism by making it a more realistic and balanced model, which 
explains how Bills with constitutional effect should be engaged with in 
Parliament. As a result, the model is made more relevant to contemporary 
debates in the UK on parliamentary and constitutional reform.  
 
Political constitutionalists have sought to defend the value of the legislative 
process in the face of the criticisms of liberal and legal constitutionalists, 
and yet at the same time, they have not fully developed an account of how 
legislative politics should work within the framework of a political 
constitution. Kavanagh has observed that despite seeking to defend the 
legitimacy of political institutions, political constitutionalism has offered 
little in the way of clear and practical prescriptions for how real political 
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processes can be improved. 4  Goldoni has also argued that political 
constitutionalists have yet to set out in much detail how politics, and in 
particular constitutional politics, should work in the political constitution.5 
Gardbaum argues that political constitutionalism ‘provides no adequate 
forum for critically scrutinising the justification for a piece of legislation to 
determine if it meets the minimum standard of plausibility in terms of public 
reasons’.6 While political constitutionalism has addressed the issue of the 
role of rights within Parliament,7 there has been little in way of direct 
engagement with the situation which the case studies cover: how should the 
legislative process within a political constitution respond to proposals that 
seek to modify the existing constitutional structure, the very structure that 
underpins the political nature of the constitution. 
 
At this point it is important to acknowledge the breadth of the literature on 
constitutionalism, and the narrow scope of this chapter. Taken at its most 
basic level constitutionalism refers to the idea that government can and 
should be legally limited in its powers, and that its authority or legitimacy 
depends on observing these limitations.8 But it can also be conceived more 
broadly, Lord Steyn defines it in the following terms: ‘the exercise of 
                                                
4 A Kavanagh, ‘Constitutional review, the courts and democratic 
skepticism’ (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems 102 133. 
5 M Goldoni, ‘Two internal critiques of political constitutionalism’ (2012) 
10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 926; M Goldoni, 
‘Constitutional reasoning according to political constitutionalism’ (2013) 
German Law Journal 14 (8) 1053; M Goldoni, ‘Political constitutionalism 
and the value of constitution making’ (2014) 27 Ratio Juris 387. 
6 S Gardbaum, Commonwealth Constitutionalism (CUP 2013) 55.  
7 R Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 
9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 86.  
8 W Waluchow, ‘Constitutionalism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism> accessed 14 May 2014. 
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government power must be controlled in order that it should not be 
destructive of the very values it was intended to promote’.9 However, even 
by the standards of constitutional law and constitutional theory, the meaning 
of constitutionalism is fiercely contested. It is difficult to exaggerate the 
scale of the literature on constitutionalism, and there are many important 
angles on constitutionalism that are not covered here.10 For example, within 
a vast literature in the United States there is an ever-expanding number of 
explanations of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy.11 
By contrast, in the United Kingdom context, Murkens asserts that the idea is 
both under-researched and under-theorised.12 Despite this, it is frequently 
used in the literature on the United Kingdom constitution, particularly in 
order to debate the competing claims of the legal and political models of the 
concept.13  
 
Political constitutionalism is used in different ways in this debate. In one 
sense, political constitutionalism is a stand-alone constitutional model that 
has been developed to challenge theories of legal and liberal 
constitutionalism. But political constitutionalism is also used to analyse the 
reality of constitutional practices. There is a welcome trend in this literature 
                                                
9 Lord Steyn, ‘The weakest and least dangerous department of government’ 
[1997] Public Law 84, 87-88.  
10 See C Schwöbel, Global constitutionalism in International Legal 
Perspective (Martina Nijhoff 2011); M Loughlin and N Walker (eds), The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism (OUP 2008); P Dobner and M Loughlin (eds), 
The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010).  
11 N Sultany, ‘The state of progressive constitutional theory’ 47 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review (2012) 371. 
12 J Murkens, ‘Quest for Constitutionalism in UK Public Law Discourse’ 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 3 (2009) 427.  
13 For a classic example see: A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart 
2005).  
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to move away from the idea of binary all-encompassing choices, in terms of 
definitively categorising constitutions, and elements of constitutions, as 
either political and legal, and towards a focus on developing the ability on 
these models to explain constitutional practices.14 In this sense, the model of 
political constitutionalism represents a particular perspective or angle for 
understanding and analysing the constitution.15 This chapter seeks to build 
on this shift, and to add to the understanding of political constitutionalism 
and its relevance to the modern legislative process. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section sets out the 
institutional core of political constitutionalism and the basis of the 
connection with parliamentary constitutional interpretation. The second 
addresses the idea that the increasing role of constitutional norms within 
Parliament represents a shift away from political constitutionalism. The 
third analyses three weaknesses in the connection between political 
constitutionalism and parliamentary constitutional interpretation. The fourth 
argues that the case for parliamentary constitutional interpretation can be 
used by political constitutionalism to provide an account of how 
constitutional politics should work within a political constitution.  
 
                                                
14 G Gee and G Webber, ‘What is a political constitution?’ (2010) 30 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273, 298; A Horne and C Walker, ‘Lessons 
learned from political constitutionalism? Comparing the enactment of 
control orders and terrorism prevention and investigation measures by the 
UK Parliament’ [2014] Public Law 267; P Scott, ‘(Political) Constitutions 
and (Political) Constitutionalism’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2157, 
2178-2179. 
15 Scott (n 14) 2179: Gee and Webber (n 14) 298.  
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7.1 The institutional core of political constitutionalism 
If the institutional core of legal constitutionalism is judicially enforced 
constitutional limits, the equivalent in the political constitution would be the 
legislative process within an elected parliament free from legally entrenched 
constitutional constraints, whereby all existing law could be amended, and 
no law was considered formally fundamental. A political constitution is the 
product of ordinary politics and is also subject to change by the ordinary 
legislative process. It is not solely the product of a constitutional moment, 
because a political constitution is constantly being moulded by the political 
circumstances of the day. One of the benefits of leaving the constitution 
open to renegotiation through legislative action is that it presents Parliament 
with the opportunity to develop its own account of what the constitution 
means, and this fact is at the heart of the connection between parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation and political constitutionalism.  
 
Political constitutionalism is wedded to a procedural understanding of a 
constitution.16 A constitution should be seen as a tool for securing legitimate 
and democratic conditions for law making, and not for securing particular 
outcomes of the legislative process. This understanding can be related to a 
range of important works on constitutional law and constitutionalism. 
Campbell’s ethical positivism,17 Ely’s limited role for judicial review,18 and 
                                                
16 For a critique of this approach see: F Michelman, ‘Constitutionalism as 
Proceduralism: A Glance at the Terrain’ in S Tierney and E Christodoulidis 
(eds), Public Law and Politics (Ashgate 2008) 156. 
17 T Campbell, Ethical Positivism (Aldershot 1996). 
18 J Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 
University Press 1980).  
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Habermas’ focus on the role of deliberation, 19  each emphasises a 
constitution’s capacity to set up legitimating procedures. A constitution does 
not necessarily involve subordinating immediate policy objectives to certain 
long-term principles or ‘tying the hands’ of temporary majorities.20 The 
distinguishing feature of political constitutionalism is that it argues that a 
constitution should set up the democratic procedure and allow that 
procedure to be renegotiated by the political majority of the day, even if that 
means that fundamental constitutional norms can be changed by the 
majority of the day. If the point of a constitution is to set up a legitimate 
procedure, and to facilitate the capacity of the legislature to alter the 
normative foundations of that procedure, then parliamentary supremacy is a 
desirable feature of a constitution and parliamentarians should be entrusted 
with the ability to negotiate how that procedure should be changed.21 As 
Gyorfi points out, on this view, the legislature’s interpretation of the 
constitution should be privileged and valued over that of judges.22 This 
position has direct consequences for how judges should interpret the 
constitution according to political constitutionalism, but this chapter asks 
how should this position affect the way in which parliamentarians act within 
the legislative process? 
 
                                                
19 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: contributions to a discourse 
theory of Law and democracy (MIT Press 1998). 
20 F Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge 1960) 180.  
21 T Gyorfi, ‘In Search of a First-Person Plural, Second-Best Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 1077, 1095-
1106. 
22 Ibid.  
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A priority of political constitutionalism is that constitutional laws should not 
disable democratic politics or remove questions from the scope of political 
debate. 23  As a result, political constitutionalism staunchly defends the 
elements of the UK constitution that are responsible for its susceptibility to 
change via the ordinary legislative process. This is relevant to understanding 
the practice of parliamentary constitutional interpretation because these 
elements are responsible for the conditions that are central to the character 
and value of the practice. Political constitutionalism’s defence of these 
elements of the United Kingdom’s constitution can be traced back to 
Griffith’s famous statement that the constitution is ‘no more and no less 
than what happens. Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing 
happened that would be constitutional also’.24 Gee and Webber argue that 
this statement is an endorsement of the idea that the constitution should 
remain open to renegotiation via the ordinary political process.25 This 
prescriptive interpretation is key to the connection between parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation and political constitutionalism. The practice 
examined in this thesis is a part of what political constitutionalists regard as 
so valuable: the renegotiation of the constitution within the ordinary 
political process. As parliamentary constitutional interpretation enables 
parliamentarians to participate in this renegotiation, the practice represents a 
form of constitutional politics that fits with the central ideas of political 
constitutionalism.  
 
                                                
23 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) 266.  
24 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 
1, 19. 
25 Gee and Webber (n 14) 280-281. 
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Bellamy argues that it is of paramount importance, for political equality and 
for non-domination, that the constitution remains subject to the ordinary 
legislative process. 26  For Bellamy the ‘democratic process is the 
constitution’.27 Bellamy explains his vision of the political constitution in 
the following way:  
The very fact that disagreements about process will be on going 
argues against constitutionalising these procedures. Rather, they 
must be left open so we may rebuild the ship at sea – employing, as 
we must, the prevailing procedures to renew and reform those self-
same procedures.28 
For Bellamy, the political constitution means that the existing norms of the 
constitution must not be protected from change. This is an argument against 
entrenched constitutional laws. Bellamy argues that ‘if the people 
themselves are to be the final arbiters of the constitution, therefore, ordinary 
legislation within the legislature has to be the sphere of constitutional 
politics’.29 Bellamy recognises that constitutional norms are valuable, in 
particular he argues that those rules that constitute the political process 
should be recognised as constraints upon arbitrary rule.30 Bellamy defends 
the ability of the legislature to ‘embody constitutional values and to supply 
mechanisms likely to preserve them’.31  
 
                                                
26 R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (CUP 2007) 174-175. 
27 Bellamy (n 26) 5.  
28 Bellamy (n 26) 174.  
29 Bellamy (n 26) 136.  
30 Bellamy (n 26) 6.  
31 Bellamy (n 26) 259.  
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Waldron also argues that the legislative process should not be precluded 
from deliberation on key aspects of a constitution.32 Waldron argues that 
recognition of the value of constitutional norms, including rights and rules 
that structure democratic procedure, should not mean that legislatures 
should be prevented from altering these norms.33 He rejects the idea that 
constitutional norms should be ‘fixed’ so they cannot be ‘gamed by 
momentary majorities attempting to lock themselves in power’.34 It is 
precisely because constitutional rights and principles are so important that 
they should be subject to debate and disagreement within the democratic 
forum of the legislature.35 By keeping the constitution within the reach of 
the legislative process, citizens are able to participate in on-going 
discussions on how the constitution should be designed and how it should 
be interpreted. Tushnet summarises the position in the following terms: 
Political constitutionalists argue that reasonable disagreements over 
these (constitutional) matters should be resolved in the same way 
that disagreements about other policies are – through open debate 
and ultimate decision by democratically chosen officials.36 
All laws should be subject to the same formal legislative procedure so that 
parliamentarians can debate and disagree on the content of the constitution 
in the same way that they disagree on the content of primary legislation. 
Political constitutionalism rejects the idea that legislators are ill suited to 
                                                
32 Waldron (n 23) 266, 306-312.  
33 Ibid. 
34 S Issacharoff, ‘The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: 
Fixed Rules and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections’ 
(2003) 81 University of Texas Law Review 1985, 1997.  
35 Waldron (n 23) 266, 306-312.   
36 M Tushnet, ‘The relation between political constitutionalism and weak-
form judicial review’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2249, 2250. 
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decide constitutional questions and that the ultimate authoritative interpreter 
of a constitution should be a court. 37  The negotiability of the UK 
constitution via the legislative process provides parliamentarians with the 
responsibility for deciding some of the most important constitutional 
questions, especially those that relate to the norms that structure the 
constitution and political accountability. Parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation shows how parliamentarians can respond to that responsibility 
in a way that enhances the central values of political constitutionalism. Two 
connections between political constitutionalism and parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation are particularly important.  
 
The first connection is that the UK constitution presents parliamentarians 
with the opportunity to shape the content of the constitution directly. 
Advocates of political constitutionalism often cite legislation as the product 
of the legislature, and defend the ability of that product to achieve the 
protection of constitutional values.38 The problem with this approach is that 
in a parliamentary system, legislation with constitutional effect is not 
necessarily subject to debate or disagreement within the legislative process, 
which can mean that parliamentarians have little input into the constitutional 
effect of a Bill. Parliamentary constitutional interpretation can remedy this 
weakness in two ways. Firstly, the practice enables parliamentarians to 
engage the Government on the constitutional effect of legislation, which is 
central to the ability of parliamentarians to contribute to the content of 
                                                
37 L Alexander and F Schauer, ‘On Extrajudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 1359, 1367.  
38 Bellamy (n 26) 244.  
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primary legislation with constitutional effect. As Garret and Vermeule 
argue, this is important because parliamentarians are well placed to ‘blend 
policy considerations with technical legal arguments’ in their consideration 
of constitutional issues.39 Secondly, parliamentarians use the practice to 
develop constitutional norms, such as standards and precedents, which can 
shape legislative debate.40 The content of such constitutional interpretation 
benefits from the political standpoint of parliamentarians, who are more 
likely than the Government to defend the norms that underpin the political 
processes, which are so cherished by political constitutionalism. A flat 
constitutional structure, as advocated by political constitutionalism, need not 
mean that constitutional values are neglected within the legislative process. 
The effectiveness of political constitutionalism depends upon the actions of 
parliamentarians. The examples of the practice examined in this thesis show 
that political actors can use their ability to shape constitutional meaning to 
make a positive contribution to the parliamentary process. 
 
Political accountability is the second important connection. Tomkins has 
placed political accountability, and in particular ministerial responsibility 
and the confidence principle, at the heart of what makes the UK a ‘political 
constitution’. 41  Parliamentary constitutional interpretation creates a 
connection between the ability to engage with the substance of the 
constitution and the ability to hold the Government to account for the 
                                                
39 E Garrett and A Vermeule, ‘Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress 
(2001) 50 Duke Law Journal 1278, 1318.  
40 See 6.3. 
41 A Tomkins, Public Law (Clarendon 2003) 134; A Tomkins, Our 
Republican Constitution (Hart 2005) 1-10, 210.  
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content of its legislative proposals. That parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation can potentially increase the level of conflict and disagreement 
between Parliament and Government is also part of this connection.42 By 
raising the level of justification the practice enlarges the scope of 
disagreement on the detail of a Bill, and in this sense ensures that the 
Government faces difficult questions on the constitutional effect of the Bills 
it introduces to Parliament. One of the strengths of Hunt’s and Feldman’s 
conception of constitutionalism is that it recognises that the substance of 
constitutional norms can be used as political tools that can enhance political 
accountability. This chapter’s argument is that political constitutionalism 
can and should do the same.  
 
7.2 The role of constitutional norms within the legislative process 
The first potential obstacle to the connection between parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation and political constitutionalism is the idea that 
the increasing role of constitutional norms within Parliament is part of a 
shift away from political constitutionalism. The idea that the UK 
constitution is becoming increasingly legal is one of the most pervading 
narratives in UK public law. There are several strands to this analysis, 
including the European Communities Act 1972, 43  the development of 
judicial review,44 and the Human Rights Act 1998.45 In Jackson, Lord Steyn 
                                                
42 G Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of JAG Griffith’ (2008) 28 Legal 
Studies 20, 32: G Webber, ‘Parliament and the Management of Conflict’ 
[2014] Public Law 101.  
43 D Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialisation of British Politics (OUP 
2001). 
44 T Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British 
Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
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said the constitution is no longer ‘uncontrolled’, while Lord Hope said that 
the rule of law is ‘the ultimate controlling principle of the constitution’.46 
Nicol explains that ‘we have witnessed nothing short of a transformation of 
the British constitution from a constitution based on politics to a 
constitution based on law’.47 Gardbaum also notes that these changes have 
‘created the strong impression that the country is moving away from 
political constitutionalism’.48 Much of the attention within this narrative has 
focused on the changing role of the courts, hence the idea that the 
constitution has been ‘judicialized’.49 For Jowell this change has resulted in 
a form of constitutionalism that protects ‘the rule of law and at least certain 
fundamental rights… even from decisions approved by the majority of the 
electorate’.50 Others have noted that these reforms have profoundly changed 
the ways in which all three branches of the state interact with the norms of 
the constitution.51  
 
A number of scholars have drawn connections between the change to the 
nature of the constitution and the way in which Parliament considers 
legislation. Rawlings refers to the ‘legalisation of the political process’ in 
                                                                                                                       
45 A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review and the Human Rights Act 1998 
(CUP 2009). 
46 R. (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; 
[2006] 1 A.C. 262 (HL) [104] and [107] respectively. 
47 Nicol (n 43) 1.  
48 Garbaum (n 6) 23.  
49 Nicol (n 43) 3. 
50 J Jowell, ‘Parliamentary sovereignty under the new constitutional 
hypothesis’ [2006] Public Law 562, 575; see also: S Lakin, ‘Debunking the 
Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: the Controlling Factor of Legality in the 
British Constitution’ (2008) 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28.  
51 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart 2009).  
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reference to the debate on the European Communities (Amendment) Bill.52 
Rawlings notes that legal analysis has long formed part of parliamentary 
debate, but that the European context meant it loomed ‘uncommonly’ large 
in the conflict. For Rawlings, this meant that the political constitution – and 
what he terms ‘a non-legal discourse of public controversy’ was harder to 
sustain in 1994 than it was 1979.53 In 2005, Rawlings again identified the 
presence of legal factors, what he terms ‘legal politics’, within the 
parliamentary debate on the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants, etc) Act 2004 as demonstrating a shift away from the political 
constitution. 54  Similarly for Nicol, this move away from the political 
constitution has resulted in a change to the nature of the role of 
parliamentarians: 
Complex legal questions – relating, for example, to the dividing line 
between areas of Community and national competence – are 
becoming the staple fare of the diligent legislator. Parliamentarians 
are increasingly having to take on the role of constitutional 
lawyers…55 
The important point for my argument relates to the idea that a growing role 
of legal or constitutional norms within Parliament is a sign of a shift away 
from the political constitution. If this is right then political constitutionalism 
would not be able to explain, or justify, the role of parliamentary 
                                                
52 R Rawlings, ‘Legal politics: the United Kingdom and ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union: Part 1’ [1994] Public Law 254, 255.  
53 R Rawlings, ‘Legal politics: the United Kingdom and ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union: Part 2’ [1994] Public Law 367, 391. 
54 R Rawlings, ‘Review, revenge and retreat’ (2005) 68 Modern Law 
Review 378, 409.  
55 Nicol (n 43) 260.  
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constitutional interpretation within the legislative process. Political 
constitutionalism advocates more, and not less, politics.56  
 
Oliver has also made this connection between the role of constitutional 
principles in Parliament and the shift away from the ‘political’ constitution. 
Oliver argues that the constitution has, over the past 30 years, become more 
‘principled’ and less ‘political’.57 As a result of a number of changes to the 
constitution, ‘principles are articulated and are supposed to govern much 
political activity’.58 Oliver’s argument implies that ‘principle-based scrutiny 
of legislation’ is part of this transition from politics to principle.59 Oliver’s 
analysis indicates that giving effect to constitutional principles within the 
legislative process should be considered to be outside of or distinct from 
ordinary politics.  
 
There are a number of problems with the idea that the presence of 
constitutional norms as a factor in parliamentary debate on primary 
legislation should be interpreted as a shift away from the political 
constitution. The first point to say about the attempt to draw this this 
connection is that it seems oddly ahistorical. Jaconelli’s account of the 
parliamentary debate on the Parliament Act 1911 shows that constitutional 
norms have formed an influential part of parliamentary debate on important 
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legislation in the past.60 A second observation is that it seems strange to 
connect the ‘political’ nature of the constitution to the absence of legal and 
constitutional considerations within the legislative process. Surely Griffith’s 
account of the constitution did not depend on the absence of ‘legal politics’? 
Part of the problem is that, as Gee observes, political constitutionalism has 
not articulated the positive role that constitutional norms, including 
constitutional law, should play in a political constitution.61  
 
Griffith was sceptical of the idea that constitutional values or rights brought 
benefits to the political process. 62  He dismissed the idea that certain 
constitutional norms could provide guidance to legislators: ‘I am very 
doubtful about the value of telling judges or legislators that they should 
look towards the ideal of justice, truth and beauty in their search for the 
right solution in difficult cases or problems’.63 As Gee points out, Griffith 
was concerned that the language of rights would be used to conceal the 
political character of the issues at stake.64 Griffith, according to Oliver, was 
ambivalent on whether parliamentarians should look to non-binding 
constitutional norms in general - say the rule of law or parliamentary 
sovereignty - to guide their answers to legislative problems: ‘it is not clear... 
to what extent Griffith would accept politicians be constrained in their 
decision-making by rules that are not enforceable by judges’. 65  Such 
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ambivalence might indicate that Griffith would question the notion that 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation could add value to the political 
process. Griffith was firmly against the idea that law should be used as a 
vehicle for making it harder to change the status quo, and therefore it is 
reasonable to say that constitutional interpretation as a political activity, 
especially institutionalised within a committee of the House of Lords, would 
be viewed with suspicion to the extent that it might make the constitution 
harder to change. Griffith, like other political constitutionalists, celebrates 
the political process, but appears ambivalent as to whether the substance of 
the norms that constitute those procedures would make a beneficial 
contribution to debate on primary legislation or enhance political 
accountability within Parliament.  
 
Gee disagrees with Oliver’s reading: 
Griffith is not troubled by limiting government per se, but rather by 
limiting government through judicially imposed constraints, and 
even then he is troubled only by certain judicially imposed 
constraints.66  
According to Gee’s interpretation, Griffith should be read as being in favour 
of a ‘political model of constitutionalism’,67 one that could support the idea 
that parliamentary constitutional interpretation adds value to the legislative 
process. Gee explains: 
And any model of constitutionalism must include an account of the 
norms creating, structuring and defining the authority of the 
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governing institutions, including an explanation as to how those 
norms constrain the power of those institutions. For Griffith, 
politics, and in particular parliamentary process, should create, 
structure and define the authority of the governing institutions, 
including imposing constraints on those institutions. That is to say 
politics, and to some extent law, should (and do in fact) constrain the 
governing institutions.68 
Two points arise from Gee’s analysis of Griffith’s position. The first is that 
while Griffith clearly would defend the role of law in setting up democratic 
procedures that constrain Government power, Oliver is right to point out 
that Griffith, and other political constitutionalists stop short of recognising 
that the substance of the norms should be prioritised in any way in the 
political process. In Political Constitutionalism Bellamy argues that 
according to the political conception of the constitution ‘the democratic 
process is the constitution’.69 According to Goldoni’s reading this means 
that ‘constitutions cannot be considered norms stricto sensu’.70 One of the 
reasons that Oliver, Nicol and Rawlings appear to connect the growing role 
of constitutional norms within legislative debate with a move away from 
political constitutionalism is precisely because Griffith and other political 
constitutionalists are ambivalent on the role that substantive constitutional 
(and legal) analysis should play within political debate in Parliament. On 
one reading, political constitutionalism is in favour of creating an 
‘autonomous political sphere’ within Parliament, where constitutional 
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norms, legal factors and the influence of courts are shut out from political 
debate.71  
 
One example of the defence of the autonomy of politics is Waldron’s well-
known contrast between the parliamentary debate on the Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Bill, and the reasoning of the US Supreme Court 
in Roe v Wade.72 Waldron cites the absence of legal consideration from the 
former as an advantage:  
The key difference between the British legislative debate and the 
American judicial reasoning is that the latter is mostly concerned 
with interpretation and doctrine, while in the former decisionmakers 
are able to focus steadfastly on the issue of abortion itself and what 
it entails.73 
This comparison is insightful in relation to the debate on the case against the 
ability of the court to strike down legislation on grounds of constitutionality. 
Nevertheless, the comparison is arguably misrepresentative of the 
parliamentary legislative process because it underplays the extent to which 
law, interpretation and legal doctrine play an important role in the 
construction of Bills, and in the debate, particularly after the second reading 
stage. Parliamentary law-making rightly produces opportunities for the sort 
of moral debate that Waldron admires, but it also is informed by analysis of 
constitutional norms, and understanding of legal doctrine. Waldron is no 
doubt aware of this, but does not address the point directly. Political 
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constitutionalism is not clear about what benefits, if any, the substance of 
constitutional norms might bring to political debate on primary legislation in 
Parliament. As a result, political constitutionalism is not associated with a 
positive case for constitutional interpretation, even if it occurs within 
political institutions.  
 
The second important element of Gee’s analysis is that Griffith conceives of 
these political constraints as not just limiting Government, but also 
empowering it. This combination is central for the relationship between 
political constitutionalism and parliamentary constitutional interpretation. 
The practice examined in this thesis should not be understood as the 
political enforcement of constitutional limits, because the interpretation is 
used to shape, rather than simply limit, the process of enacting laws with 
constitutional effect.74 This helps to explain the way the practice fits within 
political constitutionalism. The positive role for constitutional norms within 
the legislative process, defended in this thesis, is not based on the practices 
ability to enforce counter-majoritarian limits, but rather on enabling the 
majority to enact legislation in a way that, both in terms of process and 
substance, responds to the relevant constitutional norms. The practice does 
produce a limiting effect, in the sense that it demarcates what is not 
politically acceptable for those parliamentarians that engage in 
constitutional interpretation. The limiting effect is very weak in comparison 
to other mechanisms of constitutionalism (such as a judicial strike down 
power), but its presence is sufficient to create the combination of the 
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constitution and limitation of power that is central to constitutionalism.75 As 
a form of legislative politics, the practice enhances the legitimacy of the 
legislative process, strengthens the process of holding the Government to 
account for its legislative proposals and facilitates a distinctively 
parliamentary contribution to the constitution. Together these values 
represent the practical manifestation of a political form of constitutionalism 
within the legislative process in Parliament.  
 
For political constitutionalism to be relevant to parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation, the model needs to recognise that the presence of 
constitutional norms, including legal norms, within debate on primary 
legislation in Parliament is a strength rather than a weakness. As Tushnet 
points out, the problem with the idea that political constitutionalism is 
reliant on the operation of an autonomous political sphere is that it ignores 
the fact that ‘political constitutionalism is instantiated in institutions 
established by law’.76 Law in this sense extends beyond the legal norms that 
are enforced by courts, and includes constitutional norms that regulate how 
‘political institutions’ operate.77 One of the key insights from the case 
studies is that the substance of such norms, that regulate the relationships 
between the key political actors within the constitution, play a positive role 
in informing the analysis of the constitutional effect of legislation. As 
Garrett and Vermeule note ‘institutional choice and institutional design are 
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necessary components of normative constitutional analysis’. 78  The 
legislative process within Parliament is properly understood as the interface 
between law and politics within the UK constitution. The relevance of 
political constitutionalism to parliamentary constitutional interpretation 
depends on the model’s recognition that, as matter of good practice, the 
substance of the norms that constitute political relationships should 
influence debate on the content of primary legislation in Parliament. Within 
a political constitution, constitutional norms are not limited to simply 
constituting procedure, it is right that they condition the substance of 
political debate, because constitutionalism, even in its political form, 
depends upon this influence.79 
 
The presence of constitutional interpretation within legislative debate in 
Parliament has been interpreted as a departure from the political 
constitution, as traditionally conceived, because political constitutionalism 
is ambivalent on whether the substance of constitutional norms makes a 
positive contribution to political debate. One of the reasons for this 
ambivalence is that political constitutionalists make a number of powerful 
arguments against entrenchment. Bellamy argues against constitutionalising, 
in the sense of entrenching, legislative procedures because it privileges 
certain normative concerns over others: ‘it is wrong to privilege certain 
forms of concerns in a procedure that should only be about being fair and 
impartial and weighing all views equally’.80 He argues that separating 
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discussions of constitutional matters ‘fails to provide the appropriate 
incentives for ensuring decision-makers track the interests of those they 
govern’.81 As Goldoni points out, this position appears to reject the political 
enforcement of constitutional laws because it would violate the principle of 
equality and equal participation in the process of political decision-
making.82 Walen highlights the implications of Bellamy’s form of political 
constitutionalism:  
He objects to the very notion of legislatures checking themselves by 
appeal to a written constitution, for such a system would limit the 
legislature’s ability to carry out the agenda of a current majority.83  
These criticisms misread Bellamy’s argument. Bellamy is not against 
political engagement with constitutional norms, rather his arguments should 
be read as objections to removing debate on the content of the constitution 
from the ordinary legislative process.  
 
Political constitutionalism is not sceptical of the value of constitutional 
norms.84 Instead, political constitutionalism aims to offer an alternative 
account of constitutional norms, which explains their authority by locating 
their roots within the democratic process. Bellamy explains: 
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Far from being sceptical of rights or law, political constitutionalists 
defend both. They merely regard the legislature as the most 
appropriate forum for seeing rights in the round and ensuring that 
their specification in legislation takes into account the full range of 
considerations necessary to promote the public interest.85  
On this reading, political constitutionalism does not have a problem with a 
positive role for constitutional interpretation within Parliament, and is 
instead only concerned that constitutional norms should not dominate the 
process in the way that they can when they are entrenched and subject to 
strong judicial review. Bellamy is in effect arguing that a substantive 
reading of the constitution does not weaken political constitutionalism as 
long as parliamentary supremacy is not replaced by constitutional 
supremacy. 
 
Political constitutionalism is not associated with a positive role for 
constitutional interpretation, in part because it directs much of its energy 
towards criticising constitutional interpretation when it used to justify 
striking down primary legislation. 86  The case against constitutional 
interpretation in the context of entrenched and judicially enforced 
constitutional laws does not necessarily translate into opposition to the role 
of constitutional interpretation identified in this thesis. However, the 
connection relies upon political constitutionalism acknowledging that 
constitutional norms, especially constitutional law, play a positive role 
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within a political constitution. The idea that the political character of a 
constitution, and the form of constitutionalism it produces, depends on 
political debate within Parliament being free of substantive constitutional 
analysis is highly problematic, not least because it is unrealistic. Instead, 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation should be understood as an 
important component of constitutionalism within a constitution whereby the 
content of the constitution can be renegotiated within the legislative process.  
 
7.3 Three challenges  
There are a number of additional challenges to the connection between 
political constitutionalism and constitutional interpretation within 
Parliament that should be outlined at this stage. Firstly, parliamentary 
supremacy and the Government’s ability to disregard arguments based on 
constitutional analysis pose a challenge to the idea that parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation represents a form of constitutionalism at all. 
Secondly, it has been argued that it is incoherent to combine support for 
parliamentary supremacy with a positive case for constitutional 
interpretation within Parliament. Thirdly, advocating parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation could be interpreted as being too prescriptive 
for political constitutionalism.  
 
The first challenge is to the very idea that parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation within the context of a political constitution represents 
something which can be properly regarded as a form of constitutionalism. 
The principal problem is that the practice of parliamentary constitutional 
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interpretation is fundamentally conditioned by parliamentary supremacy, in 
the sense that the principles subject to interpretation do not rely on any 
formally superior status, and are not entrenched. For Murkens, the concept 
of constitutionalism should not be divorced from these constitutional 
features that the UK constitution does not possess.87 Murkens argues that 
constitutionalism should not refer to the political process of ‘self-limitation’ 
using constitutional norms. 88  As a consequence Murkens argues that 
constitutionalism is something that the United Kingdom’s constitution 
lacks:  
The centrality of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty poses a 
particular obstacle for constitutionalism which “implies 
entrenchment, whatever form that entrenchment may take.” But the 
cardinal principle of the United Kingdom’s constitution precludes 
entrenchment and is, therefore, incompatible with 
constitutionalism.89 
Kahana also argues the two ideas are fundamentally incompatible. He states 
that parliamentary supremacy is the equivalent of ‘non-constitutionalism’.90 
The fact the United Kingdom’s constitution does not have superior or 
‘fundamental’ status in relation to statute law is, in this sense, incompatible 
with a major tenet of a number of forms of liberal constitutionalism.91 
According to certain accounts of liberal constitutionalism, constitutional 
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government requires that the constitution contain protections, which mean 
that that it cannot be changed via the ordinary political process.92 Whereas 
as political constitutionalism implies that entrenchment shackles democracy, 
defenders of entrenchment as a fundamental part of constitutionalism argue 
that constitutional protection of constitutional procedures and rights is 
logically a part of democracy.93 
 
Two main points arise from this view of the relationship between 
entrenchment and constitutionalism. The first is that while opposition to 
certain forms of constitutional entrenchment is a defining feature of political 
constitutionalism, political entrenchment of constitutional norms is not 
necessarily incompatible with political constitutionalism. To require 
political constitutionalism to include certain forms of constitutional 
entrenchment would appear to place a limit on the range of forms of 
constitutionalism, which would result in an unduly narrow view of the 
concept.94 The second is that whatever conception of constitutionalism is 
preferred, the influence of the concept within a constitutional system 
necessarily extends beyond the presence of certain constitutional and 
institutional features, and filters into the way in which primary legislation is 
debated within the legislature. For constitutional norms to be effective and 
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to have the minimum level of relevance which any version of 
constitutionalism demands, they need to able to be interpreted by political 
actors. In other words, all forms of constitutionalism, even those that 
prescribe constitutional entrenchment, rely upon the interpretation of 
constitutional norms taking place outside the context of formal amendment 
procedures or judicial review. Without it, the normative content of the 
constitution cannot shape debate on primary legislation and political 
accountability. 
 
Political constitutionalism can be distinguished from certain forms of liberal 
constitutionalism by the fact that the former advocates a more fragile form 
of protection for constitutional norms. This chapter argues that political 
constitutionalism, like certain accounts of liberal constitutionalism, should 
advocate parliamentarians using the substance of constitutional norms in the 
legislative process. The problem with the idea that parliamentary supremacy 
is incompatible with constitutionalism is that it implies that the reality of 
political practice is irrelevant to the assessment of the presence and form of 
constitutionalism. 95  Parliamentary supremacy should not supersede 
evidence of practices that are associated with constitutionalism, just as 
constitutional entrenchment should not, in of itself, indicate that the reality 
of political practice fits with any form of constitutionalism. Murkens is right 
to warn that parliamentary supremacy is an obstacle to establishing a 
connection between certain form of liberal constitutionalism and the UK 
constitution. One of the strengths of political constitutionalism is that it does 
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not make this mistake, and accounts for parliamentary supremacy, and 
defends a weaker form of protection for constitutional norms than is 
afforded by systems with constitutional supremacy.  
 
Dyzenhaus puts forward a second challenge to the connection between 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation and political constitutionalism. 
Dyzenhaus argues that it is incoherent to combine support for parliamentary 
supremacy and constitutional interpretation. The first part of Dyzenhaus’ 
critique is to point out that political positivism rejects constitutional 
interpretation in any forum: 
Political positivists do not traditionally argue for an enhanced role 
for legislatures in constitutional interpretation as an independent 
good. That is because they are altogether opposed to constitutional 
interpretation, by which I mean interpretation of allegedly 
fundamental principles of legal order. Indeed, the very idea that 
there are such principles, whoever is to interpret them, is anathema 
to political positivism. 96 
This means, according to Dyzenhaus, that political positivisms’ position is 
coherent. By contrast, what Dyzenhaus calls ‘constitutional positivism’ is 
incoherent because it opposes constitutional interpretation in the context of 
strong judicial review, but defends it in the legislative context. The second 
half of Dyzenhaus’ critique is that ‘constitutional positivists think that an 
enhanced role for legislatures is a zero sum affair – what the legislature 
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gains, the judges must give up’.97 Dyzenhaus argues that the problem with 
this equation is that an enhanced role for legislatures becomes possible only 
as a consequence of the judicial role that political positivists traditionally 
dislike.98 According to Dyzenhaus, the case for parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation cannot fit with the case against judicial review. Parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation goes hand in hand with judicial constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
Dyzenhaus’ critique is important because it highlights a tension within 
political constitutionalism. There is a certain uneasiness within political 
constitutionalism about the ability of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation to increase the influence of courts within the legislative 
process. This is especially apparent when political constitutionalists engage 
with the role of constitutional rights within Parliament. Bellamy argues the 
rights-based scrutiny in Parliament is problematic to the extent that it leads 
to parliamentarians ‘governing like judges’ by privileging the view of the 
JCHR’s legal adviser, whose advice largely consists of ‘second-guessing the 
likely judgments of courts’.99 This leads to the observation that ‘to the 
extent Parliament feels constrained by legalistic reasoning over its rights 
deliberations, this alleged advantage of political over legal constitutionalism 
is diminished’.100 Bellamy’s point appears to be that the political character 
of rights scrutiny depends on parliamentarians not being constrained by the 
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judgments of courts. The problem with this point, that Bellamy himself 
concedes, is that it is difficult to see how in reality Parliament can be said to 
be constrained by either the role of the legal adviser or the judgments of the 
courts. Both the legal adviser of the JCHR and Parliament are focused on 
different tasks and questions to judges, and this makes it difficult to see how 
they can in reality be said to ‘reason like judges’. Bellamy seems concerned 
that the focus on norms that are regularly interpreted by judges might limit 
the autonomy of the political process. Bellamy, like Griffith, submits that 
the interpretation of constitutional rights will transform competing political 
claims into legal questions that are decided by judges. But if they wish to 
see political actors dominate debates on the meaning of constitutional rights, 
parliamentarians have to be able to engage in constitutional interpretation so 
that they can disagree effectively with courts. Bellamy admits that the 
reality of the role of the JCHR and the HRA in the legislative process does 
not support the ‘governing like judges’ argument, and that on the contrary 
both have promoted ‘precisely the sort of legislative deliberation about 
rights political constitutionalists advocate’. 101  Despite this, Bellamy’s 
uneasiness demonstrates that if political constitutionalism is to advocate a 
positive role for parliamentary constitutional interpretation it might need to 
revaluate some of its criticism of constitutional interpretation in courts. 
 
The third and final challenge relates to the extent to which political 
constitutionalism can prescribe how political actors should act. Gee and 
Webber point out that a feature of political constitutionalism is that it does 
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not prescribe in too much detail the content or the nature of the 
constitution.102 In this sense political constitutionalism might not be able to 
support the practice of parliamentary constitutional interpretation, because it 
is too detailed a prescription of how the constitution should work. If the 
constitution should remain open to negotiation via the legislative process, 
then it would not make sense for political constitutionalism to prescribe, in 
detail, the content of the constitution or how the constitution should be 
interpreted. However, Gee and Webber also point out that the absence of 
detailed prescription does not mean that political constitutionalism is neutral 
as to the content of the constitution or as to how constitutional actors use 
it. 103  Political constitutionalism does prescribe certain features of 
constitutional design and certain approaches to constitutionalism, and this is 
what makes it a normative model. The question is whether there is space for 
it to prescribe that constitutional issues arising in Bills should be engaged 
with in a particular way, within the legislative process. This depends on how 
political constitutionalism’s fundamental commitment to the negotiability of 
the constitution through the legislative process is interpreted. It would be 
contradictory for political constitutionalism to argue for judicially 
enforceable and entrenched constitutional laws that dictate the substance of 
primary legislation and how parliamentarians should legislate.104 But if the 
prescription is limited in the sense that it identifies how a particular element 
of the political constitution should work, rather than identifying a condition 
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of substantive constitutionality, then political constitutionalism can 
prescribe how parliamentarians should act.   
 
The difficulty for political constitutionalism is that it is associated with 
claims about limiting the scope of law and the courts within politics. At first 
sight this seems to leave little room for a positive role for constitutional 
norms within Parliament. Another related difficulty is that political 
constitutionalism is primarily associated with the identification of features 
that a constitution should not possess, entrenched constitutional laws and 
strong judicial review, and less clear about what it advocates. For political 
constitutionalism to become a stronger model that is relevant to modern 
constitutional practice in the UK, it needs to be able to accommodate 
positive arguments for the role of constitutional norms within the political 
process. Put differently, political constitutionalism needs to articulate a 
positive form of constitutionalism, which clearly outlines the advantages of 
political engagements with the substance of constitutional norms in both 
Parliament and the courts. The next section seeks to show how political 
constitutionalism would be strengthened by including a positive role for 
constitutional norms, and constitutional law, within the primary law making 
process in Parliament.  
 
7.4 Constitutional politics and political constitutionalism 
A positive case for parliamentary constitutional interpretation could 
strengthen political constitutionalism and, at the same time, enable the 
model to provide a framework for debates on how the role of the practice 
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can be enhanced. Political constitutionalism argues that the parliamentary 
process should be trusted with the last word on questions of constitutionality 
and defends the ability of political actors to uphold constitutional values. 
Nevertheless, there are weaknesses in political constitutionalism’s account 
of constitutional politics, in particular its failure to put forth a positive and 
distinctive role for constitutional law within a political constitution. This 
section sets out how including the case for parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation can remedy those weaknesses by providing a dynamic and 
positive role for constitutional norms within Parliament.  
 
To make political constitutionalism more relevant to the reality of 
constitutional democracies, political constitutionalism should provide an 
account of how questions relating to the law of the constitution should be 
addressed within the legislative process. Political constitutionalism is clear 
that mirroring the approach of courts should be avoided, but that is not 
sufficient to provide much of a framework for assessing the reality of 
parliamentary practice.105 Political constitutionalism’ reluctance to advocate 
a positive role for the interpretation of constitutional laws within Parliament 
can be in part attributed to the idea that the role of constitutional law is to 
establish procedures rather than guide the judgment of political actors 
within the political process. Political constitutionalism is in favour of 
political disagreement on the meaning of constitutional principles, so that 
the constitution and the political process can be reformed via ordinary 
politics, but at the same time is ambivalent about whether constitutional 
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norms should be considered a positive force within the political process. 
Goldoni argues that this is problematic because ‘constitutional law cannot 
be completely proceduralised’.106  
 
The logic of the procedural understanding of democracy is that it increases 
the autonomy of politics, but the problem is that for a political culture to 
function effectively the architecture must play some positive role in guiding 
the political culture and the substantive debate on legislative proposals 
within Parliament. This positive influence does not conflict with the idea 
that constitutional norms should be subject to change and to disagreement. 
In other words political constitutionalism, in order to be more relevant to the 
reality of constitutional practice needs to recognise the normativity of 
constitutional law and its relevance to the law-making process and to 
political accountability: 
This conception of a constitution as either a norm or a process 
betrays, however, a misunderstanding of the nature of higher law 
and implausible reading of the workings of political institutions. The 
latter certainly do not operate in a vacuum, but they have to respect 
some already established rules if they want to produce outcomes. In 
fact there is a risk of giving the impression that political action can 
stream out of nothing. In this way constitutional law is reduced, as 
famously argued by John Griffith, to “what happens.” In other 
words, this approach may end up adopting an almost functionalist 
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stance on constitutionalism and reducing its normativity to a bare 
minimum.107 
Constitutionalism in any setting, and especially in the legislative process, is 
not reducible to a choice between normativity and process. All constitutions 
will be made up of normative content, even if they operate in the context of 
parliamentary supremacy. One of the most positive elements of prioritising 
constitutional norms within a political constitution is that it can enhance the 
ability of parliamentarians to defend and develop the role of political 
institutions and processes. To return to the observation of Garrett and 
Vermeule political procedures are a rich source of normative constitutional 
analysis that is directly relevant to the process of shaping primary 
legislation in Parliament.108 In this sense, substantive constitutional analysis 
within a parliamentary context can promote the very values that define 
political constitutionalism. 
 
The ability of parliamentary constitutional interpretation to effectively 
translate the principles that underpin political procedures into substance 
analysis of Government Bills was shown in the case studies. In particular, 
the practice served to relate debate on the detail of a Bill to broader 
constitutional principles, often relating to the proper role of Parliament 
within the constitution. One of the other reasons that including a positive 
case for constitutional interpretation would enhance political 
constitutionalism is that it would reflect a more realistic appreciation of the 
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nature of the legislative process within Parliament. The legislative process is 
not primarily a policy forum. After the second reading stage, disagreement 
and debate is focused upon the content of the Bill in question, and in this 
context constitutional and legal norms are relevant, with or without 
entrenchment or strong judicial review. Political constitutionalism’s 
preoccupation with entrenchment appears to be a distraction from 
identifying a clear sense of how constitutional politics should work within 
Parliament. The idea that the absence of constitutional entrenchment will 
result in a more ‘open’ process is deceptive when the practical restrictions 
on parliamentary law-making within a constitution with parliamentary 
supremacy are considered. As Goldoni explains:  
Political constitutionalists present this freedom in a partially 
deceptive way. In fact, their view can turn out to be closing, rather 
than opening up, politics. On one hand, political action does not take 
place in a vacuum, neither can it be conceived as fully unfettered. As 
mentioned, there is always a common world against which political 
action emerges. This common world is usually organised through a 
political regime which carries with it principles, rules and practices. 
This background brings also with it a certain amount of arbitrariness, 
with cognitive biases, permanent subalternities and given power 
equilibriums. For the quality of representative lawmaking is better to 
bear this in mind, rather than overlooking it.109 
In a political constitution, many constitutional norms will represent the 
product of earlier political compromise, sometimes negotiated within 
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Parliament, and it is important that the majority of the day engages with the 
reasons that supported the earlier law in order to consider the widest range 
of perspectives on the proposed change to the constitution. There are good 
reasons for rejecting formalised entrenchment and other mechanisms which 
limit the ability of the current majority to alter the constitution, but at the 
same time political constitutionalism should recognise that legislation with 
constitutional effect creates a distinct challenge for the legislative process. 
The interpretation of constitutional norms represents a form of reasoning 
that allows Parliament to respond to that challenge effectively, and at the 
same time reinforce the political character of the constitution. 
 
Political constitutionalism has not yet developed a clear case for how 
constitutional politics should operate within a political constitution, or what 
role, if any, the substance of constitutional norms should play in shaping 
debates on the constitutional effect of primary legislation. Political 
constitutionalism passionately defends the value of political procedures, 
including the parliamentary law-making in defending the legislative 
process. A political model of constitutionalism should therefore recognise 
that political debate on questions that relate to the constitutional norms that 
underpin political procedures should produce distinct requirements for those 
very political procedures. A key problem identified by Goldoni is that 
political constitutionalism is unwilling to recognise that constitutional 
norms can be recognised as signifying a need for a distinct form of politics: 
For political constitutionalists all politics is constitutional, and 
ordinary politics marks the beginning and the end of the spectrum of 
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political action, the anchoring of the superior validity of 
constitutional norms in the special character of constitutional politics 
is unacceptable.110  
An important insight from the analysis of the case studies is that a flat 
constitutional structure, where there is no formal procedure for 
constitutional amendment, can accommodate a distinct track for the 
consideration of constitutional issues within the ordinary legislative process. 
The argument in this thesis is that what distinguishes this track is the 
substance of the parliamentary reasoning, which uses constitutional 
interpretation. In other words, constitutional issues can be treated in a way 
that recognises their importance that does not require legal recognition that 
constitutional norms are formally superior. 
 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation enables political 
constitutionalism to respond to Gardbaum’s criticism that the model 
‘provides no adequate forum for critically scrutinising the justification for a 
piece of legislation to determine if it meets the minimum standard of 
plausibility in terms of public reasons’.111 Political constitutionalism should 
entail that within Parliament legislative proposals are evaluated in the light 
of the constitutional norms that underpin the political process. 
Constitutional norms are understood differently within a political 
constitution, as compared to other models of constitutionalism, they do not 
                                                
110 Goldoni, ‘Two internal critiques of political constitutionalism’ (n 107) 
943.  
111 Gardbaum (n 6) 55.  
 324 
represent criteria of legality or higher law, but they can still be recognised as 
a criteria for evaluating legislative proposals.112  
 
The justification for regarding certain norms as constitutional within a 
political constitution is to provide a ‘site’ for debate. Constitutional norms 
trigger debate within Parliament by alerting to parliamentarians to clauses 
that are potentially renegotiating the terms of the constitution. This is the 
core of the case for the practice of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation that currently operates within the Westminster legislative 
process. Parliamentary constitutional interpretation should be promoted 
through the institutional structure of the legislative process and the 
constitution, to ensure that the negotiation of the constitution includes 
justification based upon the impact on the relevant constitutional principles. 
As Feldman has recently observed, such special procedures ‘foster the 
growth of constitutionalism as a form of politico-legal justification for 
action’.113 The crucial point is that, as Feldman recognises, this can be 
achieved without risking the key elements of political constitutionalism.114 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation, in the form described above, 
does not necessarily secure just outcomes – but it can improve the 
legitimacy of the legislative process, and the process of enacting 
constitutional change within a political constitution. This fits with Goldini’s 
account of political constitutionalism’s position on public reasoning: 
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Political constitutionalists put forward a proceduralist conception of 
public reasoning. The function of public reasoning is not so much 
that of justifying political decisions, as claimed by Rawls, but rather 
that of providing for input legitimacy. The ambition of a 
proceduralist version of public reasoning is captured by the idea that 
it does not generate outcomes we agree with, but rather that ‘it 
produces outcomes that all can agree to’. The best way to obtain this 
kind of reasoning is to follow the republican principle of ‘hearing 
the other side’, a principle which establishes a difference between 
oppression and domination.115  
For political constitutionalism the value of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation to the political process is in part based on the direct 
connection between constitutional norms and the function of a Parliament in 
a political constitution. In a political constitution, parliamentarians are the 
guardians of the nature of the constitution, and as a consequence they can 
contribute to the legitimacy of the process of constitutional change, and the 
political nature of that change, by using their position to contribute to the 
justification of provisions with constitutional effect.  
 
Rather than diminishing the scope of political debate, the value of 
constitutional interpretation to the legislative process and to political 
constitutionalism is that it serves to expand the basis of disagreement and 
political debate within the legislative process. The debate on a Government 
Bill is not restricted by the recognition that constitutional norms are relevant 
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to evaluating and scrutinising its contents. Many clauses cannot be opposed 
or scrutinised on the basis of party politics, as there might not be any policy 
disagreement on the detail of the Bill. In these cases, constitutional 
interpretation supplies additional grounds for disagreement and debate. 
Constitutional interpretation can serve to break open a debate on particular 
clauses by linking the detail and substance of a Bill to broader constitutional 
principles, as in the debate on the Health and Social Care Bill.116 The most 
important contribution of parliamentary constitutional interpretation is to 
enable parliamentarians to hold the Government to account for the 
constitutional effect of its legislative proposals. The substance of 
Parliament’s analysis of legislation is relevant to the standard of political 
accountability. Free and open policy debates have a role within Parliament, 
but an equally important component of legislative debate relies on the 
ability to analyse how a proposal fits within the existing constitutional and 
legal framework. Recognising the value of constitutional analysis in 
Parliament does not imply that political action needs to be contained. 
Instead, it is acknowledged that within the context of a legislative process 
whereby a legislative proposal can undermine the political processes that are 
central to the legitimacy of the constitutional system, the Government needs 
to be asked difficult questions about the constitutional effect of its Bill, and 
parliamentarians need to be able to interpret the norms that underpin those 
processes to formulate appropriate questions. Thought of in this way, the 
political process is strengthened by the use of constitutional norms as 
criteria for the evaluation of legislative proposals.  
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Parliamentary constitutional interpretation provides a guide as to how 
Parliament can and should respond to the vulnerability of the constitutional 
settlement under a political constitution. This will address a problem within 
political constitutionalism. Goldoni explains that until recently ‘political 
constitutionalists have not taken the limited self-reflexivity of parliamentary 
reasoning seriously’. 117  Political constitutionalism has failed to 
acknowledge the weaknesses of the parliamentary deliberation, and how 
such weaknesses can impact upon the political constitution. Waldron’s 
recent evidence to the JCHR on the issue of prisoner voting, also explores 
this weakness: 
The position that I defend, the misgivings I have about judicial 
review and the democratic basis that I embrace as a foundation of 
that position run into their deepest challenge when the majoritarian 
institution is actually addressing the basis its own electoral 
credentials. It runs into the deepest challenge where the parliament is 
actually addressing the right to vote and the integrity and 
continuance of the electoral and democratic process. . . Parliament’s 
legitimacy and supremacy in our constitution is not based upon 
history and is not an abstract proposition; it is based on the fact that . 
. . Parliament has electoral credibility. Parliamentary decision-
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making and legislation is legitimate because people have the right to 
vote, not the other way round. Parliament is a guardian of that.118 
Goldoni makes a similar point:  
The most serious challenge for the parliamentary style of lawmaking 
is that the legitimacy of this principle (parliamentary sovereignty) is 
contingent upon the integrity of the electoral and democratic 
process.119 
Political constitutionalists do not advocate parliamentary sovereignty being 
used as a justification for the weakening of the democratic process.120 
However, it would not be coherent for political constitutionalism to tackle 
this vulnerability via entrenchment or constitutional supremacy.121 Instead 
the answer is to bolster the ability of political institutions to engage with the 
normative foundations of the constitution. The legitimacy of the legislative 
process is enhanced when it takes changes to the constitution seriously, and 
it is in the long-term interests of the political constitution that the legislative 
process should enact legislation as legitimately as possible. If the 
vulnerability of the constitution is taken seriously then this will strengthen 
the case for leaving it open to negotiation via the ordinary legislative 
process.  
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One of the ways that parliamentary constitutional interpretation benefits 
from the fragility of the protection of constitutional norms within a political 
constitution is that it enables parliamentarians to shape constitutional 
meaning in response to constitutional change. In a more rigid constitutional 
settlement, whereby the meaning of the constitution was dominated by the 
courts and was less susceptible to amendment, parliamentarians would have 
less scope to contribute to the meaning of the constitution. The case studies 
showed that through constitutional protection clauses and committee 
reports, parliamentarians are able to set out new interpretations of 
constitutional principles that means that the content of constitutional norms 
keeps pace with the Government’s priorities. The negotiability of the 
constitution provides a space for constitutional analysis, which is now 
beginning to be used systematically. In practice the political influence of 
these contributions to the meaning of the constitution is at the mercy of the 
majority, however, this does not mean that they are necessarily ignored.  
 
Political constitutionalism is, at its core, the case for a fragile constitutional 
settlement. The problem is that within a political constitution, this fragility 
does not necessarily translate into the open debate on the constitutional 
settlement that political constitutionalism advocates. If the role and meaning 
of constitutional norms is not appreciated within the political culture, then 
they are unlikely to be subject to debate, even if they are relevant to 
proposed changes to the law. Such a failure is problematic for political 
constitutionalism as it relies on the quality of the parliamentary process to 
maintain the case for the weak protection of the norms that underpin the 
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political process. As a consequence, political constitutionalism needs to 
create a more positive role for constitutional norms in guiding debate on 
primary legislation in Parliament. The result is a more balanced model of 
constitutionalism that is in a better position to inform how Parliament can 
play an enhanced role in constitutional debate. 
 
Conclusion  
Constitutional interpretation should play a part in the legislative process in 
all constitutional democracies, but the expectations of its role in the UK 
constitution are unclear and uncertain, in part because it might be assumed 
that the absence of an entrenched constitution and the presence of 
parliamentary supremacy would limit the practice’s relevance to primary 
law-making in Parliament. The very conditions that underpin political 
constitutionalism would seem to determine the marginal relevance of the 
practice. However, having identified that its role is more than marginal in 
the case studies, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that political 
constitutionalism offers the most promising normative foundations for the 
practice. To do this, political constitutionalism needs to innovate and 
develop a clearer sense of the way in which constitutional politics should 
occur within Parliament. Political constitutionalism need not fear the 
substantive influence of constitutional norms upon primary legislation 
within the context of the majoritarian decision-making process within 
Parliament. Even if a constitution places the primacy of the parliamentary 
legislative process at the apex of the system, it enhances the credibility of 
that particular model to recognise that the norms that constitute the system 
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can play a positive political role, both in terms of holding the Government 
to account and in terms of making a difference to the scrutiny and content of 
legislation. The sort of political action that defines Feldman and Hunt’s 
conception of constitutionalism, referred to in Chapter 6, can form part of 
the political model. 
 
Political constitutionalism’ demand that a constitution is open to change 
through the legislative process need not prevent ‘the influence of previous 
constitutional settings’ from having any influence on how laws are 
made’. 122  For political constitutionalism to be effective, it needs 
parliamentarians to be proactive in their approach to developing the 
meaning of constitutional norms in the legislative context. There are signs 
that in the UK, parliamentarians are beginning to take this task seriously. 
The real difficulty is whether this will have a significant impact upon the 
Government. The political nature of the constitution may not require the 
substance of primary legislation to conform to the conditions of 
constitutionality, but if the Government cannot be prompted to justify the 
constitutional effect of its legislation within Parliament, then the political 
form of constitutionalism is not operating as it should.  
 
The nature of the constitution, and the institutions and the procedures that it 
creates, are central to the form of constitutionalism that operates within any 
constitutional context. It makes sense to maintain a clear divide between 
those constitutions that keep the substance of the constitution within the 
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grasp of the standard legislative procedure and those that create significantly 
higher legal hurdles, via entrenchment or strong judicial review. 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation shows that within the former, 
there is much that can be done to recognise the distinct needs of legislative 
proposals with constitutional effect that does not endanger the negotiability 
of the constitution, on the contrary it strengthens both the process and 
substance of negotiating the constitution within Parliament. The next 
question is what more can be done to improve the constitutional and 
institutional conditions that sustain constitutional interpretation within 
Parliament? How can they be improved without sacrificing the features that 
secure the political character of the practice? These are the questions 






Parliamentary constitutional interpretation has the potential to expand 
Parliament’s constitutional role. Within the existing framework, 
parliamentary constitutional interpretation raises the level of justification 
within the parliamentary legislative process and facilitates a distinctive 
parliamentary contribution to the normative content of the constitution. The 
practice serves to strengthen the negotiability of the constitution and 
broaden the scope of political debate, contributions which fit within the 
tenets of political constitutionalism. The current position of the practice in 
Parliament is underpinned by two institutional features: the effectiveness of 
parliamentary scrutiny in the House of Lords, which is a result of its current 
composition; and the presence of parliamentary committees dedicated to the 
task, particularly the Constitution Committee. At the same time, the detailed 
examination of the practice has revealed a number of factors within the 
process that appear to limit its potential influence. This concluding chapter 
has two aims. First, it shows how the value of constitutional interpretation 
can be used to judge parliamentary performance. Second, it sets out a 
number of options that could strengthen the role of constitutional 
interpretation within Parliament, without departing from the conditions that 
are vital to the political form of constitutionalism.  
 
Political constitutionalism makes the case against constitutional laws or 
institutional arrangements that might result in a substantive limit on the 
scope of political debate and the substance of primary legislation. Political 
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constitutionalism argues that democratic procedures, and particularly the 
legislative process, should not be subject to substantive limits. This 
argument against both strong judicial review and certain forms of 
entrenchment, and for a constitution that can be renegotiated via the 
legislative process, can be read as a defence of the United Kingdom’s 
existing constitutional arrangements. However, political constitutionalism 
does not provide a developed account of how the norms of the constitution 
should influence the legislative process, and this thesis has shown that 
constitutional interpretation does play an important role within Parliament. 
For a political constitution to function effectively, a whole range of 
constitutional norms, including those that constitute procedure, will guide 
the content of primary legislation. This does not mean that constitutional 
norms have to serve as limits on the legislative capacity of Parliament, but it 
does mean that constitutional interpretation should inform the process of 
negotiating the content of primary legislation within Parliament. By 
advocating a positive role for constitutional interpretation within 
Parliament, political constitutionalism can be used to judge parliamentary 
performance and to guide parliamentary reform. 
 
8.1 Evaluating parliamentary performance 
The potential contribution of constitutional interpretation within Parliament 
provides some basic criteria for evaluating how Parliament enacts Bills with 
constitutional effect. While many are rightly cynical about Parliament’s 
limited power over the Government, such concerns should not limit our 
expectations of what parliamentarians should do with the tools available to 
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them. Advocates of parliamentary reform bemoan the elements of the 
process that hamper parliamentary scrutiny, such as the absence of pre-
legislative scrutiny and the Government’s control of the timetable in the 
Commons. These concerns create quite clear prescriptions for how an ideal 
legislative process should work, and parliamentarians use these 
prescriptions to criticise the Government when these procedural 
expectations are not met. The preceding chapters have sought to show how 
a particular form of reasoning, constitutional interpretation, can be used to 
set certain expectations of the substance of parliamentary deliberation. 
 
In terms of raising the level of justification, three basic points can be used to 
evaluate Parliament’s substantive analysis of the constitutional effect of a 
Bill. Firstly, parliamentarians should use constitutional interpretation to 
challenge the Government’s justification for the constitutional effect of a 
Bill. If the Government does not put forward a justification at the outset of 
the parliamentary process, then parliamentarians and parliamentarians 
should put forward analysis of the constitutional effect of a Bill at the 
earliest opportunity. Secondly, the interpretation of the constitutional effect 
of a Bill should be supported by constitutive reasons that make reference to 
the existing constitutional framework. In other words, parliamentarians 
should explain the basis of their position on the constitutional effect of a 
Bill by identifying the relevant constitutional norms. Thirdly, 
parliamentarians should use amendments to frame the substance of their 
analysis of the constitutional effect of the Bill. This is critical to prompting 
the Government to developing its case for the constitutional effect of a Bill. 
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If it can be shown that a constitutional issue can be resolved via a workable 
amendment, then this makes it more likely to prompt justification from the 
Government and a potential concession.  
 
In terms of evaluating Parliament’s contribution to the substantive content 
of the constitution, three qualities are particularly relevant. Firstly, 
parliamentarians, and particularly parliamentary committee should be bold 
in their approach to analysing the constitutional effect of a Bill. They must 
not be afraid to address the ‘merits’ of a Bill. Parliamentarians and 
committees should develop innovative interpretations of established 
principles, or even establish new constitutional standards that can inform 
legislative scrutiny. Secondly, parliamentarians should use their 
understanding of the norms that underpin Parliament’s role in the 
constitution to develop their constitutional analysis. Parliamentary 
procedures, and the relationship between Government and Parliament are 
both regulated by a rich store of constitutional norms that Parliament bears 
the primary responsibility for interpreting and applying to primary 
legislation. Thirdly, parliamentarians should use the judgments of their 
predecessors, in various forms, to inform their analysis of a Bill. The case 
studies showed that committee reports, constitutional protection clauses and 
Hansard are all valuable sources for constitutional interpretation of the 
constitutional effect of a Bill.  
 
A proactive approach to developing the meaning of the constitutional norms 
in the legislative context serves to improve the strength of the practice in 
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relation to justifying the constitutional effect of a Bill. The quality and the 
depth of the parliamentary reasoning on significant constitutional questions, 
for example on the boundary between primary and secondary legislation or 
on the appropriate use of sunset clauses, makes a difference to 
parliamentarians’ ability to analyse such issues when they arise in debate. 
When a Bill is introduced at short notice which raises significant 
constitutional questions, parliamentarians can draw upon their previous 
analysis to enhance their scrutiny. In turn, a strong body of existing 
constitutional interpretation increases the ability of parliamentarians to 
influence the content of Government Bills. Clear positions on constitutional 
norms gives advance warning to Government, and also helps to build 
influence within parliamentary debate. For theses reasons, the presence of 
both of these elements of constitutional interpretation is central to 
Parliament’s ability to contribute effectively to the negotiation of the 
content of the constitution via the legislative process.  
 
8.2 Reform and justification 
In each of the case studies, the Government produced little by way of 
justification for the constitutional effect of the Bill when it was introduced 
to Parliament. None of the Bills covered, despite their significance, were 
subject to pre-legislative scrutiny. The explanatory notes to each of the Bills 
revealed little about the reasoning behind the substantive effect of the most 
constitutionally significant clauses. The speeches of Government Ministers 
at second reading went beyond the neutral language of explanatory notes, 
but often without any detailed analysis. The collective effect of this was that 
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by the time of the committee stage in the House where the Bill was first 
introduced, the parliamentarians engaged in detailed scrutiny did not have 
access to the Government’s reasoning behind the constitutional effect of the 
Bill. If an issue with constitutional effect was identified at the committee 
stage, then often there was little time to discuss or to debate an appropriate 
solution, which also limited the level of justification of the final version of 
the Bill. The general point is that identifying the constitutional issues and 
the Government’s reasoning to support the constitutional effect of a Bill at 
an early stage is critical to raising the level of justification within the debate.  
 
Each of the case studies contained examples of parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation being used as the basis for scrutiny which then prompted the 
Government to develop its reasoning for the constitutional effect of a Bill. 
In terms of justification, this prompting is key. There can be little doubt that 
without prompting the Government would not have directly addressed, for 
example, the implications of the Henry VIII powers in the Public Bodies 
Bill. One of the main ways in which the contribution of constitutional 
interpretation could be enhanced, is if the Government used constitutional 
interpretation itself to set out clearly the reasoning behind the constitutional 
effect within the Bill when the Bill is introduced to Parliament. In the 
human rights context, the JCHR has managed to persuade a number of 
Government departments to produced detailed human rights memorandums 
that set out the Government’s legal analysis of human rights issues relevant 
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to the Bill.1 Government disclosure of this advice can facilitate a ‘culture of 
justification’ within Parliament. In this context, human rights benefit from 
the fact that they are codified and that there is a body of case law to inform 
their application to legislative proposals. There is also no equivalent to 
section 19 of the HRA 1998 for constitutional norms other the relevant 
rights in the European Convention of Human Rights. However, these 
differences are not insurmountable. 
 
The comparison with s 19 formed part of the Constitution Committee’s 
analysis to support its recommendation for written ministerial statements on 
whether a Bill contains significant constitutional change, which would 
accompany the introduction of a Bill.2 If the Minister considered that a Bill 
contained significant change, the statement would address the following 
points: 
• what is the impact of the proposals upon the existing constitutional 
arrangements;  
• whether and, if so, how the government engaged with the public in 
the initial development of the policy proposals and what was the 
outcome of that public engagement;  
• in what way were the detailed policies contained in the bill subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny in the Cabinet committee system;  
• whether a green paper was published, what consultation took place 
on the proposals, including with the devolved institutions, and the 
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extent to which the government agree or disagree with the responses 
given;  
• whether a white paper was published and whether pre-legislative 
scrutiny was undertaken and the extent to which the government 
agree or disagree with the outcome of that process;  
• what is the justification for any referendum held, or to be held, on 
the proposals; and  
• when and how the legislation, if passed, will be subject to post-
legislative scrutiny.3  
The committee’s report is concerned with improving the process of 
constitutional change, and many of the points are clearly designed to 
address the scenario of a major constitutional reform Bill that is rushed 
through Parliament with little oversight. The steps recommended, such as 
pre-legislative scrutiny, would clearly enhance the opportunity for 
constitutional interpretation. But the most significant bullet point for the 
practice examined in this thesis is the first. In order to achieve a standard of 
justificatory accountability, the Government must put its case for the 
constitutional effect within the clauses of the Bill. At present this is often 
extracted from the Government gradually, and all too often late in the 
process. By formalising a requirement that the Government set out how the 
Bill would affect the existing constitutional arrangements, this would enable 
parliamentarians and parliamentary committees to use the Government’s 
constitutional interpretation to build their own analysis. The interpretability 
of the constitutional effect of a Bill depends upon the available authoritative 
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analysis. Parliamentary constitutional interpretation, like most legislative 
scrutiny, thrives on information on the Government’s position. The 
adversarial nature of parliamentary scrutiny is at its least effective when the 
Government withholds its analysis on the detail of a Bill. Hunt says that the 
quality of the information provided by the Government is the ‘single most 
important factor’ in determining effectiveness of the scrutiny of the JCHR.4 
 
In response to this proposal, the Government argued that much of this 
information, including on the impact on existing arrangements, is already 
included in the explanatory notes.5 One of the most significant points in the 
Government’s response was its negative reaction to the idea that the 
ministerial statement would refer to the detail of ‘internal government 
deliberations’.6 The Government added: 
A Bill when it is published is the collectively agreed view of the 
whole Government on how it wishes to proceed. The process by 
which it has arrived at that view is a matter for the Government, not 
for Parliament.7 
This appears to refer both to the nature of the process within Government, 
and also the substance of the reasoning that arrived at the decision. This 
attitude is emblematic of an approach that limits the level of justification 
which parliamentary constitutional interpretation can achieve. This 
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defensiveness and lack of openness within the democratic law-making 
process is highly problematic. On this evidence, any idea that coalition 
government would lead to a shift from majoritarian to a consensual 
approach within the legislative process was misplaced. One can appreciate 
that the Government may not want to reveal weaknesses or divisions to its 
political opponents. However, on questions relating to the constitutional 
effect of legislation, it seems strange to approach the Constitution 
Committee’s proposal in this way. When contrasted with alternative 
arrangements for formal constitutional change in other constitutional 
democracies, the Constitution Committee’s proposal is very modest.8 That 
is not to say that it would not represent a major improvement, but the 
strength of the disapproval from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
seems disproportionate when placed in comparative context. For example, 
as part of the ordinary legislative process the Swedish Government routinely 
receives independent legal advice on the constitutional effect of legislation 
in public from the Law Council.9  
 
The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (PCRC) in the House of 
Commons has also recently put forward a proposal designed to improve the 
level of information provided by Government to Parliament for the purpose 
of legislative scrutiny in its report ‘ensuring standards in the quality of 
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legislation’.10 The report notes that Parliament is often deprived of the 
information that it needs in order to scrutinise legislation.11 Part of the 
problem is that the explanatory notes, which are the main source of 
Government analysis of the legal effect of the detail of the Bill made 
available to Parliament, are of variable quality, and often add little to the 
understanding of the legal reasoning behind each clause.12 For this reason, 
the PCRC recommends that a code of legislative standards should be used to 
frame the explanatory notes and to ensure that they contain more of the 
information that is relevant to legislative scrutiny. The PCRC argued that 
the code would be particularly beneficial for constitutional legislation:  
Application of our draft Code of Legislative Standards would assist 
identification of constitutional legislation by ensuring the provision 
of relevant information. Thus, our Code would allow Parliament to 
determine whether it agrees with the Government’s decision that a 
particular bill, or part of it, is or is not constitutional.13 
The code contains a total of 37 standards, each of which demands the 
Government for specific information on the Bill. For example standard (k) 
asks for three or four lines on the policy objective on the Bill. If answered in 
good faith the responses to these standards would significantly increase the 
value of explanatory notes for legislative scrutiny in general, but would be 
particularly helpful for constitutional interpretation, which relies on detailed 
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knowledge of the legal effect of the Bill. Five of the standards in the PRC’s 
code would be particularly relevant for constitutional interpretation:  
(c) Does the bill in whole or in part affect a principal part of the 
constitution, and does it raise an important issue of constitutional 
principle? 
(y) A list of “marker clauses”, and a short explanation; 
(z) A list of clauses with retrospective application; 
(aa) A list of proposed areas for secondary legislation, with a note as 
to the relevant clauses; 
(bb) A list of Henry VIII powers.14 
Standard (c) is the standard used by the Constitution Committee to judge 
whether a constitutional issue raised by a Bill is worthy of a report. This 
standard, and the others which relate directly to important constitutional 
principles, would mean that Parliamentarians of both Houses are presented 
with the information necessary to engage in constitutional interpretation at 
the very outset. The level of justification improves when there are 
competing accounts of the constitutional effect of a Bill. By ensuring that 
the Government’s position is developed at an early stage, this would make a 
proper contest between competing interpretive accounts of the Bill more 
likely to develop. This information would be particularly beneficial to the 
House of Commons, which lacks both the legislative scrutiny committees 
and the level of legal expertise that help the Lords to identify and debate 
constitutional issues within Government legislation.  
 
                                                
14 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (n 10) Annex A. 
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Both of these proposals could enhance the contribution of parliamentary 
constitutional interpretation to the level of justification within the legislative 
process.  One of the problems that they are both seeking to address is the 
limited contribution of explanatory notes published alongside a Bill. One of 
the reasons that explanatory notes make such a limited contribution is that 
the Public Bill Office within Parliament, rather than Government, is 
responsible for their publication.15 As they are a parliamentary publication, 
there are restrictions upon the extent to which the notes can contain 
reasoning that attempts to justify the relevant clauses.16 The resulting notes 
illustrate the challenge of explaining the purpose of legislation in ‘politically 
neutral terms’.17 Hunt points out that this is problematic for human rights 
scrutiny.18 Proportionality analysis, which is central to the rights protected 
by the HRA 1998, requires precisely the sort of justificatory language that is 
not permitted by the rule on political neutrality. While a plain language 
explanation of a Bill is important, if the Government published explanatory 
notes directly, they could contain more information and justification for the 
detail in the Bill, and for any constitutional effect that the Bill might have. 
 
Legislative drafting in the UK is known and admired for its precision and 
clarity.19 That being said, some elements of the current approach seem to 
hinder legislative scrutiny and parliamentary constitutional interpretation. In 
particular, the absence of a culture of travaux preparatoires appears to 
                                                
15 D Greenberg, Laying Down the Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 227-234.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons, The 
Legislative Process (1997-98 HC 190) para 34.  
18 Hunt (n 4) 230.  
19 Greenberg (n 2) 35-44.  
 346 
hinder parliamentarians’ access to the reasoning that lies behind legislative 
detail. The absence of purpose clauses also contributes to this relative 
paucity of published official Government legal reasoning that accompanies 
Bills.20 Clear statements on the policy objectives behind a Bill are central to 
constitutional issues being identified and resolved within Parliament. In the 
case studies, a number of constitutional issues were resolved in part because 
it could be shown that they did not affect the immediate policy objectives 
behind the Bill. 
 
Another way that parliamentary constitutional interpretation’s contribution 
to the level of the justification could be enhanced is through changes to 
legislative scrutiny in the House of Commons. There have been many 
proposals put forward to reform Public Bill Committees, which is a 
reflection of the fact that they are recognised to be the weak point in the 
process.21 A number of these proposals, for example introducing permanent 
subject specialist committees would increase the Commons’ capacity to use 
constitutional interpretation effectively.22 There is a simple change that 
could be made, without major institutional reform, which could make a 
major difference to the ability of the Commons to engage in constitutional 
interpretation. The Commons Committee that covers the relevant 
department responsible for a Bill with constitutional effect could produce a 
report, as the PCRC did in the case study of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
                                                
20 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (n 10) 68.  
21 See Meg Russell, Bob Morris, Phil Larkin ‘Fitting the Bill: Bringing 
Commons Legislation Committees in Line with Best Practice’ (UCL 
Constitution Unit 2013) 9-18.  
22 Ibid.  
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2011. In that case, the report of the PCRC made a major contribution to the 
analysis of the constitutional effect of the Bill.23 While it is sometimes said 
that Commons select committees should focus on their core tasks, the PCRC 
report showed that in a relatively short period it could receive expert 
evidence and produce a high quality report that made a significant 
contribution to the debate on a constitutionally significant Bill. 
 
A final institutional reform that could enhance parliamentary constitutional 
interpretation would be to increase the level of legal expertise available 
within Parliament to support parliamentarians in their scrutiny of legislation. 
All three of the main legislative scrutiny committees that deal with 
constitutional issues within primary legislation, the Constitution Committee, 
the JCHR and the DPRRC, benefit from the presence of legal advisers. 
Further, in each of the case studies it was noted that parliamentarians with 
legal expertise were able to translate their interpretation of constitutional 
norms into amendments. Such practices are by no means the preserve of 
lawyers, but as legislative scrutiny is a part-time activity for most 
parliamentarians it is only logical to recognise that many would benefit 
from more parliamentary legal support.24 The Labour Party in the Lords has 
recently used ‘Cranborne money’ to develop a specialist legislative support 
                                                
23 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, The Fixed-term 
Parliaments Bill (HC 2010-12 436). 
24 D Feldman, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation and human rights’ 
[2002] Public Law 323, 327. 
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team, which serves to facilitate legislative analysis and the drafting of 
amendments.25 
 
8.3 Reform and negotiating the constitution within Parliament  
This section considers the role that a code of soft-law standards could play 
in improving parliamentarians’ ability to contribute to the negotiation and 
specification of constitutional norms. 
 
The PCRC’s aforementioned report calls for the creation of a Legislative 
Standards Committee that would review and amend the content of the code 
of standards described above.26 This would facilitate Parliament’s ability to 
develop constitutional standards. For example, it could add additional 
standards relating to other constitutional norms. However, the standards in 
the PCRC’s code are all informational; the PCRC deliberatively avoids 
substantive normative standards. The PCRC explains the reasons behind the 
decision to avoid obligatory language and substantive standards in the 
following terms: that ‘an objective set of quality standards’ is necessary ‘to 
compare and judge bills and Acts’, but it is important that the standards 
within the code are ‘politically neutral’.27 The Committee adds that the 
normative standards should ‘require policy to be explained by reference to 
the contents of the Bill, without questioning the substance of the policy’.28 
On one level, the PCRC’s approach can be interpreted as emphasis on the 
                                                
25 M Jack and TE May, Erskine May's treatise on the law, privileges, 
proceedings and usage of Parliament (24th edn, LexisNexis 2011) 74.  
26 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (n 10). 
27 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (n 10) para 55-58.  
28 Ibid.  
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party-political neutrality of such standards, and in that sense it is 
understandable to seek to avoid political controversy for the purpose of 
providing information in explanatory notes. However, this approach limits 
the potential contribution of parliamentarians to specify constitutional 
standards via a soft law code of standards. While this code would be a major 
contribution, particularly in terms of prompting the Government to provide 
more insight into its reasoning behind the constitutional effect of a Bill, it 
could be argued that the proposal is not ambitious enough. 
 
The focus on avoiding implications for the substance and policy of a Bill 
limits the potential of a soft code of constitutional standards. For example, if 
the Government introduces a Bill that grants a Minister an unfettered 
statutory power to abolish by order, with little parliamentary oversight, a 
public body established by primary legislation, where does the contents of 
the Bill end and the policy start? The legislative means are part of the 
policy. In other circumstances it may be possible to separate the two, but the 
fact that it is not a reliable distinction means that it should not provide the 
basis for the design of a code of standards. This anxiety to be seen to be 
politically neutral and to avoid commenting on the merits of legislative 
proposals is unwarranted because it dilutes the message communicated by 
the standards. One of the basic rationales of soft law legislative scrutiny 
standards is to create a set of normative principles that can be used by 
parliamentarians to engage in legislative scrutiny. A code should 
communicate to parliamentarians what the authors believe to be the 
principles that should be followed by Government within the legislative 
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process. In turn this should create an expectation that if a Government 
wishes to depart from such a principle then it should strive to justify the 
basis for such a departure. However, the language of justification was 
rejected by the PRC: ‘where proposed or existing scrutiny list criteria 
suggest requiring “justifications” to be provided or comment upon the 
“necessity” of provisions, we consider that such terms risk creating the 
appearance of subjectivity and have therefore altered the wording to be 
more neutral’.29 I do not think that a desire to be ‘neutral’ offers an adequate 
basis for omitting these terms. This language is needed to communicate the 
significance of departing from the norms in question. Legislation itself is 
not ‘neutral’ in this sense, so why should soft-law standards be any 
different? There is no getting away from the fact that procedural democratic 
norms, however they are designed, have implications for the substance of 
primary legislation and Government policies, as well as how the 
Government conducts itself within the parliamentary law-making process. If 
Parliament restricts itself to ‘politically neutral’ normative standards, it is 
limiting its ability to codify the form of norms that are regularly specified 
from constitutional principles within the Constitution Committee’s reports.  
 
In 2006, Oliver demonstrated that the work of the Constitution Committee 
could be used to extract a code of standards that could be used to enhance 
legislative scrutiny.30 A recently published report by the Constitution Unit 
contains a code of 126 standards based on all of the committee reports 
                                                
29 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (n 10) para 61.  
30 D Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: The Case for Standards and 
Checklists’ [2006] Public Law 219. 
 351 
published up until the end of the 2012-2013 session.31 The standards are 
organised into five separate categories: the rule of law; delegated powers, 
delegated legislation and Henry VIII clauses; the separation of powers; 
individual rights; and parliamentary procedure. The majority of the 
standards relate to the substance of primary legislation, they are all framed 
in obligatory language. If this form of code was adopted by the Constitution 
Committee or another Committee, it would enhance parliament’s ability to 
negotiate and specify the normative content of the constitution.  
 
In the case studies it was shown that legislative scrutiny presents 
parliamentary committees with the opportunity to build a body of 
constitutional interpretation, ‘legisprudence’, as Oliver terms it which can 
serve to enhance the Committee’s scrutiny work. A soft law code, such as 
that contained within the Constitution Unit’s report, updated at regular 
intervals, would enhance parliamentarians’ ability to shape the normative 
content of the constitution. A code of soft law standards would make this 
legisprudence more transparent and accessible for other parliamentarians. It 
would emphasise that the Committee specifies the meaning of constitutional 
norms in its scrutiny of Government Bills. A code would provide a 
reference point for the interpretation of the norms in the code, which would 
enable parliamentarians to draw connections and make comparisons in their 
legislative scrutiny of Government Bills. Most importantly, it would engage 
the Committee in an explicit process of specifying norms to inform 
                                                
31 J Simson Caird, R Hazell and D Oliver, ‘The Constitutional Standards of 
the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution’ (The Constitution 
Unit UCL 2014). 
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subsequent parliamentary scrutiny. The committee could then also adopt the 
format used by the JCHR in its reports, and set out clearly at the beginning 
of each report the relevant norms within the code that are being interpreted 
and applied to the Bill in question.32  
 
Conclusion 
Each of the proposals outlined above would enhance the interpretability of 
constitutional norms in the legislative context. Much more can be done to 
make the norms of the constitution more accessible to parliamentarians 
engaged in legislative scrutiny. One of the main findings of the case studies 
was that parliamentary constitutional interpretation is used as a basis for 
subsequent scrutiny. Constitutional interpretation that scrutinises clauses on 
a Bill is not simply valuable in terms of raising the standard of justification, 
it also serves an instrumental function of communicating the meaning of the 
constitutional effect of the clause. This communication can serve to inform 
subsequent debate on the enacted provision if it is repealed; it can also 
inform how parliamentarians approach the interpretation of comparable 
Bills, which raise similar issues of constitutional principle; and finally, if the 
analysis produces a constitutional protection clause, then this can serve as 
the normative basis of subsequent constitutional interpretation that informs 
parliamentary scrutiny. The key point is that if it is recognised that the 
political interpretability of a constitutional norm, including legislative 
provisions, is attributable to both its content and how that content is 
communicated, then parliamentary constitutional interpretation can be 
                                                
32 See for example Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: 
Immigration Bill (2013-14, HL 121, HC 935) paras 14-20.  
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understood as a tool which is central to the effectiveness of constitutional 
norms within the political sphere. Political constitutionalism must account 
for this positive role for constitutional norms, which is not necessarily about 
constitutional norms acting as limits, but instead is part of the process of a 
constitution serving to inform its own renegotiation. In this form of political 
constitutionalism, the substantive principles behind the constitutional 
structure play a key part in the construction of statutory provisions.  
 
Parliamentary constitutional interpretation is a practice that is building 
strength. As Parliament builds a track record of increasingly effective 
scrutiny, which results in the introduction of ‘constitutional protection 
clauses’ and other concessions that inform subsequent scrutiny, then the 
momentum could push the practice nearer the potential which I have sought 
to articulate in this thesis. But in order to continue to build this momentum, 
and to enhance the form of political constitutionalism within the UK 
constitution, more innovation is needed. Whatever major constitutional 
developments take place in the near future, Parliament will need to develop 
its capacity to interpret the normative foundations of the constitutional 
settlement, both in order to raise the justificatory standard in the legislative 
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